

1 XAVIER BECERRA  
 Attorney General of California  
 2 JULIE WENG-GUTIERREZ, SBN 179277  
 Senior Assistant Attorney General  
 3 CHRISTINA BULL ARNDT, SBN 175403  
 Deputy Solicitor General  
 4 R. MATTHEW WISE, SBN 238485  
 MICHELE L. WONG, SBN 167176  
 5 KARLI EISENBERG, SBN 281923  
 NIMROD P. ELIAS, SBN 251634  
 6 Deputy Attorney General  
 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000  
 7 San Francisco, CA 94102-7004  
 Telephone: (415) 703-5841  
 8 Fax: (415) 703-5480  
 E-mail: Nimrod.Elias@doj.ca.gov  
 9 *Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of California*

10 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
 11 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 12 OAKLAND DIVISION

15 **THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THE**  
 16 **STATE OF DELAWARE, THE STATE OF**  
 17 **MARYLAND, THE STATE OF NEW**  
**YORK, THE COMMONWEALTH OF**  
**VIRGINIA,**

18 Plaintiffs,

19 v.

20 **ERIC D. HARGAN, In His Official**  
 21 **Capacity as Acting Secretary of the U.S.**  
 22 **Department of Health & Human Services;**  
**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH**  
 23 **HUMAN SERVICES; R. ALEXANDER**  
 24 **ACOSTA, In His Official Capacity as**  
**Secretary of the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF**  
 25 **LABOR; STEVEN MNUCHIN, In His**  
**Official Capacity as Secretary of the U.S.**  
 26 **DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY;**  
**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE**  
**TREASURY; DOES 1-100**

27 Defendants.  
 28

4:17-cv-05783-HSG

**STATES' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS  
 AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION  
 TO MARCH FOR LIFE'S MOTION TO  
 INTERVENE**

Date: March 1, 2018  
 Time: 2:00 p.m.  
 Dept: 2, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor  
 Judge: Hon. Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr.  
 Trial Date: Not set.  
 Action Filed: October 6, 2017

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**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES****INTRODUCTION**

1  
2  
3 The March for Life Education and Defense Fund (“March for Life”) seeks to intervene in  
4 this case “in order to protect and defend its right to operate its organization in a manner consistent  
5 with its moral convictions and its reason for being, free from the imposition of potentially  
6 crippling fines.” Proposed Defendant-Intervenor’s Motion to Intervene, ECF No. 87 at 1. But the  
7 relief sought by the States will not require March for Life to violate its moral convictions and will  
8 not impose fines on it, because the permanent injunction prohibiting the federal defendants from  
9 enforcing the contraceptive mandate against March for Life remains in place. The States seek to  
10 enjoin the interim final rule (IFR) establishing a moral exemption to the contraceptive mandate,  
11 but that will not affect March for Life’s permanent injunction.<sup>1</sup> No relief granted by this Court  
12 can undermine that injunction in any way. March for Life has not cited any case permitting  
13 intervention for an intervenor with an injunction already protecting the interest at stake.

14 March for Life, moreover, has not shown that the federal defendants cannot adequately  
15 represent its interests in this litigation. By seeking to intervene as a defendant, March for Life  
16 plainly shares the “same ultimate objective” as the federal defendants—denial of the relief sought  
17 by the States. That gives rise to a presumption of adequate representation that requires a  
18 “compelling showing” to overcome. March for Life has not met—and cannot meet—that heavy  
19 burden. There is also a separate “assumption of adequacy when the government is acting on  
20 behalf of a constituency” that the intervenor represents. And that is precisely the situation here,  
21 where the federal defendants are promulgating the moral exemption on behalf of employers like  
22 March for Life. The IFR itself mentions March for Life at least 15 times in justifying this new  
23 rule, and there is no daylight between the federal defendants and March for Life with respect to  
24 their defense of the IFR. This is not a case where the federal defendants have staked out a legal  
25 position that compromises the interests of the intervenors.

26  
27  
28 <sup>1</sup> This Court’s preliminary injunction, issued yesterday, explicitly states that “[t]his nationwide injunction does not conflict with the plaintiff-specific injunctions issued by the courts in the *Zubik* cases or any other case.” See ECF No. 105 at 29.

1 Finally, permissive intervention should be denied because there is no common question of  
2 law or fact when March for Life does not need to rely on the IFR to protect its moral convictions  
3 because of the permanent injunction that it previously secured. The States do not question the  
4 sincerity or importance of March for Life's moral convictions. But it is neither necessary nor  
5 appropriate for March for Life to intervene in this lawsuit between the States and the federal  
6 government. The Motion to Intervene should be denied.

### 7 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED

8 Whether March for Life meets all of the requirements for intervention as of right under Fed.  
9 R. Civ. P. 24(a) or, in the alternative, whether the Court should grant permissive intervention  
10 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

### 11 ARGUMENT

#### 12 I. MARCH FOR LIFE DOES NOT MEET ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 13 INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT

14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) permits intervention as of right to one who  
15 "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so  
16 situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's  
17 ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest." The Ninth  
18 Circuit has established a four-part test pursuant to Rule 24: "(1) the application for intervention  
19 must be timely; (2) the applicant must have a 'significantly protectable' interest relating to the  
20 property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that  
21 the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to  
22 protect that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest must not be adequately represented by the  
23 existing parties in the lawsuit." *Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg*, 268 F.3d 810,  
24 817 (9th Cir. 2001). "Each of these four requirements must be satisfied to support a right to  
25 intervene." *Arakaki v. Cayetano*, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003).

26 The States concede that March for Life's Motion to Intervene is timely. However, March  
27 for Life has not met the remaining requirements for mandatory intervention.

28 ///



1 indeed, cannot—“contradict” any injunction issued by any other court. There is simply no factual  
2 basis for suggesting that the permanent injunction secured by March for Life could be imperiled  
3 by this lawsuit. Nor has March for Life cited any case permitting intervention for an intervenor  
4 that already *has* an injunction protecting the interest allegedly at stake in that lawsuit. March for  
5 Life lacks a significant protectable interest in this case, and therefore cannot meet the second  
6 requirement for mandatory intervention.

7 **B. Because March For Life Has a Permanent Injunction Preventing**  
8 **Enforcement of the Contraceptive Mandate Against It, the Disposition of**  
9 **This Action Will Not Impede Its Ability to Adhere to Its Moral Convictions**

10 For the same reason, March for Life cannot demonstrate that the disposition of this action  
11 will “impair or impede” its ability to adhere to its moral convictions. *Southwest Center for*  
12 *Biological Diversity*, 268 F.3d at 817. Because a permanent injunction prevents the government  
13 from enforcing the contraceptive mandate against March for Life, the outcome of this action will  
14 not impede March for Life’s ability to adhere to its moral beliefs. March for Life cannot meet  
15 this third requirement for mandatory intervention either.

16 **C. March for Life Has Not Shown that the Federal Defendants Cannot**  
17 **Adequately Represent Its Interests in this Litigation**

18 Finally, March for Life has not shown—and cannot show—that the federal defendants are  
19 unable to adequately represent its interests in this litigation. As a general rule, “[t]he burden of  
20 showing inadequacy of representation is minimal and satisfied if the applicant can demonstrate  
21 that representation of its interests may be inadequate.” *Citizens for Balanced Use*, 647 F.3d at  
22 898 (internal citation omitted). However, “[i]f an applicant for intervention and an existing party  
23 share the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation arises” and the  
24 applicant must make “a *compelling showing* of inadequacy of representation.” *Id.* (emphasis  
25 added.) Furthermore, “[t]here is also an assumption of adequacy when the government is acting  
26 on behalf of a constituency that it represents which must be rebutted with a compelling showing.”  
27 *Id.*; *see also Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Lucent*, 642 F.3d 728, 740 (9th Cir.  
28 2011) (“In the absence of a *very compelling showing* to the contrary, it will be presumed that the

1 state adequately represents its citizens when the applicant shares the same interest.”) (emphasis  
2 added.)

3 Two separate facts require March for Life to make a “compelling showing” that the federal  
4 defendants cannot adequately represent its interests. First, the federal defendants and March for  
5 Life (as a proposed defendant-intervenor) have the exact same ultimate objective: the complete  
6 denial of the relief that the States seek. Second, the federal government defendants are taking  
7 direct action on behalf of the constituency that March for Life represents: employers who object  
8 to the contraceptive mandate on moral grounds. *See* 82 Fed. Reg. at 47844 (October 13, 2017)  
9 (explaining that “these interim final rules expand exceptions to the contraceptive Mandate to  
10 protect certain entities and individuals that object to coverage of some or all contraceptives based  
11 on sincerely held moral convictions but not religious beliefs . . .”). In both of these  
12 circumstances, a proposed intervenor must make a “compelling showing” that the existing parties  
13 cannot adequately represent its interests. March for Life has not met that heavy burden.

14 **1. March for Life and the federal defendants share the same ultimate**  
15 **objective of denying the States the relief that they seek**

16 March for Life plainly shares the “same ultimate objective” as the federal defendants:  
17 denial of the relief sought by the States. *See* ECF No. 87 at 13 (acknowledging that “their  
18 ultimate goal may be the same” as the federal defendants); *see also* ECF No. 87-2 at ¶ 137  
19 (March for Life’s Proposed Answer “denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief whatsoever.”).  
20 By seeking to intervene as a defendant, March for Life *cannot* seek different relief or pursue any  
21 litigation objective aside from defending the legality of the IFRs—just like the federal defendants.  
22 Nor would differences in litigation strategy justify intervention. *See Arakari*, 324 F.3d at 1086  
23 (“Where parties share the same ultimate objective, differences in litigation strategy do not  
24 normally justify intervention”); *see also Department of Fair Employment and Housing*, 642 F.3d  
25 at 740 (same). Accordingly, March for Life “must make a compelling showing of inadequacy of  
26 representation” to rebut the presumption of adequacy that arises in such circumstances. *Citizens*  
27 *for Balanced Use*, 647 F.3d at 898. March for Life’s Motion to Intervene falls far short of that  
28 mark.

1 March for Life asserts that it maintains an “individual parochial interest” whereas “the  
2 federal government’s interest is far more expansive and generalized.” ECF No. 87 at 11-12. But  
3 that is the *inverse* of the situation in *Citizens for Balanced Use*, which March for Life cites in  
4 support of this proposition. In that case, conservation groups seeking to intervene requested “the  
5 broadest possible restrictions on recreational uses” while the Forest Service believed that “much  
6 narrower restrictions would suffice to comply with its statutory mandate.” *Citizens for Balanced*  
7 *Use*, 647 F.3d at 899 & n.4. Moreover, though nominally aligned with the government, the  
8 conservation groups were actually adverse to the Forest Service because its interim order was  
9 issued “under compulsion of a district court decision gained by [the conservation groups’]  
10 previous litigation” and was being appealed at that time. *Id.* at 899. Those factors collectively  
11 constituted a “compelling” showing that the government could not adequately represent the  
12 interests of the conservation groups.

13 Here, in contrast to *Citizens for Balanced Use*, the federal defendants and March for Life  
14 both seek to defend the broad scope of the moral exemption. March for Life is not advocating for  
15 a broader interpretation of this IFR than the federal defendants. Nor has March for Life described  
16 any specific reason why its interests diverge from the federal defendants’ interests, or highlighted  
17 any legal argument that it (but not the federal defendants) would make. And unlike *Citizens for*  
18 *Balanced Use*, the defendants and March for Life are not, in reality, adverse parties. To the  
19 contrary, the moral IFR references March for Life approximately 15 times when justifying this  
20 new rule. *See* 82 Fed. Reg. at 47838-47862 (October 13, 2017). This situation is also  
21 fundamentally different than *California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S.*, 450 F.3d 436, 445 (9th Cir. 2006)  
22 where the Ninth Circuit permitted intervention in light of “the presentation of *direct evidence* that  
23 the United States will take a position that actually compromises (and potentially eviscerates) the  
24 protections of the Weldon Amendment.” (emphasis added). The federal defendants here have  
25 not taken any position that compromises March for Life’s interests. On the contrary, they are  
26 vigorously defending those interests on behalf of March for Life and other similarly situated  
27 employers with moral objections to providing contraceptive healthcare coverage. *See* 82 Fed.  
28 Reg. at 47838-47862 (October 13, 2017).

1           The general rule is that that where the intervenor shares the same ultimate objective as an  
2 existing party, a strong presumption of adequacy arises and intervention is typically not justified.  
3 *Citizens for Balanced Use*, 647 F.3d at 898. This case is no exception. March for Life’s moving  
4 papers do not make a “compelling showing” sufficient to overcome that presumption. *Id.*

5           **2. March for Life has not made a “very compelling showing” to rebut**  
6           **the presumption that arises when the government acts on behalf of**  
7           **the constituency that the intervenor represents**

8           Even if this Court concludes that March for Life can overcome the presumption of  
9 adequacy that arises when an intervenor and an existing party share the same ultimate objective  
10 (and it should not so conclude), there is a separate “assumption of adequacy when the government  
11 is acting on behalf of a constituency that it represents.” *See Arakari*, 324 F.3d at 1086; *Citizens*  
12 *for Balanced Use*, 647 F.3d at 898. And that is precisely the situation in this case, where the  
13 federal defendants are promulgating the moral IFR on behalf of employers with moral objections  
14 to the contraceptive mandate, a constituency that includes March for Life. *See* 82 Fed. Reg. at  
15 47844 (October 13, 2017) (“These interim final rules incorporate conscience protections into the  
16 contraceptive Mandate.”) The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that “[i]n the absence of a very  
17 compelling showing to the contrary, it will be presumed that a state adequately represents its  
18 citizens when the applicant shares the same interest.” *Department of Fair Employment and*  
19 *Housing*, 642 F.3d at 744; *Arakari*, 324 F.3d at 1086 (same). March for Life’s Motion to  
20 Intervene does not come close to making the requisite showing.

21           March for Life asserts, in boilerplate fashion, that “the federal government’s ‘representation  
22 of the public interest’ is not ‘identical to the individual parochial interest’ of March for Life” and  
23 that this “distinction is sufficient, by itself, to merit a grant of intervention.” ECF No. 87 at 11-  
24 12. But March for Life does not offer even a single concrete example of how its interests, legal  
25 arguments, or litigation strategy diverge from those of the federal defendants in any way. *Id.*  
26 Moreover, it will always be the case that an individual’s interests are narrower than the  
27 government’s broader interests. If that was the legal standard, the government could *never*  
28 adequately represent the interests of a third party. But the law presumes the opposite when the

1 government is acting on behalf of the constituency that the proposed intervenor represents.  
2 *Arakari*, 324 F.3d at 1086; *Citizens for Balanced Use*, 647 F.3d at 898.

3 The Ninth Circuit’s relatively recent decision in *Department of Fair Employment and*  
4 *Housing* illustrates this principle. In that case, the California Department of Fair Employment  
5 and Housing (DFEH) brought an action claiming that a disabled employee was terminated in  
6 violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act. *Department of Fair Employment and*  
7 *Housing*, 642 F.3d at 735. The former employee moved to intervene as of right, claiming that  
8 DFEH could not adequately represent his interests because “DFEH litigate[s] in order to further  
9 the societal goal of ending discrimination, without regard to whether the result is the most  
10 advantageous that could be achieved on behalf of the individual victim.” *Id.* at 740. In other  
11 words, the former employee’s individual interests were narrower than the government’s broader  
12 interests. *Id.* But the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]his claim lacks merit” and “falls fall short of a  
13 ‘very compelling showing.’” *Id.* So too here. March for Life’s claim of having a “parochial”  
14 interest, without more, similarly falls short of making a “very compelling showing” that the  
15 federal defendants cannot adequately represent its interests in this matter.

16 The cases cited by March for Life are not to the contrary. In *Lockyer*, the Ninth Circuit  
17 found that the proposed intervenors made “a very compelling showing” that the federal  
18 government would not adequately represent its interests where the federal defendants had *already*  
19 filed a motion for summary judgment with a “limiting construction” of the statute that “actually  
20 compromises (and potentially eviscerates) the protections of the Weldon Amendment” claimed by  
21 the intervenors. *Lockyer*, 450 F.3d at 444. In *Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest*  
22 *Service*, 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 (9th Cir. 1995), *abrogated by Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Service*,  
23 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit permitted limited intervention to the State of  
24 Arizona and Maricopa County where the injunctive relief sought would directly affect them and  
25 the federal Forest Service had no “duty to represent” their unique interests in preventing the  
26 enjoining of all forest management activities in Arizona’s national forests. And in *California*  
27 *Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Nichols*, 275 F.R.D. 303, 308 (E.D. Cal. 2011), the district court  
28 found that the state agency defendant and the intervenor “were directly at odds on a number of

1 pertinent issues” and that the state agency defendant “is willing to compromise, and potentially  
2 eviscerate, the regulation in favor Plaintiff’s interests.” In contrast, the federal defendants in this  
3 case are not compromising March for Life’s interests or narrowing the scope of the IFR in any  
4 way; they are defending the moral exemption as vigorously as March for Life itself.

5 March for Life’s own cases demonstrate that it cannot make a “very compelling showing”  
6 that the government is unable to adequately represent its interests. March for Life cannot  
7 establish that it meets all four requirements for intervening as of right. The Motion to Intervene  
8 should be denied.

## 9 **II. THE COURT SHOULD DENY PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION**

10 In the alternative, March for Life requests permissive intervention on the same grounds as  
11 its requested intervention as a matter of right. *See* ECF No. 87 at 13-14. Under Fed. R. Civ. P.  
12 24(b)(1)(B), the Court may permit anyone to intervene who “has a claim or defense that shares  
13 with the main action a common question of law or fact.” In making this discretionary  
14 determination, “the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice  
15 the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). The district court has  
16 discretion “to limit intervention to particular issues” and “is able to impose almost any condition”  
17 if it permits intervention. *Department of Fair Employment and Housing*, 642 F.3d at 741.

18 The Court should deny permissive intervention for the same reasons that it should deny  
19 intervention as a matter of right. As outlined above, a principle reason is that March for Life does  
20 not need to rely on the moral IFR at issue in this lawsuit because the federal defendants are  
21 already permanently enjoined from enforcing the contraceptive mandate against it. In light of  
22 that permanent injunction, March for Life does not have “a claim or defense that shares with the  
23 main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). There is, moreover,  
24 every reason to believe that the federal defendants will adequately represent March for Life’s  
25 interests, as evidenced by the extensive discussion of March for Life and similarly situated moral  
26 objectors in the IFR itself. *See* 82 Fed. Reg. at 47838-47862 (October 13, 2017). March for  
27 Life’s intervention is unnecessary for the full and fair presentation of the legal issues involved in  
28 this lawsuit. Permissive intervention should be denied.

1 **III. IF IT PERMITS INTERVENTION, THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE REASONABLE**  
2 **CONDITIONS TO ENSURE THAT THE EXISTING PARTIES ARE NOT PREJUDICED**

3 At a minimum, if the Court permits March for Life to intervene, it should impose  
4 reasonable conditions to ensure that the original parties are not prejudiced by the intervention.  
5 First, the issues before the Court should not be broadened or enlarged. *See, e.g., Vinson v.*  
6 *Washington Gas Light Co.*, 321 U.S. 489, 498 (1944) (“an intervenor is admitted to the  
7 proceeding as it stands, and in respect of the pending issues, but is not permitted to enlarge those  
8 issues or compel an alteration of the nature of the proceeding.”) Second, there should be no delay  
9 in resolving the merits of the case. Third, there should be no duplicative or unnecessary  
10 discovery. *Department of Fair Employment and Housing*, 642 F.3d at 741; *cf.* ECF No. 87 at 11  
11 fn. 2 (March for Life seeks “to fully develop the factual record regarding the claim that its moral  
12 convictions somehow frustrate the ‘scheme and purpose’ of the ACA.”) Under no circumstances  
13 should intervention prejudice the existing parties.

14 **CONCLUSION**

15 For the foregoing reasons, the States respectfully request that the Court deny March for  
16 Life’s Motion to Intervene.

1 Dated: December 22, 2017

Respectfully Submitted,

2 XAVIER BECERRA  
3 Attorney General of California  
4 JULIE WENG-GUTIERREZ  
5 Senior Assistant Attorney General

*/s/ Nimrod P. Elias*

6 R. MATTHEW WISE  
7 KARLI EISENBERG  
8 MICHELE L. WONG  
9 CHRISTINA BULL ARNDT  
10 NIMROD P. ELIAS  
11 Deputy Attorneys General  
12 *Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of California*

13 MATTHEW P. DENN  
14 Attorney General of Delaware  
15 AARON R. GOLDSTEIN  
16 State Solicitor  
17 LAKRESHA S ROBERTS  
18 Chief Deputy Attorney General  
19 JESSICA M. WILLEY  
20 Deputy Attorney General  
21 *Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of Delaware*

22 BRIAN E. FROSH  
23 Attorney General of Maryland  
24 CAROLYN A. QUATTROCKI  
25 Deputy Attorney General  
26 STEVE M. SULLIVAN  
27 Solicitor General  
28 KIMBERLY S. CAMMARATA  
Director, Health Education and Advocacy  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of Maryland*

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN  
Attorney General of New York  
LISA LANDAU  
Bureau Chief, Health Care Bureau  
SARA HAVIVA MARK  
Special Counsel  
ELIZABETH CHESLER  
Assistant Attorney General  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of New York*

MARK R. HERRING  
Attorney General of Virginia  
SAMUEL T. TOWELL  
Deputy Attorney General  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff the Commonwealth of Virginia*