

Case No. 17-50282

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Fifth Circuit

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING AND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC.; PLANNED PARENTHOOD SAN ANTONIO; PLANNED PARENTHOOD CAMERON COUNTY; PLANNED PARENTHOOD GULF COAST, INC.; PLANNED PARENTHOOD SOUTH TEXAS SURGICAL CENTER; JANE DOE #1; JANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #7; JANE DOE #9; JANE DOE #10; JANE DOE #11,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

DR. COURTNEY PHILLIPS, in her official capacity as Executive Commissioner of HHSC; SYLVIA HERNANDEZ KAUFFMAN, in her official capacity as Inspector General of HHSC,

Defendants-Appellants.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas Austin Division
Case No. 1:15-cv-1058

***AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM'S EN BANC
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
AND URGING AFFIRMANCE***

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SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

17-50282

Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas, et al. v. Charles Smith, et al.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 29.2, the undersigned counsel for *Amici Curiae* certifies that the following persons and entities have an interest in the outcome of this appeal. These representations are made in order that the judges of this court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

1. National Health Law Program, *Amicus Curiae*. This organization is not a subsidiary of any other corporation and no publicly held corporation owns ten percent or more of the organization's stock.
2. Martha Jane Perkins is Counsel of Record for *Amici Curiae*.

Date: April 15, 2019

/s/ Martha Jane Perkins
Martha Jane Perkins

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INTEREST OF THE *AMICUS*¹

The National Health Law Program files this brief pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.

29. The National Health Law Program brings to the Court a commitment to advocate on behalf of low-income people, women, older adults, people with disabilities, and children. The National Health Law Program engages in research and provides education on a range of legal and policy issues affecting these populations, including health insurance coverage; health care delivery systems; access to comprehensive health care, including reproductive health care; and access to the courts. As such, the National Health Law Program has an interest in the outcome of this case, and its previously filed *amicus curiae* brief is in the record before this honorable Court. *See* Br. of the Nat'l Health L. Prog. et al. as *Amici Curiae* in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Urging Affirmance (Oct. 13, 2017), ECF No. 00514194904.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Medicaid is the largest public health insurance program for low-income people in the United States. Federal law requires all state Medicaid programs to cover family planning services and supplies. Low-income women enrolled in

¹ Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E), counsel for *amicus curiae* states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than *amicus curiae* made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. The parties consented to the filing of this brief.

Medicaid—nationwide and in Texas—depend on Planned Parenthood clinics for these family planning services and supplies, as well as for other services covered by Medicaid. Recognizing the importance of meaningful access to health services, including family planning services and supplies, Congress included a free choice of provider provision in the Medicaid Act. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A).

Whether a federal statute, such as section 1396a(a)(23)(A), is privately enforceable is a threshold inquiry. That question, if raised, must be answered before making inquiry into the precise scope or meaning of the right as applied to any particular set of facts.

The Supreme Court has a well-established test for determining when a federal statute creates rights that are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The free choice of provider provision meets the enforcement test. Moreover, Congress amended the Social Security Act expressly to recognize beneficiaries' ability to enforce provisions of the Act. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-2, 1320a-10. The Supreme Court's decision in *Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015), did not alter the Court's section 1983 precedents or the federal courts' application of the enforcement test to the Medicaid free choice of provider provision. Moreover, Congress's endorsement of private enforcement of the Social Security Act remains unchanged.

ARGUMENT

I. CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUALS TO ENFORCE PROVISIONS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Enacted in 1965, the Medicaid Act authorizes a cooperative state-federal medical assistance program for low-income people. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396w-5. Part of the Social Security Act, the Medicaid Act was enacted pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause power.

Medicaid beneficiaries depend on states to adhere to the various Medicaid Act requirements. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (setting forth requirements for Medicaid programs). Given the importance of allowing Medicaid enrollees to choose their health care providers, Congress included a mandate in the Medicaid Act requiring states to

provide that . . . any individual eligible for medical assistance . . . may obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required . . . who undertakes to provide him such services. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A) (“section (23)(A)” or “free choice of provider provision”). This provision was added to the Medicaid Act in 1967 in light of evidence from Medicaid's first two years of existence that some states were restricting beneficiaries to health care settings of the states' choosing. *See* Lara Cartwright-Smith & Sara Rosenbaum, *Medicaid's Free-Choice-of-Provider Protections in a Family Planning Context*, 127 PUB. HEALTH RPTS. 119 (Jan.-Feb.

2012) (citing President’s Proposals for Revision in the Soc. Sec. Sys., Hearings on H.R. 5710 before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, Pt. 4, at 2273 (Apr. 6 & Apr. 11, 1967)).

A separate Medicaid provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3), gives individuals the opportunity for a fair hearing when their claims for medical assistance are denied or not acted on promptly. Thus, the fair hearing provision allows an individual to be heard when their application for Medicaid eligibility or a covered service has been denied or unreasonably delayed. It provides no redress if the problem concerns a systemic, ongoing violation, as would arise when a state law or policy violates the Medicaid free choice of provider provision. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 431.220(b) (no individual hearing right if “the sole issue is a Federal or State law requiring an automatic change adversely affecting some or all beneficiaries.”).

Another Medicaid Act provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396c, allows the federal government to terminate or withhold funding to states that do not “comply substantially” with the federal law. That drastic provision has rarely—if ever—been enforced by the federal government. That is because, as a federal grant-in-aid program, “the posture of the federal agency toward its grantees is not generally that of a referee calling fouls, but that of a coach giving support in the form of cash and expertise.” Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, *The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement*, 58

Va. L. Rev. 600, 620 (1972). For beneficiaries, application of this remedy would make matters worse because it would deprive the state of the very funds it needs to cover the cost of medically necessary care and services.

Section 1396a(a)(3) and section 1396c are not the only remedies that Congress and the Supreme Court recognize. Entitlement to Medicaid triggers legal rights for program beneficiaries, including the right to petition courts to enforce some of the statutory requirements that are placed on the states. As explained below, Medicaid beneficiaries, like the plaintiffs in this case, can enforce certain provisions of the Medicaid Act, including the free choice of provider provision in actions for prospective, injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A. Controlling Supreme Court Precedent Establishes the Right of Individuals to Enforce Provisions of the Social Security Act Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 litigation has protected the federal rights that Congress guaranteed in the Social Security Act. As Justice Harlan observed in a Social Security Act case filed by program beneficiaries pursuant to section 1983:

It is, of course, no part of the business of this Court to evaluate, apart from federal constitutional or statutory challenge, the merits or wisdom of any welfare programs, whether state or federal, in the large or in the particular. It is, on the other hand, peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no less in the welfare field than in other areas of the law, to resolve disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to the States are being expended in consonance with the conditions that Congress has attached to their use.

Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422-23 (1970) (holding that suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with provisions of the Social Security Act). Indeed, on multiple occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized that individuals may enforce various provisions of the Social Security Act through section 1983. *See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n*, 496 U.S. 498, 524 (1990) (allowing enforcement of a Medicaid Act provision concerning payment for institutional services); *Maine v. Thiboutot*, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980) (holding “the phrase ‘and laws,’ as used in § 1983, means what it says” and allowing enforcement of a Social Security Act provision); *Edelman v. Jordan*, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974) (“[S]uits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States.”); *King v. Smith*, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968) (allowing enforcement of the “reasonable promptness” provision of a Social Security Act program); *see generally Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981) (citing *King v. Smith* with favor in case involving the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, which is not part of the Social Security Act, and stating “where Congress has intended the States to fund certain entitlements as a condition of receiving federal funds, it has proved capable of saying so explicitly.”).²

² *Pennhurst* noted that Spending Clause legislation operates “much in the nature of a contract,” 451 U.S. at 17, meaning that states agree to take actions in exchange

In *Wilder*, a hospital association filed suit under section 1983 alleging that state officials were violating the hospitals' rights under a payment provision of the Medicaid Act. 496 U.S. at 501. After acknowledging that *Maine v. Thiboutot* authorized a section 1983 action for violations of federal statutes, the Court noted two exceptions to this general rule of enforcement: when the statute does not create individual federal rights within the meaning of section 1983 and when Congress has foreclosed enforcement through section 1983 in the underlying statute itself. *Id.* at 508-09. The Court then stated a test for determining whether a statutory provision creates a "federal right" under section 1983:

Such an inquiry turns on whether the provision in question was intend[ed] to benefit the putative plaintiffs. . . . If so, the provision creates an enforceable right unless it reflects merely a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the governmental unit, . . . or unless the interest the plaintiff asserts is too vague and amorphous such that it is beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.

Id. at 509 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Applying this test, *Wilder* held that the Medicaid provision at issue created a right enforceable by hospitals under section 1983. *Id.* at 509-10.

for federal funding that Congress could not require them to take directly. However, the Court has been clear that its use of this analogy "do[es] not imply . . . that suits under Spending Clause legislation are suits in contract, or that contract-law principles apply to all issues that they raise." *Barnes v Gorman*, 536 U.S. 181, 188 n.2 (2002).

Thereafter, in *Blessing v. Freestone*, the Supreme Court instructed courts to use this “traditional” enforcement test for determining whether Congress intended a federal statute to create rights under section 1983. 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (citing *Wilder* and stating, “We have traditionally looked at three factors when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right.”). So the test, first stated in *Wilder* and refined by *Blessing*, asks whether each statutory provision cited by the plaintiff: (1) creates a right intended to benefit the plaintiff; (2) is written with sufficient clarity for a court to enforce; and (3) is mandatory on the state. *Blessing* also cautioned plaintiffs to plead their claims in “manageable analytic bites” so that the court can ascertain whether “each separate claim” satisfies the three-part enforcement test. *Id.* at 342; *see also id.* at 346 (finding lower court failed to apply the enforcement test’s “methodical inquiry” and remanding for determination of what rights plaintiffs were asserting).

Gonzaga University v. Doe further clarified the enforcement test. 536 U.S. 273 (2002). Reviewing *Wilder* and *Blessing*, the *Gonzaga* Court found some of the language used in these cases had confused lower courts, leading them to find a statute enforceable solely because the plaintiff came within the general zone of interests that the statute intended to protect. *Gonzaga* did not overrule these cases but clarified that the first prong of the test is met *only* if the federal provision contains an unambiguously conferred federal right using “rights-creating terms.”

536 U.S. 273, 283-84 (2002) (analyzing a provision of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, which is not part of the Social Security Act).

When the three-part test is met, “the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.” *Id.* at 274. The presumption can be overcome only by demonstrating that Congress foreclosed private enforcement expressly or by creating a “comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with” private enforcement. *Id.* at 284 n.4 (quoting *Blessing*, 520 U.S. at 341); *see also Blessing*, 520 U.S. at 346 (stating this is a “difficult showing”). The *Wilder* Court held that Medicaid’s administrative process “to curtail federal funds to States whose plans are not in compliance with the Act [42 U.S.C. § 1396c] . . . cannot be considered sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a congressional intent to withdraw the private remedy of § 1983.” 496 U.S. at 521-22; *see also City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams*, 544 U.S. 113, 121-22 (2005) (Scalia, J.) (including *Wilder* and Medicaid in listing of previous cases and statutes where § 1983 enforcement is not foreclosed); *Gonzaga Univ.*, 536 U.S. at 280-81 (noting *Wilder* held the Medicaid Act contains “no sufficient administrative means of enforcing the requirement against States that failed to comply”).³

³ Congress’s reference to substantial compliance in section 1396c implies that this remedy has an “aggregate focus.” *Gonzaga Univ.*, 536 U.S. at 288. That is, Congress intended this as a remedy for aggregate violations, rather than a remedy available to individual beneficiaries. *Cf. Wilder*, 496 U.S. at 522 (“[G]eneralized powers’ . . . to audit and cut off federal funds [are] insufficient to foreclose reliance

This enforcement doctrine is the law of the land. Most recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in two cases that had applied the *Blessing/Gonzaga* test to find section 1396a(a)(23)(A) enforceable pursuant to section 1983. *See Pl. P'hood of Kan. v. Andersen*, 882 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2018), *cert. denied*, No 17-1340, 2018 WL 1456394 (Dec. 10, 2018); *Pl. P'hood of Gulf Coast v. Gee*, 862 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2017), *reh. denied*, 876 F.3d 699 (2017), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 408 (2018). Three justices dissented, *see* 139 S. Ct. 408, but their opinion misrepresents the current state of the law. Writing for the dissent, Justice Thomas complains that the Court has “made a mess of the issue.” *Id.* at 409. However, the enforcement track record in the lower courts does not reflect this. From 2002, when *Gonzaga* was decided, until 2017, when a split panel issued *Does v. Gillespie*, 867 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2017), the appellate courts’ decisions on whether a particular Medicaid provision could be privately enforced were remarkably consistent. *See Jane Perkins, Pin the Tail on the Donkey: Beneficiary Enforcement of the Medicaid Act Over Time*, 9 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 207 tbl. 2 (2016). To the extent there is any confusion now, it stems not from the *Blessing/Gonzaga* test but from *Does* failure to apply the test and the aftermath of that error.

on § 1983 to vindicate federal rights.”) (citation omitted); *Pl. P'hood of Kan. v. Andersen*, 882 F.3d 1205, 1229 (10th Cir. 2018) (reaffirming *Wilder*’s holding in part “because the federal Secretary’s withholding Medicaid funds would not redress [plaintiffs’] injuries at all.”).

B. Congress Clearly Intends Private Enforcement of Social Security Act Provisions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Congress is well aware of the basic ground rules established by the Supreme Court: When a provision of a Spending Clause enactment is couched in terms that are “precatory,” *Pennhurst*, 451 U.S. at 17, or that have an “‘aggregate’ focus,” *Gonzaga Univ.*, 536 U.S. at 288, or is included in a statute that provides alternative, comprehensive private enforcement mechanisms, *see Smith v. Robinson*, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984), it will not give rise to a section 1983 remedy. However, when the provision at hand binds states and confers entitlements on individuals, those will be regarded as “rights secured by the . . . laws of the United States” under section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Congress has evinced its understanding of this design. Following the Supreme Court decision in *Suter v. Artist M.*, 503 U.S. 347 (1992), Congress amended the Social Security Act to make clear that beneficiaries can enforce provisions of the Act that meet the traditional enforcement test. *Suter* held that plaintiffs could not use section 1983 to enforce a provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare title of the Social Security Act. *Id.* at 363. *Suter* further stated that a Social Security Act provision did not create enforceable rights if it was placed in a statute that listed mandatory elements of state plans submitted to receive federal funds. *Id.* at 358. This part of the decision had potentially far-reaching ramifications because most Social Security Act titles, including Medicaid,

are written in terms of what a state plan must include for a state to receive federal funds to operate the plan.

Congress reacted decisively to correct the *Suter* error and reaffirm the law governing the private right of action as it existed previously in cases such as *Wilder*, *Thiboutot*, and *Rosado*. Specifically, Congress amended the Social Security Act to provide:

In an action brought to enforce a provision of [the Social Security Act], such provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of [the Act] requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State plan. This section is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for determining the availability of private actions to enforce State plan requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in *Suter v. Artist M.*, 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such enforceability; provided, however, that this section is not intended to alter the holding in *Suter v. Artist M.* that section 671(a)(15) of [the Act] is not enforceable in a private right of action.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-2, 1320a-10 (provision repeated). The Conferees explained:

The intent of this provision is to assure that individuals who have been injured by a State's failure to comply with the Federal mandates of the State plan titles of the Social Security Act are able to seek redress in federal courts to the extent they were able to prior to the decision in *Suter v. Artist M.*

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 761, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 926 (1994), *reprinted in* 1994

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2901, 3257. According to the House Ways and Means Committee:

Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court has recognized, in a substantial number of decisions, that beneficiaries of Federal-State programs could seek to enjoin State violations of Federal statutes by

suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See Rosado v. Wyman*, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); *Maine v. Thiboutot*, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).

Report of the Comm. on Ways & Means, House of Representatives, No. 102-631, 102 Cong., 2d Sess., at 364 (1992). The Committee also noted that:

Social Security beneficiaries, parents, and advocacy groups have brought hundreds of successful lawsuits alleging failure of the State and/or locality to comply with State plan requirements of the Social Security Act. . . . Much of this litigation has resulted in comprehensive reforms of Federal-State programs operated under the Social Security Act, and increased compliance with the mandates of the Federal statutes[.]

Id. at 364-65. Congress provided yet further evidence of its intent when it stated:

[When] Congress places requirements in a statute, we intend for the States to follow them. If they fail in this, the Federal courts can order them to comply with the congressional mandate. For 25 years, this was the reading that the Supreme Court had given to our actions in Social Security Act State plan programs. The *Suter* decision represented a departure from this line of reasoning.

139 Cong. Rec. S173, S3, 189 (1993). As is evident from the face of the statute itself, the purpose of the law is to “restore[] the right of individuals to turn to Federal courts when States fail to implement Federal standards under the Social Security Act.” 138 Cong. Rec. S17689-01 (1992) (statement of Sen. Riegle).⁴

⁴ In 1981, 1985, 1987, and 1996, Congress rejected bills that would have limited private enforcement under section 1983. *See* S. 584, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1981); S. 436, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1985); S. 325, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1 (1987); H.R. 4314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 309(a) (1996). In *Thiboutot*, the Court invited Congress to change the law if it thought the Court’s interpretation of congressional intent was in error. 448 U.S. at 8. That Congress has not done so further evidences enforcement rights under section 1983.

Although a split Eighth Circuit panel recently discounted section 1320a-2 as “hardly a model of clarity.” *Does v. Gillespie*, 867 F.3d 1034, 1044 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting *Sanchez v. Johnson*, 416 F.3d 1051, 1057, n.5 (9th Cir. 2005)), other circuit courts have had no trouble relying on the statute. *See, e.g., Midwest Foster Care & Adoption Ass'n v. Kincade*, 712 F.3d 1190, 1200 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting section 1320a-2 and stating, “A statutory provision located in [the Social Security Act] cannot be deemed individually unenforceable solely because of its situs in a larger regime ‘requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a state plan’”); *Pl. P’hood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t Health*, 699 F.3d 962, 977 n.9 (7th Cir. 2012); *Ball v. Rodgers*, 492 F.3d 1094, 1112 n.26 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting courts “around the country have relied on it [§ 1320a-2] in holding some Medicaid Act rights enforceable under § 1983 even where the statute’s “rights-creating” language is embedded within a requirement that a state file a plan or that that plan contain specific features”); *Watson v. Weeks*, 436 F.3d 1152, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2006); *Rabin v. Wilson-Coker*, 362 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2004); *S.D. v. Hood*, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th Cir. 2004); *Harris v. James*, 127 F.3d 993, 1003 (11th Cir. 1997).

The Eighth Circuit also discounted section 1320a-2 because it was enacted before *Gonzaga Does*, 867 F.3d at 1044. But *Gonzaga* had no occasion to address section 1320a-2 because it concerned a provision of the Family Educational Rights

and Privacy Act, not the Social Security Act. Moreover, as cases cited above demonstrate, courts have had no difficulty applying section 1320a-2 post-*Gonzaga*, as the provision gives them specific directions on how to interpret Social Security Act statutes that Congress enacts. Contrary to the Eight Circuit’s conclusion, Congress has expressly declared that the location of a provision like section 1396a(a)(23) within a larger section detailing the required contents of a state plan does not create any “[c]onflicting textual cues.” *Does*, 867 F.3d at 1045.

In sum, “the touchstone of the [private enforcement] determination is congressional intent, as manifest in the language and legislative history of the statute,” *Va. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bailes*, 868 F.2d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1989), *aff’d sub nom. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n*, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 and its legislative history establish that Congress clearly intends Medicaid beneficiaries to be able to enforce certain Social Security Act provisions under section 1983.

C. Courts of Appeals Have Consistently Applied the Enforcement Test to Decide Whether a Provision Creates a Federal Right Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In *Gonzaga*, the Supreme Court addressed confusion surrounding application of the first (intent-to-benefit) prong of the enforcement test by clarifying that a general intent to benefit individuals will not do; rather, the federal law at issue must contain unambiguous rights-creating language. 536 U.S. at 282-

84. Since 2002 when *Gonzaga* was decided, the federal courts of appeals have reviewed the enforceability of twenty-seven Medicaid Act provisions, with courts finding just over half of these provisions privately enforceable.⁵

The cases in which a court has found a Medicaid Act provision enforceable refer to protections or benefits that run to individual Medicaid beneficiaries. The Second Circuit has explained that the crux of the *Gonzaga* holding was that provisions containing traditional, individual rights-granting language support a private action while those focusing on state “policy or practice” in the aggregate do not. *Rabin*, 362 F.3d at 201. The Second Circuit found enforceable a Medicaid provision regarding transitional Medicaid coverage, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6, which “contains no qualifying language akin to [*Gonzaga*’s] ‘policy or practice.’” *Id.* See also, e.g., *Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford*, 509 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that “as required by *Gonzaga* [the Medicaid provision, § 1396a(bb)]

⁵ See Jane Perkins, *Pin the Tail on the Donkey: Beneficiary Enforcement of the Medicaid Act Over Time*, 9 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 207 (tbl. 2) (2016), as updated by *Legacy Cmty Health Servs., Inc. v. Smith*, 881 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding § 1396a(bb) enforceable); *Andersen*, 882 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2018), *cert. denied*, No 17-1340, 2018 WL 1456394 (Dec. 10, 2018) (holding § 1396a(a)(23)(A) enforceable); *BT Bourbonnais Care v. Norwood*, 866 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding § 1396a(13)(A) enforceable); *Does v. Gillespie*, 867 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding § 1396a(a)(23) unenforceable); *Pl. P’hood of Gulf Coast v. Gee*, 862 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2016), *rehearing denied*, 876 F.3d 699 (2017), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 408 (2018) (holding § 1396a(a)(23)(A) enforceable); *Health Sci. Funding v. N.J. Div. of Human Serv.*, 658 F. App’x 139 (3d Cir. July 25, 2016) (holding § 1396a(a)(54) unenforceable).

contains rights-creating language because it specifically designates the beneficiaries—the [health clinics]—and . . . has an individual focus rather than an aggregate focus on institutional policy or practice”); *Sabree ex rel. v. Richman*, 367 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding Medicaid provision’s reference to “individual” recipients was indistinguishable from Title VI’s reference to “no person” as discussed with favor in *Gonzaga*). The free choice of provider provision at issue in the instant dispute does not contain the phrase “policy or practice” or any other comparable qualifying language.

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has observed that provisions concerning “systemwide administration” have an aggregate focus, but that a Medicaid provision directed to services for “individuals” passes muster under *Gonzaga*. *S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood*, 391 F.3d 591, 603-04 (5th Cir. 2004). Because the free choice of provider provision does not address “systemwide standards and measures employed by the state Medicaid agency in its administration of the [Medicaid] program,” *see id.* at 604 n.29, the provision does not have an aggregate focus.

Finally, with one exception, the circuit courts that have reviewed the free choice of provider requirement have concluded that it creates a federal right for Medicaid beneficiaries. In his opinion for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Sutton assessed the provision against the traditional enforcement test and concluded that it contains the requisite rights-creating language. *See Harris v. Olszewski*, 442 F.3d 456, 460-

65 (6th Cir. 2006). He noted that the provision is directed to “*any individual* eligible for medical assistance” and that these words comprise individually focused, rights-creating language. *Id.* at 462 (quoting § 1396a(a)(23)(A)) (emphasis in original). And, “by saying that ‘[a] State plan . . . must . . . provide’ this free choice, the statute uses the kind of ‘rights-creating,’ ‘mandatory language,’ that the Supreme Court and our court have held establishes a private right of action.” *Id.* at 461-62 (citation omitted).

Thereafter, the Fourth Circuit stated that “§ 1396a(a)(23) of the Medicaid Act ‘is clearly drawn to give Medicaid recipients the right to receive care from the Medicaid provider of their choice, rather than the government’s choice.’” *Doe v. Kidd*, 419 F. App’x 411, 416 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Silver v. Baggiano*, 804 F.2d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding recipients can enforce § 1396a(a)(23) under § 1983), *abrogated on other grounds by Lapidus v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga.*, 535 U.S. 613 (2002)). Other circuit courts have agreed. *See Pl. P’hood of Greater Tex. v. Smith*, 913 F.3d 551, 561-62 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc review pending); *Pl. P’hood of Kan. v. Andersen*, 882 F.3d at 1224 (“We are comfortable joining four out of the five circuits that have addressed this issue, and we too hold that § 1396a(a)(23) affords the [Patient’s] a private right of action under § 1983.”) (citation omitted); *Pl. P’hood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee*, 862 F.3d at 457; *Pl. P’hood of Ariz. v. Betlach*, 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013); *Pl. P’hood of Ind. v.*

Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 974 (7th Cir. 2012)

(“Medicaid patients are the obvious intended beneficiaries” of section (23)(A), which “does not simply set an aggregate plan requirement, but instead establishes a personal right to which all Medicaid patients are entitled.”).

In these cases, the statutory text decides the question, and whether a federal statute creates a right that is enforceable under section 1983 is a threshold inquiry that is separate and distinct from any inquiry into the precise scope or meaning of the right as applied to any particular set of facts. *See, e.g., Harris*, 442 F.3d at 462; *see also BT Bourbonnais Care*, 866 F.3d at 820 (noting that the question of whether a statute creates an enforceable right under § 1983 is a “narrow question” distinct from whether “this particular complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted.”).

As noted above, *Does* is the private enforcement exception, 867 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2017), and there are numerous errors in its reasoning. First, the *Does* majority fails to focus on the provision that the complaint sought to enforce as *Blessing* requires. Second, it does not apply the *Blessing/Gonzaga* enforcement test. The majority also says *Wilder* has been overruled. *Id.* at 1040. But that is not so. *See* § I.A., *supra*; *see also Legacy Cmt’y Health Servs.*, 881 F.3d at 372 (finding a Medicaid provision enforceable and rejecting counterarguments because they “would likely overrule cases such as *Wilder* . . . thus Texas’s contention goes

too far”); *Andersen*, 882 F.3d at 1229 n.16 (“The Eighth Circuit contends that *Armstrong* effectively overruled *Wilder*. Even if the Supreme Court had done so—and we do not think it did—it would not impact our analysis.”) (internal cite omitted). Finally, *Does* makes essentially the same mistake *Suter* made: it concludes Medicaid beneficiaries have no federal rights under section 1983 because section 1396a(a)(23) is part of a “directive to the Secretary,” and section 1396c authorizes the Secretary to withhold federal funds to a state that is not substantially complying with the law. *Does*, 867 F.3d at 1043. That reasoning is not correct because it would mean that no Medicaid provision could be privately enforced. As this brief has discussed, Congress and the Supreme Court have clearly said that is not the case.

II. THE SUPREME COURT’S *ARMSTRONG* DECISION DOES NOT IMPLICATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care Center, 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015), does not alter the analysis for determining whether Medicaid beneficiaries can enforce a provision of the Medicaid Act pursuant to section 1983. *Armstrong* concerned claims brought by providers under the Supremacy Clause and in equity. 135 S. Ct. at 1382-83. “*Armstrong* isn’t a § 1983 case.” *Andersen*, 862 F.3d at 1229. Further, *Armstrong* addressed an entirely different provision of the Medicaid Act: 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), a provision that does not meet the three-prong test of

Blessing and *Gonzaga*. The Supreme Court pointed to the provision’s broad language to conclude there was no cause of action in equity to enforce section (30)(A). *Id.* at 1385 (“It is difficult to imagine a requirement broader and less specific than §30(A)’s mandate”); *see id.* at 1388 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing the unique difficulty of § 30(A)’s application to ratemaking and concluding that “Congress intended to foreclose respondents from bringing *this particular action* for injunctive relief”) (emphasis added); *see generally Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart*, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1639 n. 3 (2011) (“The fact that the Federal Government can exercise oversight of a federal spending program and even withhold or withdraw funds—which are the chief statutory features respondents point to—does not demonstrate that Congress has ‘displayed an intent not to provide the more complete and more immediate relief that would otherwise be available under *Ex parte Young*.’”) (quoting *Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.*, 535 U.S. 635, 647 (2002)).

Armstrong did not concern and certainly did not overrule the section 1983 test established in *Wilder* and refined in *Blessing* and *Gonzaga*, and it did not address 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2. For these reasons, in the wake of *Armstrong* all courts of appeals, save one outlier, have continued to apply the *Blessing/Gonzaga* factors to determine whether a specific provision of the Medicaid Act creates a private right of action. *See, e.g., Andersen*, 882 F.3d at 1226 (“*Armstrong* does

nothing to undermine the Patients’ claim that Congress intended to confer on them an enforceable right of action with the free-choice-of-provider provision.”); *Gee*, 862 F.3d at 461; *Legacy*, 881 F.3d at 372 (finding reliance on *Armstrong* Part IV plurality opinion “unavailing”); *Health Science Funding v. N. J. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.*, 658 F. App’x 139 (3d Cir. 2016) (same); *Fishman v. Paolucci*, 628 F. App’x 797, 801 n.1 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (same); *Backer ex rel. Freedman v. Shah*, 788 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015) (same). In short, *Armstrong* did not address or undermine the conclusion that Medicaid beneficiaries have a federal right under section 1983 to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A).

In sum, while the Supreme Court has clarified and tightened the section 1983 enforcement test over the years, it has not removed Medicaid beneficiaries’ ability to obtain relief from federal courts when states violate unambiguously conferred rights within the Medicaid Act. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has noted:

[N]othing in *Armstrong*, *Gonzaga*, or any other case we have found supports the idea that plaintiffs are now flatly forbidden in section 1983 actions to rely on a statute passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause powers. There would have been no need, had that been the Court’s intent, to send lower courts off on a search for “unambiguously conferred rights.” A simple ‘no’ would have sufficed.

BT Bourbonnais Care, 866 F.3d at 820-21.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, *amicus curiae* ask that this Court affirm the preliminary injunction.

Dated: April 15, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and (6) because it has been prepared in 14-point Times New Roman, a proportionally spaced font. I certify that the foregoing brief complies with the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) and 29(a)(5), and that the total number of words in this brief is 5,708 according to the count of Microsoft Word, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).

Date: April 15, 2019

/s/Martha Jane Perkins
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CERTIFICATE OF DIGITAL SUBMISSION

I hereby certify that with respect to the foregoing:

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Date: April 15, 2019

/s/ Martha Jane Perkins
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day, April 15, 2019, I electronically filed the forgoing brief with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system.

/s/Martha Jane Perkins
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