

No. 19-35394

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

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STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ALEX M. AZAR II, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; and UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendants-Appellants.

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NATIONAL FAMILY PLANNING & REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

ALEX M. AZAR II, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

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**APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF**

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## INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Plaintiffs' responses only underscore how extraordinary this injunction is. Like the district court, plaintiffs accept that *Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) upheld regulations that, like the ones challenged here, prohibited Title X projects from providing abortion referrals and required those projects to be physically separate from abortion-related activities based on a statutory provision that has not changed. Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that a single district court can effectively overrule the Supreme Court through a nationwide injunction based on a clause in an appropriations rider and an obscure provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).

A unanimous motions panel of this Court correctly rejected that remarkable position, and plaintiffs make little effort to grapple with its decision. Dkt.No.34.<sup>1</sup> As the panel explained, Congress did not amend Title X—much less abrogate a high-profile Supreme Court decision—*sub silentio* through a clause in an appropriations rider or a mousehole in the ACA. Nor did HHS act irrationally in adopting regulations over plaintiffs' objections or in making reasonable predictions using its expertise. And plaintiffs' predicted harms do not outweigh injuries to the government that the Supreme Court has already identified—namely, the inability to enforce laws or to prevent

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<sup>1</sup> Although this Court ordered these cases to be reheard en banc and instructed that the motions panel's order not be cited as precedential, Dkt.No.55, the panel's order constitutes persuasive authority. Moreover, the en banc panel subsequently denied the plaintiffs' motions for an administrative stay of the panel's order and clarified that this Court had not vacated that order, which remains in effect. Dkt.No.84.

taxpayer dollars from promoting abortion. In any event, nothing justifies enjoining aspects of the Rule never found to be unlawful or applications of the Rule to those who have not challenged it.

## **ARGUMENT**

### **I. The Rule Is Lawful**

The crux of plaintiffs’ statutory-authority challenge is that Congress implicitly abrogated the Supreme Court’s high-profile decision in *Rust* in an appropriations rider and an obscure provision of the ACA. But we explained why that facially implausible position is incorrect, and nothing in plaintiffs’ responses rehabilitates it.

#### **A. The Rule Falls Well Within The Secretary’s Authority**

##### **1. The Appropriations Rider**

Title X plainly authorizes the Rule’s restrictions on referrals and counseling. If a program refers patients for or otherwise promotes abortion as a method of family planning, then the program is one “where abortion is a method of family planning” and hence ineligible for funding under § 1008. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6; *see* 84 Fed. Reg. 7714, 7759 (Mar. 4, 2019). Plaintiffs suggest § 1008 merely prohibits “funding abortion” (Wash.Br.6; *see* NFPRHA.Br.42), but even the 2000 regulations concluded that is “not ... the better reading.” 65 Fed. Reg. 41,270, 41,272 (July 3, 2000) (preamble). After all, when Congress wants to prevent only the funding of abortion, it knows how to do so. *See* Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979) (“[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions.”). Section 1008, by contrast,

reveals “Congress’ intent in Title X that federal funds not be used to ‘promote or advocate’ abortion as a ‘method of family planning.’” *Rust*, 500 U.S. at 195 n.4.<sup>2</sup>

All of this remains true notwithstanding a subsequent appropriations rider providing that Title X funds “shall not be expended for abortions” and that “all pregnancy counseling shall be nondirective.” Pub. L. No. 115-245, div. B, tit. II, 132 Stat. 2981, 3070-71 (2018). If anything, that rider reinforces § 1008 by further ensuring that pregnancy counseling is not used to “direct” patients *toward* abortion. Plaintiffs’ contrary arguments do not withstand scrutiny.

a. With respect to the referral restrictions, the private plaintiffs contend that declining to grant a patient’s request for an abortion referral is “directive” because it does not take “a neutral stance toward [her] decisionmaking.” NFPRHA.Br.27. But given the limited, preconceptional nature of the Title X program, “a doctor’s silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her,” *Rust*, 500 U.S. at 180, let alone *direct* her to maintain the status quo. And providers are “always

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<sup>2</sup> The private plaintiffs alternatively suggest that providing abortion referrals does not “‘promote’ or ‘encourage’ abortion” in violation of § 1008. NFPRHA.Br.29. But by definition, the purpose and effect of an abortion referral is to further—*i.e.*, promote—an abortion. Indeed, *Rust* observed that under the 1988 regulations, a referral “list may not be used indirectly to encourage or promote abortion, ‘such as ... by “steering” clients to providers who offer abortion as a method of family planning.’” 500 U.S. at 180 (quoting § 59.8(a)(3)). By that logic, referring “clients to providers who offer abortion as a method of family planning” directly “promote[s] abortion.”

free” to respond to a client’s request by explaining that referrals for abortion are “simply beyond the scope of the program.” *Id.*

For its part, Washington does not contend that a failure to refer for abortion alone is directive, but rather suggests that when *combined* with a separate requirement that pregnant patients be referred for prenatal health care, these restrictions violate the appropriations rider. Wash.Br.29. But the prenatal-referral requirement does not direct a decision about abortion—it merely refers women for care while they are pregnant, even if they obtain an abortion later. Gov.Br.25-26. And the Rule permits providers to explain that abortion is outside the scope of the program, and that if a patient wants to seek an abortion she can find information about that elsewhere, but in the meantime, they can provide her with a list of providers who can offer her care while she is pregnant. *See* 42.C.F.R. § 59.14(e)(5). Providers could even include an express disclaimer that the prenatal-care referral is a general requirement and should not be taken as directing the patient’s ultimate decision about her pregnancy. And even if the required prenatal-care referral were directive, that would not justify invalidating the prohibition on abortion referrals. The provisions are contained in different subsections, 42.C.F.R. §§ 59.16(a), 59.16(b)(1), which are severable, 84 Fed. Reg. at 7725.

In any event, Congress’s requirement that “pregnancy counseling” be “nondirective” does not speak to the issue of “referrals,” much less require HHS to allow referrals for abortion specifically. Plaintiffs insist that in passing the appropriations rider, Congress must have intended “counseling” to refer to both. But

even accepting plaintiffs’ assertion that “counseling and referral are intertwined and complementary” (Wash.Br.30), would not mean that they are the same thing. Even materials cited by plaintiffs frequently use the terms separately, and if counseling clearly included referrals, then none of these authorities would have needed to discuss referrals at all. For instance, plaintiffs seize on (Wash.Br.30-31) statements in the Rule’s preamble indicating that a separate statute, 42 U.S.C. § 254c-6(a)(1), reflects a legislative intent that “adoption information and referrals be included as part of any nondirective counseling,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 7733, but that has no bearing on whether Congress considers referrals a *type* of counseling (as opposed to something that may occur *at the same time* as counseling). And given HHS’s longstanding position—reflected in this Rule and its predecessors (Gov.Br.27-28)—that referrals and counseling are distinct, plaintiffs place far too much weight on the Department’s brief discussion of this separate statute. At most, the few instances they identify as implying that counseling may include referrals suggest the term “nondirective counseling” is ambiguous and thus cannot supply the clear mandate necessary to overcome both the presumption against implied repeals and the judicial deference owed to HHS’s reasonable interpretation.

**b.** Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Rule’s counseling provisions fares no better. Given that the Rule *permits* “nondirective pregnancy counseling, which may discuss abortion,” 42 C.F.R. § 59.14(e)(5), plaintiffs train their fire on the fact that the Rule *does not require* counseling on abortion. Wash.Br.31-32; NFPRHA.Br.26-27. But in providing that “all pregnancy counseling shall be nondirective,” the appropriations rider

does not require *any* pregnancy counseling at all —especially in a “*preconceptional* family planning program” such as Title X, *Rust*, 500 U.S. at 202. Nor does a provider’s choice to omit counseling about abortion specifically “direct” anything. The Rule’s preamble contemplates that any counseling will present more than one option, *see, e.g.*, 84 Fed. Reg. at 7716, and offering childbirth-only counseling or adoption-only counseling would not “direct” a patient to choose that option, so long as the provider did not advise a patient to do so. At most, such counseling would (implicitly) “promote” that option over the others, but nothing in the appropriations rider prohibits the promotion of childbirth or adoption. Section 1008, by contrast, does prohibit the use of Title X funds “to ‘promote or advocate’ abortion as a ‘method of family planning,’” *Rust*, 500 U.S. at 195 n.4, which is why the Rule forbids counseling where “abortion [is] the only option presented,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 7747.

Washington objects that HHS remarked that “present[ing]” abortion as “the only option” in counseling would violate the appropriations rider in addition to § 1008. Wash.Br.31-32. But it is immaterial whether, under the appropriations rider, abortion-only counseling is distinguishable from childbirth-only counseling, *see* 84 Fed. Reg. at 7747, because abortion-only counseling is already prohibited under § 1008, and thus the agency’s discussion of whether it is also prohibited by the appropriations rider was beside the point. *See, e.g., WildEarth Guardians v. Provencio*, 923 F.3d 655, 678 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding that agency’s “inappropriate” “references” to an exemption “at most amounted to harmless error” under the APA, “as they had no effect” on the challenged

agency action). And in all events, if permitting Title X providers to refrain from counseling on abortion were somehow unlawful, the remedy would merely be to invalidate and sever that aspect of the Rule. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 7725. But this Court need not and should not consider that question, because these plaintiffs (as opposed to Title X patients) have no standing to complain about—and are certainly not irreparably harmed by—what the Rule “permits” *other* providers to do. Wash.Br.31.

More generally, plaintiffs contend that the appropriations rider requires “equal[]” presentation of all options (NFPRHA.Br.27)—in essence, a fairness doctrine for pregnancy counseling. But when Congress wants specific pregnancy options to be given equal treatment, it knows how to say so explicitly, as 42 U.S.C. § 254c-6(a)(1) reveals. *See* Gov.Br.29-30. Indeed, if “nondirective” already required that all pregnancy options—adoption included—be treated equally, then Congress’s instruction in § 254c-6(a)(1) that adoption be treated “on an equal basis” with other pregnancy options would be gratuitous. Although private plaintiffs dismiss this statute on the theory that there are only two pregnancy options—childbirth and abortion (NFPRHA.Br.25 & n.5)—both Congress and HHS have treated adoption as a third approach. *See, e.g.*, 42 U.S.C. § 254c-6(a)(1) (requiring that “adoption” be treated “on an equal basis” with “all other courses of action”); S. 323, 102d Cong. § 2 (1991) (Family Planning Amendments Act of 1992) (requiring “nondirective counseling and referrals regarding (A) prenatal care and delivery; (B) infant care, foster care, and adoption; and (C) termination of pregnancy”); 65 Fed. Reg. at 41,279 (§ 59.5(a)(5)) (similar).

c. Even if this were a closer question, settled interpretive principles would dispose of plaintiffs' construction of the appropriations rider. Plaintiffs do not dispute that there is a heightened presumption against implied repeals through appropriations legislation (*see* Gov.Br.25), but contend that the presumption is inapplicable here. Yet their responses confirm that plaintiffs believe the rider "narrowed" the Department's "authority" under § 1008. Wash.Br.27; *see* NFPRHA.Br.23-24. By definition, that is a repeal of § 1008 in relevant respect. *See National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 551 U.S. 644, 663 n.8 (2007) ("Every amendment of a statute effects a partial repeal to the extent that the new statutory command displaces earlier, inconsistent commands"). If § 1008 explicitly delegated HHS authority "to prohibit Title X projects from referring their patients for abortion as a method of family planning," for instance, no one would dispute that subsequent legislation stripping the Department of that authority would constitute a repeal. That § 1008, combined with the express rulemaking authority granted under § 1006, *implicitly* delegated the same authority is irrelevant under *Chevron*. Gov.Br.32-33. And that is especially true where the Supreme Court has already authoritatively construed § 1008 to contain that delegation, a scenario none of plaintiffs' authorities address. *See* Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, *Reading Law* 331 (2012) (Even when an "earlier ambiguous provision has already been construed by the jurisdiction's high court to have a meaning that does not fit as well with a later statute as another meaning," any "[l]egislative revision of law clearly established by judicial opinion ought to be by express language or by unavoidably implied contradiction.").

Plaintiffs similarly err in contending that HHS conceded that the appropriations rider narrowed its authority under § 1008 (Wash.Br.28), when it acknowledged, for instance, that the rider “imposed additional requirements” on the Title X program, 84 Fed. Reg. at 7720. Such general acknowledgements have no bearing on the question here: whether the rider implicitly erased HHS’s preexisting authority under § 1008 to forbid referring for, or otherwise promoting, abortion as a method of family planning.

Plaintiffs also claim that the Rule’s referral and counseling provisions go “further” than their 1988 counterparts, but never contend that the current restrictions would have exceeded HHS’s statutory authority before the enactment of the appropriations rider or the ACA, rendering these assertions beside the point. Wash.Br.24; *see* NFPRHA.Br.13. And some of plaintiffs’ characterizations are simply inaccurate. For example, the 1988 regulations did not prohibit Title X participants from providing any “pregnancy counseling” whatsoever (NFPRHA.Br.13), but allowed them to “provide counseling ... regarding any of a wide range of family planning and other topics, save abortion,” *Rust*, 500 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and in fact required them to give pregnant patients “information necessary to protect the health of mother and unborn child,” 53 Fed. Reg. at 2945 (§ 59.8(a)(2)).

More generally, plaintiffs double down on the facially implausible theory that in 1996, Congress smuggled into an appropriations rider providing that Title X funds “shall not be expended for abortions” an implied repeal of § 1008 and silent abrogation of *Rust* after it had tried, and failed, to do so expressly in the vetoed Family Planning

Amendments Act of 1992. *See* Gov.Br.25-26, 30-32. Washington dismisses this history as irrelevant because the 1988 rule had been suspended by HHS in 1993 when the 1996 Congress enacted the differently-worded appropriations rider. Wash.Br.26. But the Congress responsible for the 1996 appropriations rider declined to enact the Family Planning Amendments Act of 1995, which, like its 1992 predecessor, would have required Title X projects to include “termination of pregnancy” within their “nondirective counseling and referrals.” *Compare* H.R. 833, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995), *with* S. 323, 102d Cong. § 2 (1991). “Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend *sub silentio* to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language,” *INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca*, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987), and that principle alone should put an end to plaintiffs’ fanciful theory.

## 2. Section 1554 Of The Affordable Care Act

Plaintiffs are on no firmer ground in contending that § 1554 of the ACA implicitly eliminated HHS’s authority to reinstate both the physical-separation requirement and the referral and counseling restrictions.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Although plaintiffs suggest that the distinctions between the Rule’s physical-separation requirement and its 1988 counterpart are material, they never explain why that it is so. Wash.Br.24-25 & n.10; NFPRHA.Br.13-14. And it is implausible that the *Rust* Court would have invalidated the 1988 regulations if they had also addressed “office entrances and exits, shared phone numbers, email addresses, educational services, and websites,” as well as “electronic or paper-based health care records[] and workstations.” *Compare* 42 C.F.R. § 59.15, *with* 53 Fed. Reg. at 2945 (§ 59.9)).

**a.** To start, plaintiffs do not deny that they failed to raise this statutory argument before HHS, and they never respond to our explanation that statutory-authority arguments are subject to waiver at least with respect to facial challenges, because agencies “have no obligation to anticipate every conceivable argument about why they might lack such statutory authority.” Gov.Br.34 (quoting *Koretzoff v. Vilsack*, 707 F.3d 394, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam)); cf. Wash.Br.34-45; NFPRHA.Br.32. Instead, plaintiffs ask this Court to excuse their waiver because they made generic objections containing language that happened to resemble language in § 1554. See Wash.Br.35; NFPRHA.Br.32. But merely notifying HHS of *substantive* objections did not give the agency a chance to address a question of *statutory interpretation* implicating various rules of construction. See *infra* Pt. I.A.2.b. Accordingly, HHS plainly did not have an opportunity to apply its expertise in administering the ACA with respect to this issue. Indeed, when HHS addressed comments relying on § 1554 in a different rulemaking (see Wash.Br.34), it responded by invoking its authority to administer § 1554, and provided interpretive arguments in addition to policy ones. See 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536, 57,551-52 (Nov. 15, 2018). And none of the generalized statements from this Court’s precedents that plaintiffs cite establish the requisite proposition that a litigant can preserve a challenge to an agency’s statutory authority without ever citing the relevant statutory provision. See Gov.Br.34-35.

**b.** In any event, plaintiffs’ § 1554 argument is meritless, which is presumably why none of the 500,000-plus comments on the proposed Rule raised it. The Rule

merely limits what the government chooses to fund and thus does not, for example, “create[] any unreasonable barrier” to obtaining health care. 42 U.S.C. § 18114(1). As the Supreme Court explained in *Rust*, there is a fundamental distinction between impeding something and choosing not to subsidize it, 500 U.S. at 201-02; *see* Gov.Br.35-36, and that reasoning disposes of this claim, whether it is packaged as a constitutional or statutory one.

Indeed, accepting plaintiffs’ expansive construction of terms such as “creates,” “impedes,” or “interferes” to include a refusal to provide government subsidies would have dramatic consequences for Title X and the government’s authority more generally. Under plaintiffs’ theory, for instance, HHS could not even adopt a rule permitting Title X providers with conscience objections to decline to provide abortion referrals, since that rule has the effect of reallocating some funds from grantees who provide abortion referrals to ones who do not, and thus likewise presumably deprives Title X patients of “all relevant information and communication about the full range of treatment options.” NFPRHA.Br.30; *see* NFPRHA.Br.39 (accepting that Title X providers with conscience objections can decline to provide abortion referrals). More generally, plaintiffs’ expansive reading of § 1554 would halt HHS from making even minor changes to the Title X program—as well as many others—any time a provider or patient arguably was adversely affected. If Congress had actually taken the momentous step of requiring HHS to continue devoting federal funds to particular Title X providers in

perpetuity, NFPRHA and others presumably would have known about that decision and immediately raised the objection in the comment period.

In addition, while plaintiffs dismiss as irrelevant (Wash.Br.37; NFPRHA.Br.31 n.7) the fact that § 1554 applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 18114—thereby signaling that this provision may implicitly displace otherwise-applicable provisions *only in the ACA*—they never explain why Congress used that language when it repeatedly used the common phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” elsewhere in the ACA. *See* Gov.Br.35-36. And plaintiffs’ various arguments do not make § 1554 any less of a mousehole or their theory any less of an elephant: “Congress ... does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions,” *Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns*, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001), and § 1554 qualifies as both.

### 3. Title X

The Rule likewise does not violate “Title X’s central purpose” (Wash.Br.39), which is the same as it was the day the Supreme Court decided *Rust*. *Cf. Rust*, 500 U.S. at 188-89 (rejecting similar argument that the physical-separation requirement was inconsistent with Congress’s “intent” to create “a comprehensive, integrated system of family planning services”). Nor does the Rule violate the statutory requirement—in place at the time of *Rust*—that “[t]he acceptance by any individual of family planning services or family planning or population growth information” provided through the Title X program “shall be voluntary and shall not be a prerequisite to eligibility for or

receipt of any other service or assistance from, or to participation in, any other program of the entity or individual that provided such service or information.” 42 U.S.C. § 300a-5. To the contrary, the Rule preserves a regulatory provision implementing this statutory directive. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(2). Again, similar statutory arguments were advanced in *Rust* and the Supreme Court never embraced them. *See, e.g.*, Reply Brief for State Petitioners at 6-7, *Rust* (Nos. 89-1391, -1392), 1990 WL 505761; *see also Rust*, 500 U.S. at 202 (rejecting constitutional argument that the 1988 regulations “interfere with a woman’s right to make an informed and voluntary choice”).<sup>4</sup>

## **B. The Secretary Provided A Reasoned Explanation**

### **1. The Referral And Counseling Restrictions Are Reasonable**

HHS reasonably adopted the prohibitions on promoting and referring for abortion because they implement the best reading of § 1008—namely, that a program that refers patients for or promotes abortion as a method of family planning is by definition a program “where abortion is a method of family planning.” *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 7759. The Supreme Court held in *Rust* that such “justifications are sufficient to support the Secretary’s revised approach,” 500 U.S. at 187, which is “plainly allow[ed]”

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<sup>4</sup> Washington also briefly suggests that a separate provision of the Rule, 42 C.F.R. § 59.18, violates Title X by “limit[ing] the use of Title X funds for core functions” (Wash.Br.40), but fails to mention that this provision only forbids expenditures “*for purposes prohibited with these funds*, such as support for the abortion business of a Title X grantee or subrecipient.” 42 C.F.R. § 59.18(a) (emphasis added); *see also id.* § 59.18(b) (prohibiting use of funds for “activity ... that in any way tends to promote public support or opposition to any legislative proposal or candidate for office”). Those restrictions are entirely consistent with § 1008.

by Title X, *id.* at 184. The conclusion remains true today, and HHS adequately explained its reasons for adopting the Rule over plaintiffs' objections.

a. In particular, HHS considered and responded to comments arguing that the Rule requires providers to violate medical ethics. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 7742, 7748. As we explained (Gov.Br.38-40), HHS concluded that those concerns were misplaced, relying on federal and state conscience laws permitting providers to take the same actions required by the Rule, and on *Rust*'s upholding a nearly identical, but stricter, version of the referral and counseling restrictions. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 7742, 7748.

While plaintiffs disagree with HHS's conclusion, they fail to show that it was unreasonable. Plaintiffs dismiss the conscience statutes as irrelevant (NFPRHA.Br.39), but those laws demonstrate that Congress and state legislatures do not believe that medical ethics require that all medical providers *must* refer for abortion. Similarly, plaintiffs argue that "*Rust* did not address, analyze, or base its holding on medical ethics" (Wash.Br.43), but the Court upheld the restrictions against a First Amendment challenge in the face of a dissent arguing that they compelled doctors to violate medical ethics. Gov.Br.39. The Court explained that a doctor was "always free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is simply beyond the scope of the program," *Rust*, 500 U.S. at 200, and the same is true under the present Rule, *see* 42 C.F.R. § 59.14(e)(5).

More fundamentally, plaintiffs' grievance is with the limited nature of the Title X program itself. Title X creates a limited program, focused on preconception services, and in that context, the doctor-patient relationship is not "sufficiently all encompassing

so as to justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice.” 500 U.S. at 200. And because Title X “does not provide post conception medical care, ... a doctor’s silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her.” *Id.* Congress’s limitations on the program no more violate a physician’s ethical responsibilities than her First Amendment rights.

**b.** Because HHS reasonably concluded that the referral and counseling restrictions do not force Title X grantees to violate medical ethics, plaintiffs cannot override that reasoned determination by threatening “that large numbers of providers and individual clinicians would be forced to stop participating in Title X if that aspect of the Rule took effect.” NFPRHA.Br.40; *see* Wash.Br.48. Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Rule forces providers to leave Title X depends on their incorrect premise that it requires violations of medical ethics, and they cite no authority for the extraordinary proposition that an agency administering a competitive grant program must either accede to the wishes of a subset of current grantees or identify in advance those entities who will take their place. Indeed, similar threats did not alter the outcome in *Rust*, and plaintiffs offer no reason why this case should be different. *See* Planned Parenthood Amicus Brief at 14 n.45, *Rust* (Nos. 89-1391, -1392), 1990 WL 10012649 (“Since many providers will not accept Title X funds under the unethical restrictions imposed by the regulations, they will be forced to close or drastically curtail services, depriving poor women of their sole source of family planning services.”).

Regardless, HHS reasonably predicted that any withdrawing incumbent providers likely will be replaced by new providers who were previously discouraged from joining the program by the abortion-referral requirement in the 2000 rule, or who will otherwise be willing to compete for and accept federal funds under the Rule. HHS explained that “under the 2000 regulations, some individuals and entities may have chosen not to apply to provide Title X services because they anticipated they would be pressured to counsel or refer for abortions,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 7780, and it pointed to data showing that a substantial number of medical professionals would limit the scope of their practice if forced to provide services that violated their conscience, *id.* at 7781 n.139. In addition, HHS had received input from “supportive commenters not[ing] that the 2000 regulations stand in the way of some organizations applying for Title X funds, or participating in Title X projects, due to the requirement for abortion referrals and information.” *Id.* at 7744. HHS thus predicted that the Rule may “lead to an increase in the number of health care providers who apply and receive funding under the Title X program, thus decreasing current gaps in family planning services in certain areas of the country.” *Id.* at 7780.

Those predictions have been borne out, with new providers emerging as a result of the Rule’s referral provisions, as evidenced by recent challenges to the abortion-referral requirement in the 2000 regulations brought by current and prospective Title X grantees on the basis of statutory and constitutional protections for religious beliefs. *See Obria Group, Inc. v. HHS*, No. 19-905 (C.D. Cal.) (voluntarily dismissed June 13,

2019); *Vita Nuova, Inc. v. Azar*, No. 19-532 (N.D. Tex.) (filed July 3, 2019). Although plaintiffs suggest these providers are inadequate substitutes because they offer different family-planning approaches (*see* Wash.Br.44 n.19; NFPRHA.Br.40 n.11), HHS was permitted to consider the emergence of new providers regardless of plaintiffs' views of their potential competitors, and the existence of such lawsuits alone confirms the reasonableness of HHS's prediction. Indeed, HHS expects the Rule's new application criteria favoring innovative approaches for underserved populations to "encourag[e] broader and more diverse applicants," 84 Fed. Reg. at 7718, a feature HHS found weighs in the Rule's favor. And more generally, HHS explained, it could not precisely "anticipate future turnover in grantees"—which hinges on the decisions of various independent actors—meaning any such "calculations would be purely speculative, and, thus, very difficult to forecast or quantify." *Id.* at 7782. In all events, HHS concluded that "compliance with statutory program integrity provisions is of greater importance" than the "cost" of departing from the status quo, *id.* at 7783, and the APA does not permit courts to second-guess that policy judgment.

c. Plaintiffs similarly err in claiming that HHS "fail[ed] to mention its *sub silentio* reversal of its own Program Requirements—including the [Quality Family Planning guidelines (QFP)]" (Wash.Br.45), referring to a 2014 publication containing clinical recommendations for providing quality family planning services. HHS continues to expect Title X providers to follow QFP guidelines to the extent they are

consistent with the Rule.<sup>5</sup> To the extent those guidelines conflict with the Rule, HHS acknowledged it was departing from its prior approach under the 2000 regulations, and the QFP guidelines in place at the time of the Rule did not (and indeed could not) substantively go beyond the 2000 regulations. *See, e.g.*, 84 Fed. Reg. at 7715.

Moreover, while NFPRHA claims that “HHS offer[ed] no rational reason or justification for abandoning the QFP” guidelines (NFPRHA.Br.36), HHS reasonably explained that it was adopting the Rule based on the best reading of § 1008. Thus, while plaintiffs assert that the Rule is inconsistent with the QFP guidelines because it “prohibit[s] referrals for abortion” and “requir[es] separate medical records for any patients who receive abortion care” (Wash.Br.46), HHS explained that these restrictions were warranted to implement § 1008’s exclusion of programs that promote or encourage abortion. 84 Fed. Reg. at 7759, 7767. Similarly, plaintiffs object to the Rule’s prenatal-referral requirement (Wash.Br.46), but HHS explained that prenatal referrals do not direct a patient to forgo obtaining an abortion and are appropriate to address the health of the patient *while* she is pregnant. *See* Gov.Br.26. Finally, plaintiffs (Wash.Br.46) object to the Rule’s elimination of the requirement that counseling and services be “medically approved” (in favor of the statutory requirement that they be

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<sup>5</sup> *See* HHS, Announcement of Availability of Funds for Title X Family Planning Services Grants, at 14-15 (2019), <https://www.hhs.gov/opa/sites/default/files/FY2019-FOA-FP-services-amended.pdf>.

“acceptable and effective”), but HHS adequately explained its reasons for dropping that confusing and redundant language, *see* 84 Fed. Reg. at 7732, 7740-41.

## 2. The Physical-Separation Requirement Is Reasonable

Plaintiffs fare no better in arguing that the Rule’s physical-separation requirement is arbitrary and capricious. The 2000 regulations already mandate financial separation, 84 Fed. Reg. at 7715; 65 Fed. Reg. at 41,276, and HHS reasonably determined that physical separation also is warranted to address the risk that taxpayer funds will be used to fund abortion—the same rationale approved in *Rust*.

Plaintiffs disagree with that conclusion, but the Supreme Court held in *Rust* that HHS’s predictive judgement about how best to comply with § 1008 was a reasonable basis for the same requirement. 500 U.S. at 187. As in *Rust*, HHS justified its policy by explaining that the prior regulations “failed to implement properly the statute.” *Id.* And HHS considered and discussed reliance interests, comments received, and the previous approaches, ultimately “reaffirm[ing the] reasoned determination” it made in 1988. 84 Fed. Reg. at 7724. The observation that “Title X funds pay only for the Title X project’s rent, staff, services, etc.” (NFPRHA.Br.42) does not meaningfully respond to HHS’s conclusion that collocation of Title X clinics and abortion clinics has the effect of subsidizing abortion in violation of § 1008. *See id.* at 7766.

Plaintiffs observe that the 1988 regulations partially relied upon reports from the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the General Accounting Office (GAO), which, they contend, cannot be considered now because they were issued “three decades ago.”

NFPRHA.Br.41-42. In issuing the Rule, HHS did not rely on those reports, but rather the fundamental economic principle that collocation of Title X and abortion clinics necessarily results in financial support for abortion-related activities and the perception that Title X clinics offer abortion-related services—an explanation plaintiffs have yet to refute. That justification is no less reasonable now than it was thirty years ago. Nor is there any indication that *Rust* would have come out differently had HHS not relied on the OIG and GAO reports in issuing the 1988 regulations. To the contrary, in the lead-up to *Rust*, the First Circuit rejected an arbitrary-and-capricious challenge to the 1988 regulations notwithstanding its conclusion that those “reports provide[d] a very slim reed of support.” *Massachusetts v. HHS*, 899 F.2d 53, 63 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc), *abrogated on other grounds by Rust, supra*.

Plaintiffs also argue that HHS underestimated compliance costs for incumbent Title X grantees (Wash.Br.49-50), but HHS, which administers the Title X program, is best situated to consider the potential effects on that program and it expressly did so. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 7781-82. Although commenters “provided extremely high cost estimates based on assumptions that they would have to build new facilities” to comply with the physical-separation requirement, HHS reasonably anticipated “that entities will usually choose the lowest cost method to come into compliance,” such as “shift[ing] their abortion services” to one of their multiple “distinct facilities.” *Id.* at 7781. And in any event, HHS “acknowledg[ed] that there is substantial uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the[] effects” of the physical-separation requirement, and provided an

“estimate” of “an average” that was “an increase from [the] averaged estimate ... in the proposed rule.” *Id.* at 7781-82. Thus, in considering the compliance costs on providers and the possibility that some incumbent providers might withdraw from the program, HHS simply made a different judgment than plaintiffs, which it of course was permitted to do. *See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

Nothing in the APA requires an agency to defer to the views of any particular commenter over the agency’s own. Rather, the agency must consider significant comments and provide a reasoned response. *See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n*, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015). Having considered the Rule’s effects on incumbent Title X providers, HHS concluded that the Rule was warranted to comply with Title X notwithstanding those predicted costs. That decision was not irrational simply because plaintiffs disagree with HHS’s predictive judgments or ultimate conclusion that the benefits outweighed the costs. *See Gov.Br.43*.

## **II. Merits Aside, The Preliminary Injunction Must Be Vacated**

### **A. The Balance Of The Equities Precludes Injunctive Relief**

1. Plaintiffs’ asserted injuries to public health are, as a unanimous motions panel of this Court acknowledged, speculative and “minor relative to the harms to the Government.” Dkt.No.34, at 26. To start, their warnings of dire public-health consequences and attendant effects on Washington’s fisc depend on crediting their own “predictions about the effect of implementing the Final Rule[] over HHS’s predictions

that implementation of the final rule will have the *opposite* effect.” *Id.* at 25. Specifically, they depend on plaintiffs’ view that only the existing network of Title X providers can provide effective care. *See* Wash.Br.52; NFPRHA.Br.44. HHS, however, came to the opposite conclusion: that public health would benefit from the Rule, which would “contribute to more clients being served, gaps in service being closed, and improved client care.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 7723. While the net effect of the Rule is necessarily “difficult to quantify,” *id.* at 7783, HHS’s predictions about changes to the Title X provider landscape are entitled to greater deference than plaintiffs’ speculation that only existing providers can serve Title X patients well.

In any event, plaintiffs’ predictions are necessarily predicated on their views of the merits. Plaintiffs’ assertion that “the Rule will force” providers “to either provide deficient care to pregnant patients or exit the program” (NFPRHA.Br.44), for example, depends on their claim that those restrictions force providers to violate medical ethics. And to the extent plaintiffs suggest these objections are independent of medical ethics, such preferences cannot overcome the government’s significant interest in enforcing its reasonable interpretation of § 1008. Similarly, plaintiffs’ assertion that the physical-separation requirement would be prohibitively expensive (NFPRHA.Br.44-45) depends on crediting their predictions as to those costs over HHS’s reasoned judgment.

2. On the other side of the ledger, the government has a significant interest in enforcing statutes, *see Maryland v. King*, 567 U.S. 1301 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers)—an interest that is heightened when the Supreme Court has already upheld

the government’s construction of a statute now reflected in a regulation that plaintiffs seek to enjoin. The government also has a weighty interest in declining to promote abortion through taxpayer funds, *see, e.g., Rust*, 500 U.S. at 192-93, particularly when the Supreme Court has already upheld HHS’s judgment that certain activities would do so (in violation of law), and sanctioned the remedial steps HHS proposes to ensure that taxpayer dollars are not being used for that purpose. Indeed, plaintiffs’ asserted harms—the closure of certain clinics and curtailment of lawful Title X services—confirm that, under the 2000 regulations, Title X funds were used to support abortion.

**B. The Preliminary Injunction Is Overbroad In Multiple Respects**

**1. The Nationwide Injunction Is Inappropriate**

At a minimum, constitutional and equitable principles require vacating the preliminary injunction insofar as it provides nationwide relief. Gov.Br.46-51. Plaintiffs do not deny that nationwide injunctions create an inequitable “one-way-ratchet” under which a victory by the government will not stop other challengers from “run[ning] off to the 93 other districts for more bites at the apple.” *City of Chicago v. Sessions*, 888 F.3d 272, 298 (7th Cir. 2018) (Manion, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); *see* Gov.Br.50. Nor do they meaningfully respond to this Court’s concerns that nationwide injunctions “deprive appellate courts of a wider range of perspectives,” deny “non-parties ... the right to litigate in other forums,” and encourage “forum shopping.” *California v. Azar*, 911 F.3d 558, 583 (9th Cir. 2018); *see* Gov.Br.50. At most, they assert that the injunction here “does not interfere with the development of the law in multiple

jurisdictions” (NFPRHA.Br.51), but their example of parallel litigation only underscores the inequities associated with this remedy: In *Family Planning Ass’n of Maine v. HHS*, 2019 WL 2866832 (D. Me. July 3, 2019), one of NFPRHA’s members lost its own motion for a preliminary injunction yet benefitted from the injunction that NFPRHA secured. Affirming the injunction here thus would effectively nullify the government’s successful efforts in both that jurisdiction as well as the Fourth Circuit, where it obtained a stay of another preliminary injunction against the Rule, *Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Azar*, No. 19-1614, 2019 WL 3072302 (4th Cir. July 2, 2019).

Washington nevertheless claims the Rule’s nationwide impact necessitates nationwide relief (Wash.Br.56-57), but cases such as *Gill v. Whitford*, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) and *California*, 911 F.3d 558, confirm that this theory is untenable. *See* Gov.Br.48. And the State’s reliance on principles of APA review (Wash.Br.58) is foreclosed by this Court’s precedent. *See, e.g., California*, 911 F.3d at 582-84 (vacating nationwide scope of preliminary injunction in APA challenge to HHS regulation); *Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius*, 638 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 2011) (same even for permanent injunction). Plaintiffs question “how the district court could have crafted a narrower injunction that would provide [them with] complete relief” (NFPRHA.Br.50; *see* Wash.Br.57), but the courts that issued party-specific injunctions in the lead-up to *Rust* have already supplied the answer. *See* Gov.Br.47 (noting pre-*Rust* party-specific injunction where plaintiffs included “national organizations” (one of which was NFPRHA) that “represent[ed] nearly 75% of Title X recipients and 285 subgrantees across the country”).

Finally, NFPRHA fails to rebut our showing that granting relief beyond those specific members the organizations relied upon for standing would be impermissibly overbroad. Gov.Br.49-50. NFPRHA accepts that “[a] plaintiff’s remedy must be tailored to redress the plaintiff’s particular injury,” *Gill*, 138 S. Ct. at 1933-34, and that it must “demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought,” *Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650 (2017), but these requirements are not satisfied by the assertion that “all of its 750 Title X-funded members are harmed by the Rule and need protection from it” or generic statements in a declaration. NFPRHA.Br.50 (citing SER47-63); *cf. Summers v. Earth Island Inst.*, 555 U.S. 488, 495 (2009) (affidavit asserting injury “from development on Forest Service land ... does not suffice” to establish standing “because it does not identify any particular site”).

## **2. The Injunction Of Severable Provisions Is Improper**

Finally, plaintiffs offer little defense of the district court’s (unexplained) decision to enjoin every provision of the Rule after analyzing only some of them. Gov.Br.51. Although they suggest it is the government’s duty to justify severability (NFPRHA.Br.51), it is *plaintiffs’* burden to justify why an injunction is necessary with respect to each provision of the Rule, and they have failed to do so. *Cf. Printz v. United States*, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (courts “have no business answering” questions about the validity of provisions that concern only “the rights and obligations of parties not before [them]”).

Even though only “strong evidence” can overcome the presumption that the valid provisions of a law containing a severability clause should be left intact, *National Mining Ass’n v. Zinke*, 877 F.3d 845, 862 (9th Cir. 2017), plaintiffs dismiss the preamble’s severability statement with the bare assertion that “the many changes in the Rule are interdependent and work together.” NFPRHA.Br.52; *see* Wash.Br.59. But provisions that have nothing to do with abortion—such as the requirement that Title X projects comply with state and local laws that mandate reporting of sexual abuse, 42 C.F.R. § 59.17—can easily operate without the referral restrictions and physical-separation requirement. Likewise, the physical-separation requirement can function without the referral and counseling restrictions and vice versa. And even if *requiring* referrals for *prenatal care* were invalid, that would not justify preventing HHS from *prohibiting* referrals for *abortion*. *See supra* Pt. I.A.1.a.

## CONCLUSION

The district court’s preliminary injunction should be vacated in whole or at least as to its overbroad scope.

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JULY 2019

### STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

The following related cases are currently pending in this Court: *Oregon v. Azar*, No. 19-35386(L); *California v. Azar*, No. 19-15974; *Essential Access Health, Inc. v. Azar*, No. 19-15979.

**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH  
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32(a)**

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and (6) because it has been prepared in 14-point Garamond, a proportionally spaced font.

I further certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) and Ninth Circuit Rule 32-1 because it contains 6,990 words, according to the count of Microsoft Word.

s/ Jaynie Lilley  
Jaynie Lilley

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on July 19, 2019, I filed the foregoing brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. All participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and will be served by the appellate CM/ECF system.

s/ Jaynie Lilley  
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