

No. \_\_\_\_\_

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**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

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JANE DOES 1–6, JOHN DOES 1–3, JACK DOES 1–1000, JOAN DOES 1–1000,

*Applicants,*

v.

JANET T. MILLS, in her official capacity as Governor of the State of Maine,  
JEANNE M. LAMBREW, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Maine  
Department of Health and Human Services, NIRAV D. SHAH, in his official  
capacity as Director for the Maine Center for Disease Control and Prevention,  
MAINEHEALTH, GENESIS HEALTHCARE OF MAINE, LLC, GENESIS  
HEALTHCARE, LLC, NORTHERN LIGHT HEALTH FOUNDATION,  
MAINEGENERAL HEALTH,

*Respondents.*

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**Petitioner’s Motion for Writ of Injunction Pending Appeal  
RELIEF NEEDED TODAY, OCTOBER 15, 2021**

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Mathew D. Staver (Counsel of Record)  
Anita L. Staver  
Horatio G. Mihet  
Roger K. Gannam  
Daniel J. Schmid  
LIBERTY COUNSEL  
P.O. Box 540774  
Orlando, FL 32853  
(407) 875-1776  
court@LC.org | hmihet@LC.org  
rgannam@LC.org | dschmid@LC.org

*Counsel for Applicants*

## **PARTIES**

Applicants are JANE DOES 1–6, JOHN DOES 1–3, JACK DOES 1–1000, JOAN DOES 1–1000. Respondents are JANET T. MILLS, in her official capacity as Governor of the State of Maine, JEANNE M. LAMBREW, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Maine Department of Health and Human Services, NIRAV D. SHAH, in his official capacity as Director for the Maine Center for Disease Control and Prevention, MAINEHEALTH, GENESIS HEALTHCARE OF MAINE, LLC, GENESIS HEALTHCARE, LLC, NORTHERN LIGHT HEALTH FOUNDATION, MAINEGENERAL HEALTH.

## **DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS**

JANE DOES 1-6, et al. v. MILLS, et al., No. 21-1826 (1st Cir. Oct. 15, 2021), Order denying Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.

JANE DOES 1-6, et al. v. MILLS, et al.. No. 1:21-cv-242-JDL (D. Me. October 13, 2021), Order Denying Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2.

JANE DOES 1-6, et al. v. MILLS, et al.. No. 1:21-cv-242-JDL (D. Me. October 13, 2021), Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction, attached hereto as EXHIBIT 3.

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## INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Sup. Ct. Rule 21, 28 U.S.C. §1651, and 28 U.S.C. §2101, Petitioners JANE DOES 1–6, JOHN DOES 1–3, JACK DOES 1–1000, JOAN DOES 1–1000 hereby move this Court for an Emergency Writ of Injunction Pending Appeal. **Because of the deadline imposed by Defendants’ unconstitutional, unlawful, and unconscionable demands that Applicants violate their sincerely held religious conscience by TODAY, October 15, 2021, relief cannot wait another day. Plaintiffs and other healthcare workers in Maine are already being told not to report to work tomorrow absent Court-ordered relief or violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs. For many years prior to the instant action and in strict compliance with federal law, Defendants permitted healthcare workers in the State of Maine to apply for and receive religious exemptions to mandatory vaccine requirements. Yet, on August 14, 2021, Maine stripped all protections for religious objectors to any vaccination requirement in conjunction with its emergency declaration that all healthcare workers in Maine receive a COVID-19 vaccination. (EXHIBIT 4, Verified Complaint, “V. Compl.” ¶¶41-49.) Defendants now also threaten all Applicants with the immediate termination of their ability to feed their families, a loss of their license for failing to abide by the unconstitutional and unlawful mandate, and attempt to turn their religious beliefs into First Amendment orphans. Relief is needed **today** to protect Applicants’ sincerely held religious beliefs**

## TEMPORARY AND LIMITED RELIEF SOUGHT

**State Defendants’ deadline to become fully vaccinated is October 29, 2021, which requires Plaintiffs to accept a vaccination that violates their sincerely held religious beliefs by no later than TODAY, Friday, October 15, 2021.** The relief sought in the instant Application is needed **today** to protect Plaintiffs’ cherished First Amendment liberties and prevent irreparable harm. Plaintiffs have moved expeditiously and with extreme urgency, filing their notice of appeal within 1 hour of the district court’s denial of injunctive relief, and filing this motion in this Court on the very next morning, within a few minutes of the appeal being docketed.

On Plaintiffs-Appellants JANE DOES 1–6, JOHN DOES 1–3, JACK DOES 1–1000, JOAN DOES 1–1000, (“Plaintiffs”) **on an emergency basis**, hereby move this Court for an Injunction Pending Appeal, restraining and enjoining Defendants–Appellees, all of their officers, agents, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them, from enforcing, threatening to enforce, attempting to enforce, or otherwise requiring compliance with the Governor’s COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate such that

- i. Defendant Governor Mills will not enforce her unconstitutional mandate that John Doe 1 require his employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine and refuse to provide a religious exemption or accommodation for such employees in violation of John Doe 1’s and his employees’ sincerely held religious beliefs;



- ii. Defendants will immediately cease in their refusal to consider, review, and grant Plaintiffs' requests for religious exemption and accommodation from the Governor's COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate, provided that Plaintiffs agree to abide by reasonable accommodation provisions such as masking, testing, symptom monitoring, and reporting; and
- iii. Defendants will immediately cease threatening to discharge and terminate Plaintiffs from their employment for failure to accept a COVID-19 vaccine that violates their sincerely held religious beliefs.

Applicants seek very limited and interim relief from this Court. Applicants have a currently pending appeal in this instant action at the First Circuit. The First Circuit has ordered expedited relief with all parties briefs due October 18, and a decision to issue expeditiously thereafter. However, irreparable harm will result absent relief pending disposition of the appeal and any petitions for certiorari.

### **JURISDICTION AND TIMING**

Plaintiffs filed this action on August 25, 2021 (Exhibit 4), and immediately moved for preliminary injunctive relief. (Dkt. 3). Over Plaintiffs' objections, the Court delayed a hearing until September 20, 2021. (Dkt. 44). The Court then held Plaintiffs' motion under advisement **for more than three weeks, waiting until two days before Plaintiffs' vaccine compliance deadline to rule on an emergency motion that had been briefed and argued for nearly a month.** On October 13, 2021, the district court finally denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction,

holding that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to the Governor's COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate (Exhibit 3, PI Order at 14). Plaintiffs noticed their appeal to the First Circuit on the same day, within one hour of the PI Order.

In conjunction with Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8(a)(1)(C), Plaintiffs also requested alternative relief in the form of an injunction pending appeal should the court deny the preliminary injunction. (**EXHIBIT 5**, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Injunction Pending Appeal, "PI Motion"). The district court also denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal. (Exhibit 2.) Within one hour of the First Circuit docketing Plaintiffs' appeal on October 14, Applicants filed an Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal with the First Circuit. Without any discussion or explanation, the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied that Motion on October 15. (Exhibit 1.) **Applicants present this Motion today, October 15, the same day as their IPA denial from the First Circuit due to the extraordinary urgency of Defendants' unconscionable, unconstitutional, and unlawful demands.**

#### **URGENCIES JUSTIFYING EMERGENCY RELIEF**

The seminal issue before this Court can be boiled down to a simple question: Does federal law apply in Maine? Though the question borders on the absurd, so does Defendants' answer to it. Defendants have explicitly claimed to healthcare workers in Maine, including Plaintiffs, that federal law does not apply, and neither should they. Defendants have informed Plaintiffs, who have sincerely held religious objections to the Governor's mandate that all healthcare workers in Maine must

receive a COVID-19 vaccine by October 1, 2021 (the “**COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate**”), that no protections or considerations are given to religious beliefs in Maine. Indeed, Defendants’ answer has been an explicit claim that federal law does not provide protections to Maine’s healthcare workers. When presented with requests from Plaintiffs for exemption and accommodation for their sincerely held religious beliefs, Defendants have responded in the following ways:

- “I can share MaineHealth’s view that **federal law does not supersede state law in this instance.**” (V. Compl. ¶87 (emphasis added).)
- “[W]e are no longer able to consider religious exemptions for those who work in the state of Maine.” (V. Compl. ¶84 (bold emphasis original).)
- “All MaineGeneral employees will have to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by Oct. 1 unless they have a medical exemption. The mandate also states that only medical exemptions are allowed, **no religious exemptions are allowed.**” (V. Compl. ¶93 (emphasis added).)
- “Allowing for a religious exemption would be a violation of the state mandate issued by Governor Mills. So, unfortunately, that is not an option for us.” (V. Compl. ¶94.)

The answer to the question before this Court is clear: federal law and the United States Constitution are supreme over any Maine statute or edict, and Maine cannot override, nullify, or violate federal law. *See* U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding.”). “This Court has long made clear that federal law is as much the law of the several States as are the laws passed by their legislatures.” *Haywood v. Drown*, 556 U.S. 729, 734 (2009). Indeed, “[i]t is a familiar and well-established principle that the Supremacy Clause . . . invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause . . . state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.” *Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.*, 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985) (emphasis added) (cleaned up).

Thus, there can be no dispute that **Maine is required to abide by federal law and provide protections to employees who have sincerely held religious objections to the COVID-19 vaccines**. And, here, the federal law is clear: There can be no dispute that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits Defendants from discriminating against Plaintiffs on the basis of their sincerely held religious beliefs. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s . . . religion.”). And, Defendants have a duty under Title VII to provide religious exemptions and accommodations to those with sincerely held religious objections to the COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate. In direct contrast to this unquestionable principle of black letter law, however, every Defendant in this suit has seen fit to claim to its healthcare workers that the converse is true, and that Maine law is supreme over federal law; has engaged in a conspiracy

and scheme to discourage employees with religious objections to the mandatory vaccines from even seeking religious exemptions from such a policy; has informed Plaintiffs that their requests for an exemption and accommodation from the mandate cannot even be evaluated or considered; and has flatly denied all requests for religious exemption and accommodation from the mandate that all healthcare workers receive a COVID-19 vaccine. Employers bent on discrimination “usually don’t post help wanted signs reading ‘blacks need not apply.’” *Lewis v. City of Unity City*, 918 F.3d 1213, 1261 (11th Cir. 2019) (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part). But Maine and its healthcare employers have no problem being direct: “**religious misbelievers need not apply.**”

The dispute in this case is not about what accommodations are available to Plaintiffs or whether accommodation of Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious objections can be conditioned on compliance with certain reasonable requirements. Plaintiffs have already acknowledged to Defendants that they are willing to comply with reasonable health and safety requirements that were deemed sufficient a mere two weeks ago. The dispute is about whether Defendants are required to even consider a request for reasonable accommodation of Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs. The answer is clear: **yes**. And this Court should require Defendants to acknowledge and accept that federal law mandates accommodation for Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs and order that Defendants extend such protections.

As the Northern District of New York has just held when it enjoined New York’s very similar scheme: “**Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with**

regard to religious practices . . . rather, it gives them favored treatment.’ Thus, under certain circumstances, Title VII ‘requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an accommodation.’” *Dr. A v. Hochul*, No. 1:21-CV-1009, 2021 WL 4734404, \*9 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2021) (quoting *EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.*, 575 U.S. 768, 775-776 (2015)) (emphasis added). Indeed, the court in *Dr. A* plainly held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims because – as here – the Governor’s mandate “has effectively foreclosed the pathway to seeking a religious accommodation that is guaranteed under Title VII.” *Id.* at \*6. And this Court should require Defendants to acknowledge and accept that federal law mandates accommodation for Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs and order that Defendants extend such protections.

On September 30, 2021, the Second Circuit gave its imprimatur to the *Dr. A* TRO against State Defendants in *We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul*, No. 21-2179, dkt. 65 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2021). There, the Second Circuit issued an injunction pending appeal against the Governor’s COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate, ordering that the New York State Defendants are enjoined from enforcing their mandate.

On October 7, 2021, the Sixth Circuit issued an order affirming a preliminary injunction against Western Michigan University for its similar refusal to grant requested religious accommodations from a mandatory COVID-19 vaccine policy. *See Dahl v. Bd. of Trustees of W. Michigan Univ.*, No. 21-2945, 2021 WL 4618519 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2021). In denying the university’s request for a stay, the Sixth Circuit

concluded that the student athletes’ “free exercise challenge will likely succeed on appeal.” *Id. at* \*1. Specifically,

the University’s failure to grant religious exemptions to plaintiffs burdened their free exercise rights. The University **put plaintiffs to the choice: get vaccinated or stop fully participating in intercollegiate sports. . . . By conditioning the privilege of playing sports on plaintiffs’ willingness to abandon their sincere religious beliefs, the University burdened their free exercise rights.**

*Id. at* \*3 (emphasis added).

The court continued,

But the mandate does penalize a student otherwise qualified for intercollegiate sports by withholding the benefit of playing on the team should she refuse to violate her sincerely held religious beliefs. **As a result, plaintiffs have established that the University's vaccination policy for student-athletes burdens their free exercise of religion.**

*Id.* (emphasis added).

As here, the university offered medical exemptions and, theoretically, religious exemptions to its student-athletes, but refused to provide religious accommodations.

*Id. at* \*1. The Sixth Circuit found that such a discriminatory scheme of individualized exemptions made the vaccine mandate not neutral or generally applicable. *Id. at* \*4.

That alone was sufficient to mandate the application of strict scrutiny under *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo*, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020).

**If Plaintiffs do not comply with the vaccine mandate by today, they will be terminated and deprived of their ability to feed their families. Plaintiffs are facing a deadline to become fully vaccinated to October 29,**

**which requires Plaintiffs to accept a vaccination by no later than TODAY,  
Friday, October 15.**

Relief cannot wait another day. No American should be faced with this unconscionable choice, especially the healthcare heroes who have served us admirably for the entire duration of COVID-19. An IPA is needed now to ensure that Defendants are enjoined from their continued efforts to deny that federal law even applies in Maine and to compel Defendants to extend the protections that federal law demands of them. Plaintiffs will suffer (and some have already suffered) irreparable harm by being forced to choose between their jobs and their sincerely held religious beliefs. Despite the Governor's mandate only requiring full vaccination by October 1, Plaintiff Jane Doe 2 was told her deadline to comply with the mandate was August 23, and she has already suffered termination as a result of the Governor's mandate. Relief from this unconscionable and unlawful deprivation of Plaintiffs' liberties cannot wait another day.

Earlier this year, the Governor rightfully declared that Maine's healthcare workers were "Superheroes" and requested that "all Maine people join me in thanking all of our healthcare workers who have heeded the call of duty and worked long hours, days, and weeks, often at great sacrifice to themselves and their families, to protect Maine people during this extraordinary crisis." Office of Governor Janet T. Mills, *Governor Mills Announces Four Maine Healthcare Superheroes to Attend Super Bowl LV Thanks to Generosity of New England Patriots' Kraft Family* (Feb. 2, 2021), <https://www.maine.gov/governor/mills/news/governor-mills-announces-four-maine->



healthcare-superheroes-attend-super-bowl-iv-thanks. Every word of that statement is equally as true today as it was the day the Governor uttered it. **Yet, on August 12, 2021, those same superheroes have now been cast as evil villains for requesting exemption and accommodation from the Governor's edict for their sincerely held religious beliefs.**

Neither the Governor nor any of the Defendant employers is permitted to blatantly ignore federal protections under the First Amendment and Title VII, yet that is precisely why emergency relief is needed in the instant action: Plaintiffs need **an order mandating that Defendants follow federal protections for religious objectors to the COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate.**

Plaintiffs are all healthcare workers in Maine who have sincerely held religious beliefs that preclude them from accepting any of the COVID-19 vaccines because of the vaccines' connections to aborted fetal cell lines and for other religious reasons that have been articulated to Defendants. Since COVID-19 first arrived in Maine, Plaintiffs have risen every morning, donned their personal protective equipment, and fearlessly marched into hospitals, doctor's offices, emergency rooms, operating rooms, and examination rooms with one goal: to provide quality healthcare to those suffering from COVID-19 and every other illness or medical need that confronted them. They did it bravely and with honor. They answered the call of duty to provide healthcare to the folks who needed it the most and worked tirelessly to ensure that those ravaged by the pandemic were given appropriate care. **All Plaintiffs seek in this lawsuit is to be able to continue to provide the healthcare they have provided to**

**patients for their entire careers, and to do so under the same protective measures that have sufficed for them to be considered superheroes for the last 18 months.** Defendants shamelessly seek to throw these healthcare workers out into the cold and ostracize them from the very medical facilities for which they have sacrificed so much solely because of Plaintiffs’ desire to continue to provide quality healthcare while still exercising their sincerely held religious beliefs.

The law mandates that Defendants permit them to do both. Regardless of whether Maine sees fit to extend protections to religious objectors under its own statutory framework, **federal law demands that these Plaintiffs and all employees in Maine receive protections for their sincerely held religious beliefs.** This Court should hold Maine to the bargain it made with its citizens when it joined the union and ensure that Maine extends the required protections that federal law demands. As the Supreme Court held just last year, “**even in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.**” *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo*, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2021) (emphasis added). When we have demanded so much of our healthcare heroes, we owe them nothing less than the full measure of our own commitment to constitutional principles. Anything less would be desecrating the sacrifice these medical heroes made for untold numbers of people—including Defendants—when the call of duty demanded it of them.

## LEGAL ARGUMENT

### I. APPLICANTS HAVE A CLEAR AND INDISPUTABLE RIGHT TO RELIEF BECAUSE DEFENDANTS' INTENTIONAL REMOVAL OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM THE VACCINE MANDATE WHILE ALLOWING MEDICAL EXEMPTIONS VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

#### A. Maine's Singling Out of Religious Employees Who Decline Vaccination for Especially Harsh Treatment Is Not Religiously Neutral.

“[G]overnment regulations are not neutral and generally applicable, and therefore trigger strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause, whenever they treat *any* comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise.” *Tandon v. Newsom*, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (bold emphasis added). In fact, “the regulations cannot be viewed as neutral because they single out [religion] for especially harsh treatment.” *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo*, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020). “When a state so obviously targets religion for differential treatment, our job becomes much clearer.” *South Bay*, 141 S. Ct. at 717 (Gorsuch, J.) (emphasis added).

Here, Maine has plainly singled out religious employees who decline vaccination for especially harsh treatment (*i.e.*, depriving them from earning a living anywhere in the State), while favoring employees declining vaccination for secular, medical reasons. Under the *Tandon*, *South Bay*, and *Catholic Diocese* triumvirate, Government Defendants' discriminatory treatment of unvaccinated religious employees violates the First Amendment. Under the prior version of Maine's immunization exemption requirements, Maine allowed for (a) medical exemptions,

and (b) exemptions for any employee who “states in writing an opposition to immunization because of a sincerely held religious belief.” (V. Compl. ¶ 48.) On August 14, 2021, however, Maine removed **only the religious exemption from the rule.** (V. Compl. ¶46.) Indeed, where – as here – the government has removed a previously available religious exemption, that “intentional change in language is the kind of ‘religious gerrymander’ that triggers heightened scrutiny.” *Dr. A v. Hochul*, No. 1:21-cv-1009, 2021 WL 4734404, \*8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2021).

**B. The Vaccine Mandate’s More Favorable Treatment of Employees Declining Vaccination for Secular, Medical Reasons as Compared to Employees Declining Vaccination for Religious Reasons Is Not Generally Applicable.**

Maine’s continuing recognition of only medical exemptions also removes the Vaccine Mandate from neutrality and general applicability. As *Dr. A* held this week, where the government permits medical exemptions from the mandate, but excludes religious exemptions, the law is not neutral. 2021 WL 4734404, at \*8. In *Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark*, Justice (then-Judge) Alito wrote unequivocally for the court that “[b]ecause the Department makes exemptions from its [no beards] policy for secular reasons and has not offered any substantial justification for refusing to provide similar treatment for officers who are required to wear beards for religious reasons, we conclude that the Department’s policy violates the First Amendment.” 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). There, like Maine here, the city argued that it was required to provide medical accommodations under federal law but that religious exemptions were not required. *Id.* at 365. The court squarely

rejected that rationale: “It is true that the ADA requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities. However, **Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposes an identical obligation on employers with respect to accommodating religion.**” *Id.* (emphasis added) (cleaned up). Thus, the court held, “**we cannot accept the Department's position that its differential treatment of medical exemptions and religious exemptions is premised on a good-faith belief that the former may be required by law while the latter are not.**” *Id.* (emphasis added).

Here, the district court found that the availability of medical exemptions, while religious exemptions were specifically targeted and excluded, does not violate the First Amendment because the two are not comparable. (PI Order at 19.) Justice Alito squarely rejected that contention:

We also reject the argument that, because the medical exemption is not an “individualized exemption,” the *Smith /Lukumi* rule does not apply. While the Supreme Court did speak in terms of “individualized exemptions” in *Smith* and *Lukumi*, **it is clear from those decisions that the Court’s concern was the prospect of the government’s deciding that secular motivations are more important than religious motivations. If anything, this concern is only further implicated when the government does not merely create a mechanism for individualized exemptions, but instead, actually creates a categorical exemption for individuals with a secular objection but not for individuals with a religious objection.**

*Fraternal Order of Police*, 170 F.3d at 365 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). The same is true here. Maine maintained a policy that permitted religious exemptions and medical exemptions to mandatory vaccinations. (V. Compl. ¶ 48.) Then, Maine specifically removed religious exemptions while maintaining medical exemptions. (V.

Compl. ¶¶ 46–47.) And, that discriminatory removal of a religious exemption while maintaining a medical exemption violates the First Amendment. 170 F.3d at 365 (“**Therefore, we conclude that the Department's decision to provide medical exemptions while refusing religious exemptions is sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent so as to trigger heightened scrutiny under *Smith* and *Lukumi*.**” (emphasis added)).

Here, Maine claims secular, medical reasons for declining vaccination are important enough to overcome its purported interest but that religious reasons for declining vaccination are not. Such a value judgment does not legitimize a discriminatory policy:

**[T]he medical exemption raises concern because it indicates that the Department has made a value judgment that secular (i.e., medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important enough to overcome its general interest in uniformity but that religious motivations are not. As discussed above, when the government makes a value judgment in favor of secular motivations, but not religious motivations, the government’s actions must survive heightened scrutiny.**

170 F.3d at 366 (emphasis added). Essentially, as here, “[w]e thus conclude that the Department's policy cannot survive any degree of heightened scrutiny and thus cannot be sustained.” *Id.* at 367 (emphasis added).

The Northern District of New York’s decision in *Dr. A*, and Justice Alito’s opinion for the court in *Fraternal Order of Police* hardly represent a novel proposition. As the Sixth Circuit explained, “a double standard is not a neutral standard.” *Ward v. Polite*, 667 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir. 2012). As many courts have recognized, allowing medical exemptions while prohibiting religious exemptions is unconstitutional. *See*,

*e.g., Litzman v. N.Y. City Police Dep't*, No. 12 Civ. 4681(HB), 2013 WL 6049066, \*3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2013) (holding that a policy that permits medical exemptions but not religious exemptions is neither neutral nor generally applicable and must be subject to strict scrutiny); *Singh v. McHugh*, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201, 225 (D.D.C. 2016) (“In sum, it is difficult to see how accommodating plaintiff’s religious exercise would do greater damage to the Army’s compelling interests in uniformity, discipline, credibility, unit cohesion, and training than the tens of thousands of medical shaving profiles the Army has already granted.”); *Cunningham v. City of Shreveport*, 407 F. Supp. 3d 595, 607 (W.D. La. 2019) (allowing medical exemptions while precluding religious exemptions removes law from neutrality and general applicability). Maine’s discriminatory retention of medical exemptions while excluding religious exemptions must be subjected to, and cannot withstand, strict scrutiny. Put simply, “restrictions inexplicably applied to one group and exempted from another do little to further [the government’s] goals and do much to burden religious freedom.” *Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear*, 957 F.3d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 2020).

**C. Maine’s Discriminatory Treatment of Religious Exemptions Is Subject to and Cannot Withstand Strict Scrutiny**

- 1. Maine’s favorable treatment of exemptions posing equal risks, and Maine’s questionable risk assumptions undermine its claim of a compelling interest.**
  - a. Maine’s favorable treatment of medical exemptions posing risks equal to excluded religious exemptions undermines its compelling interest claim.**

Where, as here, First Amendment rights are at issue, **“the government must shoulder a correspondingly heavier burden and is entitled to considerably**

less deference in its assessment that a predicted harm justifies a particular impingement on First Amendment rights.” *Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31*, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472 (2018) (emphasis added). Here, because Maine’s Vaccine Mandate and its exclusion of religious exemptions implicate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, Maine “must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured. It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural.” *Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC*, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994); *see also Edenfield v. Fane*, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993). This is so because “[d]eference to [the government] cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake.” *Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Maine*, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978).

To be sure, efforts to contain the spread of a deadly disease are “compelling interests of the highest order.” *On Fire Christian Ctr., Inc. v. Fischer*, 453 F. Supp. 3d 901, 910 (W.D. Ky. 2020). But Maine’s permitting unvaccinated employees with medical exemptions to continue in their same healthcare positions while claiming unvaccinated employees with religious exemptions would put the entire healthcare system at risk undermines any claim that Maine’s interest is compelling. **If any unvaccinated employees pose a risk to Maine’s healthcare system because they are unvaccinated, then all unvaccinated employees pose the same risk.** Put simply, Maine’s Vaccine Mandate “cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order . . . **when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.**” *Republican Party of Minn. v. White*, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) (emphasis added) (cleaned up). Where, as here (V. Compl. ¶¶ 46–49), the



government permits exceptions, the Supreme Court has recognized that such exceptions “can raise doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker.” *Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar*, 575 U.S. 433, 448 (2015) (cleaned up). Indeed, “[w]here a regulation already provides an exception from the law for a particular group, the government will have a higher burden in showing that the law . . . furthers a compelling interest.” *McAllen Grave Brethren Church v. Salazar*, 764 F.3d 465, 472 (5th Cir. 2014).

**b. Maine’s claimed compelling interest is based on questionable risk assumptions as shown by scientific evidence in the Verified Complaint and from the CDC.**

Maine asserts that mandatory vaccination for healthcare workers is supported by a compelling interest because nothing else can protect the healthcare industry and patient health in Maine. (Dkt. 49-4, Shah Decl., ¶¶ 55–56.) Maine claims that vaccines are the only way to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and that unvaccinated individuals are at greater risk of infection from the Delta variant than vaccinated. (*Id.* ¶ 23.) But, as demonstrated in the Verified Complaint,

A preliminary study has shown that in the case of a breakthrough infection, the Delta variant is able to grow in the noses of vaccinated people **to the same degree as if they were not vaccinated at all**. The virus that grows is just as infectious as that in unvaccinated people, meaning vaccinated people can transmit the virus and infect others.

(V. Compl. ¶ 79 (quoting Sanjay Mishra, *Evidence mounts that people with breakthrough infections can spread Delta easily*, National Geographic (Aug. 20, 2021), <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/evidence-mounts-that-people-with-breakthrough-infections-can-spread-delta-easily> (emphasis added)).) *See also*

Statement from CDC Director Rochelle P. Walensky, MD, MPH on Today's MMWR, <https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/s0730-mmwr-covid-19.html> (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (noting that "the Delta infection resulted in similarly high SARS-CoV-2 viral loads in vaccinated and unvaccinated people") Thus, Maine's assumptions of the relative risks of transmission by vaccinated and unvaccinated employees are scientifically questionable, further undermining Maine's claimed compelling interest in mandating vaccination. And, critically, it is the Government's burden to demonstrate the compelling interest. *Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal*, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006) ("the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial."). Maine has not met that burden here

**2. Maine Stands Virtually Alone In Its Blanket Refusal to Extend Religious Accommodations and Its Mandate is Not the Least Restrictive Means.**

Even assuming *arguendo* that imposing a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination requirement on healthcare workers in Maine while excluding religious exemptions is supported by a compelling government interest, the Vaccine Mandate still fails strict scrutiny because it is not the least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest. As the Supreme Court said in *Tandon*,

narrow tailoring requires the government to show that measures less restrictive of the First Amendment activity could not address its interest in reducing the spread of COVID. **Where the government permits other activities to proceed with precautions, it must show that the religious exercise at issue is more dangerous than those activities even when the same precautions are applied.** Otherwise, precautions that suffice for other activities suffice for religious exercise too.

141 S. Ct. at 1296–97 (emphasis added). Now that New York’s unconstitutional exemption regime has been judicially enjoined, 48 other states have demonstrated that preventing the spread of COVID-19 and encouraging vaccination of patient-facing healthcare workers can still be achieved while protecting the sincerely held religious beliefs of conscientious objectors. These states have found a way to accommodate religion under the same alternative protective measures Plaintiffs request here. Maine stands virtually alone in its refusal to recognize this truth.

In *Dr. A*, the court held that failure to explain “why they chose to depart from similar healthcare vaccination mandate issued in other jurisdictions that include the kind of religious exemption that was originally included” demonstrates a lack of narrow tailoring. 2021 WL 4734404, at \*9.

In *Dahl*, as is true here, the court found that the university failed strict scrutiny under the narrow tailoring prong:

the University falters on the narrow tailoring prong. For one, public health measures are not narrowly tailored if they allow similar conduct that creates a more serious health risk. That is the case at the University, which allows non-athletes—the vast majority of its students—to remain unvaccinated. One need not be a public health expert to recognize that the likelihood that a student-athlete contracts COVID-19 from an unvaccinated non-athlete with whom she lives, studies, works, exercises, socializes, or dines may well meet or exceed that of the athlete contracting the virus from a plaintiff who obtains a religious exemption to participate in team activities. For another, narrow tailoring is unlikely if the University's conduct is “more severe” than that of other institutions. **To that point, several other universities grant exemptions from their COVID-19 mandates.**

2021 WL 4618519, at \*5 (emphasis added) (cleaned up)

In fact, despite Maine’s contentions that there are no alternatives to a vaccine mandate that prohibits religious exemptions, healthcare providers in Maine (and across the country) are regularly providing religious accommodations to healthcare workers. An employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs at the VA Maine Healthcare System in Augusta was merely required to check a box requesting a religious exemption. employee who is employed as Chief Chaplin of Service at the VA Maine Healthcare System in Augusta notes that the VA “permits and freely grants exemptions and accommodations to healthcare employees with sincerely held religious objections to mandatory vaccinations.” (Dkt. 57-2 ¶ 5.) This employee was granted an accommodation of wearing a mask while at work, and he is “permitted to carry out [his] duties and responsibilities to the same extent as always,” including interacting with patients “both with COVID and without COVID.” (*Id.* ¶ 10.)

Another VA employee was likewise given an accommodation in Maine. (Dkt. 57-2, ¶¶ 2–6.) That employee’s experience highlights the dichotomous treatment of healthcare workers in Maine. Her VA exemption allowed her to “continue all of [her] previous duties and responsibilities, including working on-site, interacting with colleagues, and providing quality and safe care to [her] patients,” and her accommodation only requires that she wear a mask and submit to testing twice weekly. (*Id.* ¶ 10.) This same employee, however, was also a per diem employee at Eastport Memorial Nursing Home in Maine where she requested a religious accommodation similar to her VA accommodation but was informed that such

accommodations were not available under Maine law, and her employment was discriminatorily terminated. (*Id.* ¶ 11.)

The availability and workability of accommodations for patient-facing healthcare workers with sincerely held religious objections to COVID-19 vaccination is evident from sea to shining sea, at large employers and small. (Dkt. 57-3 – 57-33 (demonstrating accommodations granted to healthcare employees in Maine, Oregon, California, Washington, New Mexico, Missouri, Texas, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, Colorado, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Florida.)

Maine’s contention that it simply cannot provide any reasonable accommodation to the sincerely held religious beliefs of healthcare workers in Maine is demonstrably false. Indeed, the list of healthcare providers granting exemptions across the country involves (a) top education and research hospitals, including University of Colorado, University of Chicago, University of Maryland, Temple University, (b) some of the largest healthcare providers in the nation, including Kaiser Permanente, Trinity Health, and Advocate Aurora Healthcare with hundreds of thousands of employees providing patient-facing care and accommodating the subset of those with sincere religious beliefs, and (c) mid-size and smaller healthcare providers that have also readily accommodated patient-facing personnel with sincere religious beliefs. (*See* Dkt. 57-3 – 57-33.). *See Dr. A*, 2021 WL 4734404, at \*9 (regulation not narrowly tailored if other jurisdictions have proven less restrictive alternative available).

And, this point is critical because the government must show it “**seriously** undertook to address the problem with less intrusive tools readily available to it,”

meaning that it “**considered different methods that other jurisdictions have found effective.**” *McCullen v. Coakley*, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2539 (2014) (emphasis added). See also *Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo*, 983 F.3d 620, 633 (2d Cir. 2020) (same). And the Governor must “show either that substantially less-restrictive alternatives were tried and failed, or that the alternatives were closely examined and ruled out for good reason,” *Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh*, 824 F.3d 353, 370 (3d Cir. 2016), and that “imposing lesser burdens on religious liberty ‘would fail to achieve the government’s interest, not simply that the chosen route was easier.’” *Agudath Israel*, 983 F.3d at 633 (quoting *McCullen*, 134 S. Ct. at 495). **If 48 other states, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and a who’s-who of excellent healthcare providers can accommodate their employees’ religious beliefs and still advance their interests in protecting patients, Maine can and must do the same.** Maine has brought forth no record facts to even suggest, let alone prove, that the COVID situation in Maine is so much worse than the rest of the country, to justify its lonesome, draconian approach. In fact, the Governor has admitted quite the opposite.<sup>1</sup>

**Despite having the oldest median age population in the country, Maine, adjusted for population, ranks third lowest in total number of cases and fourth lowest in number of deaths from COVID-19 from the start of the pandemic, according to the U.S. CDC.**

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<sup>1</sup> Particularly troubling, too, was the district court’s failure to recognize that Defendants carry the burden on narrow tailoring. (PI Order at 22-23). But, there is no question that Defendants **alone** bear the burden to demonstrate narrow tailoring. *Ashcroft v. ACLU*, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004).

(See dkt. 34-1 at 3, *Mills Administration Provides More Time for Health Care Workers to Meet COVID-19 Vaccination Requirement* (emphasis added).) This is a solution in search of a problem. Indeed, a VA employee who works 9 miles from Defendant MaineGeneral in Augusta has been given an accommodation, yet Plaintiffs in the same hospital somehow lost their constitutional rights on that short 10-minute drive. If this is “narrow tailoring,” that term means nothing.

**II. APPLICANTS HAVE A CLEAR AND INDISPUTABLE RIGHT TO RELIEF BECAUSE DEFENDANTS’ WHOLESAL REJECTION OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS IS PLAINLY INCONSISTENT WITH TITLE VII AND IS THEREFORE NULLIFIED AND SUPERSEDED BY FEDERAL LAW.**

**A. Title VII Supersedes Maine’s Rule Because Even the Employer Defendants Have Admitted That Title VII’s Requirement of Religious Accommodation and Maine’s Revocation of Religious Exemptions Are in Conflict and That They Cannot Comply With Both.**

Employer Defendants’ primary contention concerning their utter refusal to comply with the demands of Title VII is that Maine’s revocation of religious exemptions from the COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate are not inconsistent with Title VII, and thus they need not comply. (V. Compl. ¶1.) Employer Defendants are wrong. Title VII plainly requires that every employer with over 15 employees (which includes all Employer Defendants (V. Compl. ¶ 171)) **must provide religious accommodations** “unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). *See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison*, 432 U.S. 63, 75 (1977) (“the employer’s statutory obligation

to make reasonable accommodation for the religious observance of its employees, short of incurring an undue hardship, **is clear**” (emphasis added)). Despite that mandate of federal law, Maine has issued a wholesale revocation of religious exemptions and accommodations for healthcare workers and has abolished the entire exemption and accommodation process under Title VII for religious objectors. (V. Compl. ¶ 46 (noting that Maine “eliminate[d] the ability of health care workers in Maine to request and obtain a religious exemption and accommodation from the COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate”).) Additionally, Government Defendants made it abundantly clear that “[t]he health care immunization law **has removed the allowance for philosophical and religious exemptions.**” (V. Compl. ¶ 49 (quoting Division of Disease Surveillance, *Maine Vaccine Exemption Law Change 2021*, <https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/mecdc/infectious-disease/immunization/maine-vaccine-exemption-law-changes.shtml> (emphasis added))).)

Thus, Title VII’s requirement that employers provide at least a process for seeking an accommodation for an employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs, and Maine’s refusal to provide such a process, are in direct conflict. Under such a scheme, the Supremacy Clause demands that Defendants comply with Title VII. Where—as here—federal law “imposes restrictions [and] confers rights on private actors,” and Maine law “imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law,” “**the federal law takes precedence** and the state law is preempted.” *Murphy v. NCAA*, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018) (emphasis added). Employer Defendants take great pains to suggest that Maine’s refusal to extend religious protections is not preempted by Title



VII's demand that employers provide a reasonable accommodation for religious beliefs. This is incorrect. Title VII supersedes state laws where—as here—“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.” *California Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra*, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987) (citing *Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul*, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).

In their refusals to consider Plaintiffs' requests for exemption and accommodation, Employer Defendants have claimed that it is not impossible for them to comply with both Title VII and Maine's revocation of religious exemptions from the COVID-19 Vaccine Mandate. However, Employer Defendants' newly minted contentions are plainly belied by the undisputed facts in the Verified Complaint. As shown there, Employer Defendants made it clear that they could not comply with Title VII because it would violate state law. (*See, e.g.*, V. Compl. ¶ 86 (“I can share MaineHealth's view that **federal law does not supersede state law in this instance**. . . . Requiring MaineHealth to violate state law by granting unrecognized exemptions would impose such a hardship. **As such, we are not able to grant a request for a religious exemption from the state mandated vaccine**.”); *id.* ¶ 94 (“Allowing for a religious exemption would be a violation of the state mandate issued by Governor Mills. So, unfortunately, that is not an option for us.”).) Thus, Employer Defendants admit that Maine's revocation of a religious exemption is in direct conflict with Title VII and that both cannot be complied with by Employer Defendants.

Employer Defendants' admission is fatal. “[T]he **Supremacy Clause** . . . **invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law.**

**Under the Supremacy Clause . . . state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.”** *Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.*, 471 U.S. 707, 712–13 (1985) (emphasis added) (cleaned up). Employer Defendants admit that compliance with both is impossible, which requires a finding that Title VII supersede Maine’s inconsistent and contrary rules. *California Fed. Savings & Loan*, 479 U.S. at 281. Maine’s discriminatory revocation of religious exemptions simply does not relieve Employer Defendants of their obligations under Title VII, and the Supremacy Clause demands that Maine provide the protections explicitly provided by Title VII.

**B. Title VII Explicitly Preempts State Laws, Like Maine’s, That Require the Doing of an Act That Is Prohibited by Title VII.**

Under the plain language of Title VII, Maine’s refusal to recognize and accommodate Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs is preempted and overridden by Title VII. Indeed,

Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, **other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.**

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (emphasis added). Thus, because Maine’s rule revoking religious exemptions and accommodations “purports to require” discrimination on the basis of religion, and purports to abolish the exemption and accommodation procedure explicitly provided in Title VII, each of which are “an unlawful employment practice”

under Title VII, *see* 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a), Maine’s rules are superseded and preempted by Title VII.

In addition to the explicit textual preemption of Title VII, abundant precedent demonstrates that Maine cannot require employers to engage in a practice that is unlawful under Title VII. *See, e.g., Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson*, 122 F.3d 692, 710 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that Title VII preempts state laws that “purport to require the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under Title VII”); *Brown v. City of Chicago*, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1112 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that Congress “intended to supercede [*sic*] all provisions of State law which require or permit the performance of an act which can be determined to constitute an unlawful employment practice under the terms of Title VII of the Act or are inconsistent with any of its purposes” (quoting *Rinehart v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.*, No. C 70-537, 1971 WL 174, \*2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 1971)); *LeBlanc v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 333 F. Supp. 602, 608 (E.D. La. 1971) (noting that Louisiana’s employment law provisions that conflict with Title VII “are invalid under the Supremacy Clause”). Moreover, Employer Defendants are not permitted to rely upon Maine’s revocation of protections for religious objectors as a defense to refusing to do what Title VII requires. *See, e.g., Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm.*, 630 F.2d 79, 104–105 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Nor can the City justify the use of rank-ordering by reliance on what it contends are requirements of state law. Title VII explicitly relieves employers from any duty to observe a state hiring provision “which purports to require or permit” any discriminatory employment practice.” (citation omitted))

### III. APPLICANTS ARE SUFFERING IRREPARABLE HARM.

#### A. Applicants Are Suffering Irreparable First Amendment Injury.

While it is generally true that a loss of employment does not constitute irreparable harm, **that ignores the seminal First Amendment questions before the Court.** And there can be no dispute that State Defendants' substantial burden on Plaintiffs' religious exercise constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of law. As this Court has held time and again, Plaintiffs "are irreparably harmed by the loss of free exercise rights for even minimal periods of time." *Tandon*, 141 S. Ct. at 1297. Indeed, "[t]here can be no question that the challenged [mandate], if enforced, will cause irreparable harm." *Catholic Diocese*, 141 S. Ct. at 67 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs' constitutional injuries in the instant matter are presumed irreparable harm. *See, e.g., Sindicador Puertorriqueno de Trabajadores v. Fortuno*, 699 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012) ("irreparable injury is presumed" in First Amendment cases). Put simply, "a violation of plaintiffs' constitutional right, and in particular, a violation of First Amendment rights, constitutes irreparable harm, *per se*." *Westchester Legal Servs., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty.*, 607 F. Supp. 1379, 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

Defendants' collective false reduction, that Plaintiffs face only the loss of a job rather than the unconscionable loss of First Amendment rights at the hand of State Defendants, must be rejected. The impact of Maine's far-reaching mandate cannot be understated. Plaintiffs cannot simply go from one employer who unlawfully discriminates, and get a job at a different employer to feed their families while their

legal claims are pending. Maine has essentially ensured the Plaintiffs **cannot work anywhere in the entire State**. If that’s not irreparable harm, the word has no meaning. Indeed, “[t]he harm [Plaintiffs] would suffer is not only, as [Defendants] argue[], the loss of [their] job[s] *per se*, but also the penalty for exercising [their First Amendment] rights. The chilling effect of that penalty cannot be adequately redressed after the fact.” *Romero Feliciano v. Torres Gaztambide*, 836 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).

Indeed, where the Governor’s mandate “conflicts with plaintiffs’ and other individuals’ federally protected right to seek a religious accommodation from their individual employers,” injunctive relief is appropriate. *Dr. A*, 2021 WL 4734404, at \*10. As the Sixth Circuit held, “[e]nforcement of the [government’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate] would deprive plaintiffs of their First Amendment rights, an irreparable injury.” *Dahl*, 2021 WL 4618519, at \*6.

**B. Injunctive Relief Is Needed to Preserve The Status Quo For Applicants’ Title VII Claims.**

Even in the Title VII context, injunctive relief is available to preserve the status quo. *See Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp.*, 676 F.2d 877, 884 (2d Cir. 1981). Specifically, the Second Circuit held that “if the court eventually will have jurisdiction of the substantive claim and an administrative tribunal has preliminary jurisdiction, **the court has incidental equity jurisdiction to grant temporary relief to preserve the status quo pending ripening of the claim for judicial action on the merits.**” *Id.* (emphasis added). It continued, “within the framework of Title VII, we are persuaded that Congress intended the federal courts to have resort to all of

their traditional equity powers, direct and incidental, in aid of the enforcement of the Title.” *Id.* at 885. Indeed,

It is noteworthy that the court is the only arbiter of the merits of a discrimination claim, and **we think it plain that for the court to renounce its incidental equity jurisdiction to stay such employer retaliation pending the EEOC's consideration would frustrate Congress's purposes.** Unimpeded retaliation during the now-lengthy (180-day) conciliation period is likely to diminish the EEOC's ability to achieve conciliation. It is likely to have a chilling effect on the complainant's fellow employees who might otherwise desire to assert their equal rights, or to protest the employer's discriminatory acts, or to cooperate with the investigation of a discrimination charge. **And in many cases the effect on the complainant of several months without work or working in humiliating or otherwise intolerable circumstances will constitute harm that cannot adequately be remedied by a later award of damages.** Given the singular role in 1964 of the individual private action as the only method of enforcing Title VII, and the continued view in 1972 of that right of action as “paramount,” **we cannot conclude that Congress intended to preclude the courts' use of their incidental equity power in these circumstances to prevent frustration of Congress's goals.**

*Id.* at 885-86 (emphasis added).

Put simply, “**where a person has filed a Title VII charge with the EEOC, the court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for temporary injunctive relief against employer retaliation while the charge is pending before the EEOC and before the EEOC has issued a right to sue letter.**” *Id.* at 887 (emphasis added). *See also Holt v. Continental Grp., Inc.*, 708 F.2d 87, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1983) (same); *Bermand v. New York City Ballet, Inc.*, 616 F. Supp. 555, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Decisions by our Court of Appeals, however, **firmly establish . . .** this Court has jurisdiction to entertain applications for preliminary injunctive relief for the purpose of preserving the status quo pending EEOC's investigative and conciliatory

process.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs awarded immediate injunctive relief to remedy their present and ongoing loss of First Amendment rights

#### **IV. PLAINTIFFS SATISFY THE OTHER IPA REQUIREMENTS.**

As *Dr. A* recognized when it enjoined New York’s similar scheme, “the public interest lies with enforcing the guarantees enshrined in the Constitution and federal anti-discrimination laws.” *Dr. A*, 2021 WL 4734404, at \*10. Indeed, “[p]roper application of the Constitution . . . serves the public interest [because] it is always in the public interest to prevent a violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” *Dahl*, 2021 WL 4618519, at \*6 (emphasis added).

Additionally, “the balance of the hardships clearly favors plaintiffs.” *Id.* (emphasis added). Indeed, as there, “defendants have not shown that granting the same benefit to religious practitioners that was originally included in the August 18 Order would impose any more harm—especially when Plaintiffs have been on the front lines of stopping COVID for the past 18 months while donning PPE and exercising other proper protocols in effectively slowing the spread of the disease.” *Id.* The IPA should issue today.

#### **CONCLUSION**

Because the Governor’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate completely removes any protections for Plaintiffs’ sincerely held religious beliefs and subjects them to especially harsh treatment, it violates the First Amendment and should be immediately enjoined pending this appeal, to avoid irreparable harm.

Dated this October 15, 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

Mathew D. Staver (Counsel of Record)

Anita L. Staver

Horatio G. Mihet

Roger K. Gannam

Daniel J. Schmid

LIBERTY COUNSEL

P.O. Box 540774

Orlando, FL 32853

(407) 875-1776

court@LC.org | hmihet@LC.org

rgannam@LC.org | dschmid@LC.org

*Counsel for Applicants*