

1 ROBERT W. FERGUSON  
*Attorney General*

2 JEFFREY T. SPRUNG, WSBA #23607  
3 JOSHUA WEISSMAN, WSBA #42648  
4 PAUL M. CRISALLI, WSBA #40681  
5 NATHAN K. BAYS, WSBA #43025  
6 BRYAN M.S. OVENS, WSBA #32901  
*Assistant Attorneys General*  
800 Fifth Ave., Suite 2000  
Seattle WA 98104  
(206) 464-7744

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8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
**EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**  
9 **AT SPOKANE**

10 STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,

11 Plaintiffs,

12 v.

13 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT  
14 OF HOMELAND SECURITY, a  
federal agency, et al.

15 Defendants.

NO. 4:19-cv-05210-RMP

PLAINTIFF STATES'  
OPPOSITION TO  
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO  
STAY DISCOVERY ON  
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM

NOTED FOR: JUNE 4, 2020  
Without Oral Argument

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 After comprehensive briefing on the Plaintiffs States’ motion to compel,  
3 this Court agreed that Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery on their Equal Protection  
4 claim. In seeking to stay the Court’s Order, Defendants recycle many of the same  
5 arguments they made in opposing Plaintiffs’ motion to compel. The Court has  
6 already rejected those arguments and should do so again here. Having long  
7 delayed filing any responsive pleading, Defendants cannot meet their heavy  
8 burden of showing that good cause exists to stay discovery, and their motion to  
9 stay (ECF No. 213) should be denied.

10 **II. BACKGROUND**

11 Plaintiff States filed this action on August 14, 2019. *See* Compl. (ECF No.  
12 1). Among other claims, the Amended Complaint asserts that the *Inadmissibility*  
13 *on Public Charge Grounds* Final Rule issued by the U.S. Department of  
14 Homeland Security, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019), violates the Equal  
15 Protection component of the Fifth Amendment because it was motivated by an  
16 unlawful intent to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.  
17 Am. Compl. (ECF No. 31) ¶ 430.

18 Even though this case has been pending for over nine months, Defendants  
19 have yet to file a responsive pleading of any kind. Instead, Defendants asked this  
20 Court to first resolve a series of discovery disputes *before* setting a schedule for  
21 dispositive motion briefing, as they asserted the Court’s decisions on discovery  
22

1 “could impact the schedule for dispositive motions and the scope of such  
2 motions.” ECF No. 193, at 3–4.

3 Accordingly, the parties briefed two discovery issues, including whether  
4 Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery on the Equal Protection claim. Last month, the  
5 Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to compel, ruling that “discovery regarding the  
6 States’ equal protection claim is warranted under the Federal Rules of Civil  
7 Procedure.” ECF No. 210 at 20.

8 Following the Court’s ruling, Defendants announced they now intend to  
9 proceed with moving to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. *See* ECF No. 211 at 2. Almost  
10 three weeks after the Court entered its Order granting Plaintiffs’ motion to  
11 compel, Defendants filed this motion to stay discovery indefinitely pending  
12 resolution of their “upcoming motion.” ECF No. 213 at 2.

### 13 III. ARGUMENT

#### 14 A. Discovery Should Proceed Unless Defendants Can Show Good Cause 15 For A Stay

16 A stay of a prior court order “is not a matter of right, even if irreparable  
17 injury might otherwise result.” *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). Courts  
18 generally consider four factors in determining whether to stay a prior order: “(1)  
19 whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed  
20 on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;  
21 (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties  
22

1 interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” *Lair v.*  
2 *Bullock*, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Nken*, 556 U.S. at 434).

3 Similarly, a party seeking to stay discovery under Federal Rule of Civil  
4 Procedure 26 “carries the heavy burden of making a strong showing why  
5 discovery should be denied.” *Ministerio Roca Solida v. U.S. Dep’t of Fish &*  
6 *Wildlife*, 288 F.R.D. 500, 503 (D. Nev. 2013) (citing *Blankenship v. Hearst*  
7 *Corp.*, 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)). Blanket motions to stay discovery  
8 pending a decision on a motion to dismiss are disfavored. *Mlejnecky v. Olympus*  
9 *Imaging Am., Inc.*, No. 2:10-CV-02630, 2011 WL 489743, at \*6 (E.D. Cal.  
10 Feb. 7, 2011); *see also Gray v. First Winthrop Corp.*, 133 F.R.D. 39, 40 (N.D.  
11 Cal. 1990) (“notion” that motion to dismiss stays discovery is “directly at odds  
12 with the need for expeditious resolution of litigation”).

13 **B. Defendants’ Latest Round Of Delay Tactics Fall Far Short Of**  
14 **Carrying Their Burden To Show A Stay Is Warranted**

15 Defendants have not carried their heavy burden of establishing that a stay  
16 of discovery is warranted.

17 *First*, the sequencing from which Defendants seek relief is entirely of their  
18 own making. Defendants have been free to file a motion to dismiss for months  
19 but have chosen to do so only now, after the Court ruled that discovery may  
20 proceed.

21 As early as November 2019, Defendants represented that they “intend to  
22 move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims,” but the parties agreed that the Court should

1 not set a schedule for dispositive motion briefing until after production of the  
2 administrative record. Joint Report (ECF No. 188) at 7. After the record was  
3 produced,<sup>1</sup> Defendants agreed that certain discovery disputes—including this one  
4 regarding Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim—should be resolved before the  
5 Court adopted a deadline for dispositive motions and Defendants’ responsive  
6 pleading. Joint Status Report (ECF No. 193) at 2. Defendants specifically noted  
7 that even though they were “planning to move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims,” the  
8 Court should first decide these discovery issues, because that decision “could  
9 impact the schedule for dispositive motions and the scope of such motions.” *Id.*  
10 at 3–4. Defendants also agreed that “[t]he schedule for resolution of this case will  
11 be impacted by the outcome of” Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel. *Id.*

12 Now that the Court has ordered discovery, however, Defendants reverse  
13 course, arguing that *no* discovery is appropriate until *after* their not-yet-filed  
14 motion to dismiss has been decided. *See* ECF No. 213 at 2–4. According to  
15 Defendants, their forthcoming motion to dismiss is so “likely to succeed” that  
16 discovery should be stayed indefinitely, despite the Court’s previous order  
17 directing the parties to proceed. *Id.* at 3. This change in position begs the question  
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21 <sup>1</sup> Plaintiffs are reviewing the administrative record and reserve their rights  
22 to seek further completion as appropriate.

1 why Defendants did not raise these purportedly dispositive defenses sooner.<sup>2</sup> The  
2 forthcoming motion will likely take months to resolve, and Defendants’  
3 deliberate choice to wait until now to file their motion—and to seek a stay of all  
4 discovery in the meantime—frustrates “the just, speedy, and inexpensive  
5 determination” of this dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Defendants’ current view—that  
6 resolution of a theoretical motion to dismiss will shape the course of discovery—  
7 is also entirely inconsistent with their earlier position that discovery issues  
8 needed to be resolved *before* dispositive motions could be filed. Defendants  
9 cannot have it both ways as to whether discovery or dispositive motions should  
10 come first.

11 *Second*, even absent the particular litigation history in this case, the  
12 pendency of a motion to dismiss does not justify a complete stay of all discovery.  
13 “Had the Federal Rules contemplated that a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ.  
14 P. 12(b)(6) would stay discovery, the Rules would contain a provision for that  
15 effect.” *Skellerup Indus. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles*, 163 F.R.D. 598, 600–01  
16 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Instead, a stay of discovery is justified only where the court is  
17 “*convinced* that the plaintiff will be unable to state a claim for relief.” *Wood v.*  
18 *McEwen*, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 <sup>2</sup> Indeed, these same Defendants filed a motion to dismiss in related  
21 litigation as early as January of this year. *See Cook County v. Wolf*, No. 1:19-cv-  
22 06334, ECF Nos. 124, 146 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2020).

1 In arguing otherwise, Defendants rely entirely on out-of-Circuit authority.  
2 See ECF No. 213 at 1–2; see also ECF No. 210 at 6–7 (contrasting D.C. Circuit  
3 and Ninth Circuit precedent). But that is not the law here. See *supra* at 3; see also  
4 *Palmason v. Weyerhaeuser Co.*, No. C11-0695RSL, 2011 WL 13101278, at \*1  
5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2011) (denying to stay discovery pending resolution of  
6 motion to dismiss and noting “statutory presumption in favor of discovery”); *In*  
7 *re Valence Tech. Sec. Litig.*, No. C 94-1542-SC, 1994 WL 758688, at \*2 (N.D.  
8 Cal. Nov. 18, 1994) (denying to stay discovery pending challenge on the  
9 pleadings where movant failed to show “a clear case of hardship or inequity to  
10 justify a stay”); *TNG Entm’t, LLC v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC*, No. 2:15-CV-00933-  
11 RFB, 2015 WL 5562701, at \*1 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 2015) (“[T]he fact that a  
12 dispositive motion is pending is not a situation that in and of itself would warrant  
13 a stay of discovery.”).

14 As to the likelihood of success on their forthcoming motion, Defendants  
15 point only to the “deferential” rational basis standard they contend applies to  
16 Plaintiffs’ discrimination claim. ECF No. 213 at 3. But a party’s “conclusory”  
17 assertion that it will prevail on a future motion “does not satisfy Rule 26(c)’s  
18 good cause requirement,” because “[s]uch general arguments could be said to  
19 apply to any reasonably large civil litigation . . . [and] would undercut the Federal  
20 Rules’ liberal discovery provisions.” *Skellerup*, 163 F.R.D. at 600.

1           What is more, this Court has already held that the applicable standard has  
2 no bearing on whether Plaintiffs may take discovery. Whether Plaintiffs may face  
3 a heavier burden to prove their claim—a matter Plaintiffs continue to dispute,  
4 ECF No. 200 at 8—does not deprive them of the opportunity to build a factual  
5 record to carry that burden. ECF No. 210 at 19 (“[T]he Court agrees that the level  
6 of deference impacts only how the Court will eventually consider the evidence,  
7 not whether the States are entitled to the discovery they seek.”). Like the privilege  
8 log issue, Defendants have failed to “make an adequate showing” in “predicting  
9 that [their] forthcoming motion to dismiss will be resolved in their favor.” ECF  
10 No. 219 at 4.

11           Nor are decisions in related litigation to the contrary. In the California  
12 cases, the court directed last fall that the parties address the availability of Equal  
13 Protection discovery before defendants filed their motion to dismiss. *See* Tr. at  
14 14 (Nov. 14, 2019, ECF No. 138), Case No. 4:19-cv-04975-PJH (N.D. Cal.).  
15 Moreover, the concern the court expressed about “blindly authoriz[ing]” “wide-  
16 ranging discovery,” *California v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 19-CV-  
17 04975-PJH, 2020 WL 1557424, at \*16 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020), is not present  
18 here. Plaintiffs seek only “limited discovery into circumstantial and direct  
19 evidence of discriminatory intent,” as required under the legal framework that  
20 applies to Equal Protection claims. ECF No. 195 at 15.



1 As to the Supreme Court’s January order, the stay pending appeal of  
2 preliminary injunctions issued in the New York litigation says nothing about the  
3 merits of Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim here. *See* ECF No. 219 at 3–4  
4 (explaining that “merits” of claims addressed in preliminary injunction appeals  
5 are still “an open question” before this Court). The one-paragraph decision does  
6 not explain the Court’s basis for granting the stay, which just as likely depended  
7 entirely on factors other than likelihood of success, such as balance of equities or  
8 irreparable harm. *See Wolf v. Cook County, Illinois*, 140 S. Ct. 681, 682 (2020)  
9 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from grant of stay application) (noting, with respect to  
10 stay application in New York cases, that “[n]o Member of the Court discussed  
11 the application’s merit apart from its challenges to the injunction’s nationwide  
12 scope”).

13 *Finally*, Defendants’ generalized objections are premature. ECF No. 213  
14 at 4–5. That Defendants may claim privilege at some point in the future with  
15 respect to particular discovery requests does not amount to good cause to stay  
16 any and all discovery Plaintiffs may serve. Likewise, claims that certain requests  
17 are too burdensome or not “proportional to the needs of the case” under Fed. R.  
18 Civ. P. 26(b)(1) can be addressed as necessary through the ordinary process for  
19 resolving discovery disputes. *See Neill v. All Pride Fitness of Washougal, LLC*,  
20 No. C08-5424RJB, 2009 WL 10676369, at \*1 (W.D. Wash. May 21, 2009)  
21 (typical process for serving and objecting to discovery requests allows “the court  
22

1 [to] zero in on the discovery requests and the objections and rule specifically” on  
2 the issues raised). Even if Defendants are intent on raising these objections, they  
3 must do so in reference to specific discovery requests. *See Moore v. King Cty.*  
4 *Fire Prot. Dist. No. 26*, No. C05-442JLR, 2005 WL 8172569, at \*1 (W.D. Wash.  
5 Oct. 26, 2005) (party objecting to discovery “bears the burden of pointing out  
6 specific discovery requests and explaining the basis of its objection to them”).  
7 Defendants offer no reason why a blanket stay is required in place of raising and  
8 addressing any individual questions of burden or privilege in the normal course.

9 **IV. CONCLUSION**

10 Defendants’ motion to stay the Court’s Order authorizing discovery on  
11 Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim should be denied.

12 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of May, 2020.

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MARK R. HERRING  
Attorney General of Virginia  
  
/s/ Jessica Merry Samuels (pro hac vice)  
JESSICA MERRY SAMUELS, VSB #89537  
Assistant Solicitor General  
MICHELLE S. KALLEN, VSB #93286  
Deputy Solicitor General  
RYAN SPREAGUE HARDY, VSB #78558  
ALICE ANNE LLOYD, VSB #79105  
MAMOONA H. SIDDIQUI, VSB #46455  
Assistant Attorneys General  
Office of the Attorney General  
202 North Ninth Street  
Richmond, Virginia 23219  
(804) 786-7240  
JSamuels@oag.state.va.us  
MKallen@oag.state.va.us  
RHardy@oag.state.va.us  
ALloyd@oag.state.va.us  
MSiddiqui@oag.state.va.us  
SolicitorGeneral@oag.state.va.us  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff Commonwealth of  
Virginia*

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ROBERT W. FERGUSON  
Attorney General of Washington

/s/ Jeffrey T. Sprung

JEFFREY T. SPRUNG, WSBA #23607  
JOSHUA WEISSMAN, WSBA #42648  
PAUL M. CRISALLI, WSBA #40681  
NATHAN K. BAYS, WSBA #43025  
BRYAN M.S. OVENS, WSBA #32901

Assistant Attorneys General  
800 Fifth Ave., Suite 2000  
Seattle, WA 98104  
(206) 464-7744

Jeff.Sprung@atg.wa.gov  
Joshua.Weissman@atg.wa.gov  
Paul.Crisalli@atg.wa.gov  
Nathan.Bays@atg.wa.gov  
Bryan.Ovens@atg.wa.gov

*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Washington*

PHIL WEISER  
Attorney General of Colorado

/s/ Eric R. Olson

ERIC R. OLSON, #36414  
Solicitor General  
Office of the Attorney General  
Colorado Department of Law  
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor  
Denver, CO 80203

(720) 508 6548  
Eric.Olson@coag.gov

*Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of Colorado*

1  
2  
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22

KATHLEEN JENNINGS  
Attorney General of Delaware  
AARON R. GOLDSTEIN  
State Solicitor  
ILONA KIRSHON  
Deputy State Solicitor

/s/ Monica A. Horton  
MONICA A. HORTON, #5190  
Deputy Attorney General  
820 North French Street  
Wilmington, DE 19801  
Monica.horton@delaware.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff the State of Delaware*

KWAME RAOUL  
Attorney General of Illinois

/s/ Liza Roberson-Young  
LIZA ROBERSON-YOUNG, #6293643  
Public Interest Counsel  
Office of the Illinois Attorney General  
100 West Randolph Street, 11th Floor  
Chicago, IL 60601  
(312) 814-5028  
ERobersonYoung@atg.state.il.us  
*Attorney for Plaintiff State of Illinois*

CLARE E. CONNORS  
Attorney General of Hawai'i

/s/ Lili A. Young  
LILI A. YOUNG, #5886  
Deputy Attorney General  
Department of the Attorney General  
425 Queen Street  
Honolulu, HI 96813  
(808) 587-3050  
Lili.A.Young@hawaii.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Hawai'i*

1  
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3  
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22

BRIAN E. FROSH  
Attorney General of Maryland  
  
/s/ Jeffrey P. Dunlap  
JEFFREY P. DUNLAP, #1812100004  
Assistant Attorney General  
200 St. Paul Place  
Baltimore, MD 21202  
T: (410) 576-7906  
F: (410) 576-6955  
JDunlap@oag.state.md.us  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Maryland*

MAURA HEALEY  
Attorney General of Commonwealth of  
Massachusetts  
  
/s/ Abigail B. Taylor  
ABIGAIL B. TAYLOR, #670648  
Chief, Civil Rights Division  
DAVID UREÑA, #703076  
Special Assistant Attorney General  
ANGELA BROOKS, #663255  
Assistant Attorney General  
Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General  
One Ashburton Place  
Boston, MA 02108  
(617) 963-2232  
abigail.taylor@mass.gov  
david.urena@mass.gov  
angela.brooks@mass.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff Commonwealth of  
Massachusetts*

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DANA NESSEL  
Attorney General of Michigan  
  
*/s/Toni L. Harris*  
FADWA A. HAMMOUD, #P74185  
Solicitor General  
TONI L. HARRIS, #P63111  
*First Assistant Attorney General*  
Michigan Department of Attorney General  
P.O. Box 30758  
Lansing, MI 48909  
(517) 335-7603 (main)  
HarrisT19@michigan.gov  
Hammoudfl@michigan.gov  
*Attorneys for the People of Michigan*

KEITH ELLISON  
Attorney General of Minnesota  
  
*/s/ R.J. Detrick*  
R.J. DETRICK, #0395336  
*Assistant Attorney General*  
Minnesota Attorney General’s Office  
Bremer Tower, Suite 100  
445 Minnesota Street  
St. Paul, MN 55101-2128  
(651) 757-1489  
(651) 297-7206  
Rj.detrick@ag.state.mn.us  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Minnesota*

1  
2  
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22

AARON D. FORD  
Attorney General of Nevada

/s/ Heidi Parry Stern  
HEIDI PARRY STERN, #8873  
Solicitor General  
Office of the Nevada Attorney General  
555 E. Washington Ave., Ste. 3900  
Las Vegas, NV 89101  
HStern@ag.nv.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Nevada*

GURBIR S. GREWAL  
Attorney General of New Jersey

/s/ Glenn J. Moramarco  
GLENN J. MORAMARCO, #030471987  
Assistant Attorney General  
Office of the Attorney General  
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex  
25 Market Street, 1st Floor, West Wing  
Trenton, NJ 08625-0080  
(609) 376-3232  
Glenn.Moramarco@law.njoag.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of New Jersey*

HECTOR BALDERAS  
Attorney General of New Mexico

/s/ Tania Maestas  
TANIA MAESTAS, #20345  
Chief Deputy Attorney General  
P.O. Drawer 1508  
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-1508  
tmaestas@nmag.gov  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of New Mexico*



1  
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PETER F. NERONHA  
Attorney General of Rhode Island

/s/ Lauren E. Hill  
LAUREN E. HILL, #9830  
Special Assistant Attorney General  
Office of the Attorney General  
150 South Main Street  
Providence, Rhode Island 02903  
(401) 274-4400 x 2038  
E-mail: [lhill@riag.ri.gov](mailto:lhill@riag.ri.gov)  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff State of Rhode Island*

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**DECLARATION OF SERVICE**

I hereby declare that on this day I caused the foregoing document to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the Court’s CM/ECF System which will serve a copy of this document upon all counsel of record.

DATED this 18th day of May, 2020.

/s/ Jessica Merry Samuels (pro hac vice)  
JESSICA MERRY SAMUELS, VSB #89537  
Assistant Solicitor General