

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA**

STATE OF OKLAHOMA, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No: CIV-21-1069-G

**PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

Pursuant to this Court's order of January 14, 2022 (Doc. 36), Plaintiffs respectfully submit this supplemental brief addressing new Supreme Court authority that strongly supports their pending motion for a preliminary injunction.

The Supreme Court has stayed the vaccine mandate imposed on employees of large businesses. *See Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Dep't of Labor, OSHA*, Nos. 21A244 & 21A247, 2022 WL 120952 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2022) (per curiam) ("*NFIB*") (Ex. 1). *NFIB* identified the doctrines and precedents that apply to court review of vaccine mandates. *Id.* at *3–4; *id.* at *5–6 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Congress must "speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance." *Id.* at *3 (quoting *Ala. Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of HHS*, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021) (per curiam)). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") issued the vaccine mandate as an emergency temporary standard, but the Court regarded the measure as a matter of "vast economic and political significance" that Congress had not authorized with a "clear voice." *NFIB*, 2022 WL 120952, at *3.

Likewise the mandate here, originating in President Biden’s Executive Order 14042 (“EO 14042”), which precipitated the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force (the “SFWTF”) guidance that ultimately resulted in these agency vaccination requirements, pertains to matters of “vast economic and political significance” that Congress has not clearly authorized. SFWTF has instead arrogated to itself vast public-health authority. Thus the contractor mandate exceeds the Executive’s statutory authority. *NFIB*, 2022 WL 120952, at *3. And just like the OSHA mandate, the contractor mandate too should be enjoined.

OSHA designed its mandate to apply to everyone who worked for employers with 100 or more employees. *Id.* at *2. Those employers were required to “develop, implement, and enforce a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.” 86 Fed. Reg. 61402 (2021). And they also had to verify that each of their employees was vaccinated—and maintain proof of all such vaccinations. *Id.* at 61552. While the OSHA mandate permitted employers to require unvaccinated workers to “undergo [weekly] COVID-19 testing and wear a face covering at work in lieu of vaccination,” those employers were under no obligation to offer that option. *Id.* at 61402. Unvaccinated employees who did not comply with this mandate were to be “removed from the workplace.” *Id.* at 61532.

OSHA crafted a few “narrow exemptions for employees who work remotely ‘100 percent of the time’ or who ‘work exclusively outdoors.’” *NFIB*, 2022 WL 120952, at *2 (quoting 86 Fed. Reg. at 61460). Yet those exemptions were, for the most part, “illusory.” *Id.* The OSHA mandate failed to distinguish “based on industry or risk of exposure to COVID-19.” *Id.* This meant that “most lifeguards and linemen face the same regulations

as do medics and meatpackers.” *Id.* As a result, this mandate covered more than 84 million workers nationwide. *Id.* at *3.

On the merits, the Supreme Court ruled that the OSHA rule likely exceeds the agency’s statutory authority. *NFIB*, 2022 WL 120952, at *3. The Court began by observing that “[a]dministrative agencies are creatures of statute.” *Id.* OSHA “accordingly possess[es] *only* the authority that Congress has” conferred on it. *Id.* (emphasis added).

The Court then reasoned that to “order[] 84 million Americans to either obtain a COVID-19 vaccine or undergo weekly medical testing at their own expense ... is no ‘everyday exercise of federal power.’” *Id.* (quoting *MCP I*, 20 F.4th at 272 (Sutton, C.J., dissenting)). The Court characterized the OSHA mandate as “a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast number of employees,” rendering the question was one of vast economic and political significance. *Id.*

This triggered the major questions doctrine (“MQD”), which holds that courts “expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance.” *Id.* (quoting *Ala. Ass’n of Realtors*, 141 S. Ct. at 2489). The MQD is a form of the clear-statement rule that applies whenever the Executive claims some congressional authorization to regulate a matter of great significance. Under the MQD, the Supreme Court repeatedly has cautioned that courts should not assume that Congress has delegated questions of vast “economic and political significance” to the Executive Branch unless Congress has done so expressly and unambiguously. *Id.*; *see also id.* at *7 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing *King v. Burwell*, 576 U.S. 473 (2015)).

Applying the MQD, the *NFIB* Court examined whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act, enacted in 1970, 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. § 651 *et seq.*, had clearly authorized the OSHA mandate. The Court inferred that while this statute “empowers the Secretary [of Labor] to set *workplace* safety standards,” it does “not [authorize] broad public health measures.” *NFIB*, 2022 WL 120952, at *3 (emphasis in original) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b), 655(c)(1)). The Court “[c]onfirmed th[at] point” from this law’s “provisions,” which “typically speak to hazards that employees face at work.” *Id.* (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 653, 657). As the Supreme Court explained, “no provision of [this statute] addresses public health more generally, which falls outside of OSHA’s sphere of expertise.” *Id.*

The six Justices in the majority rejected the dissent’s suggestion that its quest for express congressional authorization had, in effect, “impos[ed] ‘a limit found no place in the governing statute.’” *Id.* (citing *id.* at *10 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). That is because “OSHA is charged with regulating [*only*] ‘occupational’ hazards and the safety and health of ‘employees.’” *Id.* at *3 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 654(a)(2), 655(b)–(c)). Moreover, the Court believed that comparing a vaccine mandate on large businesses with “workplace regulations that OSHA has typically imposed”—such as “fire or sanitation regulation[s]”—was like comparing apples to oranges. *Id.* at *4. Typical agency regulations simply could not be compared with vaccine mandates. To the Court, “a vaccination ... cannot be undone at the end of the workday.” *Id.* at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Irreparable harm, the balance of the equities, and the public interest also supported enjoinder of the OSHA mandate because of the “unrecoverable compliance costs and” because “hundreds of thousands of employees [otherwise would be forced to] leave their

jobs.” *Id.* Concurring, Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito) underscored the constitutional underpinnings of the MQD, which was linked closely to the nondelegation principle undergirding our separation of powers. *Id.* at *6–7 (concurring opinion).

In addition to their common subject-matter, *NFIB* has strong parallels with this case. Both vaccine mandates cover millions of workers on a matter of vast economic and political significance. In addition, the contractor mandate, like the OSHA mandate, fails to distinguish between contractors who are in an industry where the risk of exposure to COVID-19 is high vis-à-vis one where that risk is low. For example, many federal contractors are in information technology (“IT”), many of whom have low risk of exposure to COVID-19, especially those IT workers who work entirely remotely. Yet they will lose their job if they do not get vaccinated. In addition, as will become clearer, neither mandate claims, or could claim, to be supported by a statute authorizing “broad public health measures.” *Id.* at *3 (majority opinion).

In other respects, the contractor mandate is worse than the OSHA mandate, thus making enjoining it *a fortiori* imperative. Unlike the OSHA mandate, which had some exceptions geared towards employees who worked remotely all of the time, the contractor mandate lumps all contractor and subcontractor employees—remote or not—together. Everyone must get vaccinated.

As the U.S. District Court for Southern District of Georgia observed when enjoining enforcement of the contractor mandate nationwide, EO 14042 imposes “extreme economic burden[s]” on Plaintiffs and similarly situated entities. *Georgia v. Biden*, No. 1:21-cv-163,

2021 WL 5779939, at *9 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2021), *appeal docketed sub nom. Georgia v. President of United States*, No. 21-14269 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2021). It also adversely affects their “ability to continue to perform federal contract work.” *Id.* Moreover:

the direct impact of EO 14042 goes beyond the administration and management of procurement and contracting; in its practical application (requiring a significant number of individuals across the country working in a broad range of positions and in numerous different industries to be vaccinated or face a serious risk of losing their job), it operates as a regulation of public health. It will also have a major impact on the economy at large, as it limits contractors’ and members of the workforce’s ability to perform work on federal contracts.

Id. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that EO 14042’s contractor mandate is a regulation of “vast economic and political significance.” *Id.*

As a separate point, Congress needed to have spoken *clearly* to empower the Executive to issue vaccination policies for federal contractors and subcontractors. *See NFIB*, 2022 WL 120952, at *3; *Ala. Ass’n of Realtors*, 141 S. Ct. at 2489. Absent such a clear statement, courts do not presume Congress upended or even “alter[ed] the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” *Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns*, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). Consequently, requiring anything short of a clear statement from Congress when reviewing such sweeping regulations would raise troubling separation-of-powers concerns. *See NFIB*, 2022 WL 120952, at *6–7 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

Indeed, Congress has not spoken *at all* to authorize EO 14042, to say nothing of speaking clearly. The ostensible “[p]urpose” of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (“Procurement Act”) was “to provide the Federal Government with an

economical and efficient system for ... *procur[ement] and supply[.]*” 40 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). Other courts recently construing this law have looked to *Am. Fed’n of Labor & Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. Kahn*, 618 F.2d 784, 787–88 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See, e.g., *Georgia*, 2021 WL 5779939, at *8–11; *Kentucky v. Biden*, No. 3:21-cv-00055-GFVT, 2021 WL 5587446, at *6 & n.8, *9 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 30, 2021), *appeal docketed*, No. 21-6147 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2021). *Kahn* interpreted the Procurement Act to give the Executive “particularly direct and broad-ranging authority over those *larger administrative and management issues* ... that ... should be used in order to achieve a flexible *management system* capable of making sophisticated judgments in pursuit of *economy and efficiency*.” 618 F.2d at 789 (emphases added). Congress did not give the President a blank check. Quite the contrary, Congress conferred authority that is limited to the context of government contracts and procurements.¹

“Administrative.” “Management.” “Economy.” “Efficiency.” These evidently are the terms closely associated with the subject matter of the Procurement Act. They do not pertain to vaccines, vaccine mandates, or anything concerning public health. The immense delta between these terms and vaccinations cannot be bridged. Or as another court deduced

¹ By contrast, the Supreme Court held, the same day it decided *NFIB*, that the Secretary of Health and Human Services had the statutory authority to require that staff of Medicare and Medicaid funding recipients must be vaccinated. In the Court’s view, “Congress has authorized the Secretary to impose conditions on the receipt of Medicaid and Medicare funds that ‘the Secretary finds necessary in the interest of the health and safety of individuals who are furnished services.’” *Biden v. Missouri*, Nos. 21A240 & 21A241, 2022 WL 120950, at *2 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2022) (per curiam) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(9)) (Ex. 2). The HHS Secretary’s order was more tethered to the statutory language at issue in *Missouri* than the OSHA rule was to the corresponding statute or EO 14042 is to the Procurement Act.

while enjoining the contractor mandate, “[w]hile the [Procurement Act] grants to the president great discretion, it strains credulity that Congress intended ... [this] procurement statute ... to be the basis for promulgating a public health measure such as mandatory vaccination.” *Kentucky*, 2021 WL 5587446, at *6. Therefore, it is clear that Congress has not spoken clearly to authorize the contractor mandate. *See NFIB*, 2022 WL 120952, at *3–4.

Nor could Defendants plausibly claim that there is a sufficiently close “nexus” at all between EO 14042 and the Procurement Act. *See Kahn*, 618 F.2d at 793; *id.* at 797 (Bazelon, J., concurring). That is because the Procurement Act addresses just what its name announces: a law about procurements and government contracts. It is not a law authorizing the Executive to regulate any matters that lie outside the arena of procurements and government contracts. For “[i]f a vaccination mandate” is deemed to “ha[ve] a close enough nexus to economy and efficiency in federal procurement, then the [Procurement Act] could be used to enact virtually any measure at the president’s whim under the guise of economy and efficiency.” *Kentucky*, 2021 WL 5587446, at *7; *cf. UAW-Labor Emp. & Training Corp. v. Chao*, 325 F.3d 360, 366–67 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding sufficiently close nexus between Procurement Act and executive order when it concerns the protection of employees from compelled unionization); *Kahn*, 618 F.2d at 786–87 (finding sufficiently close nexus between Procurement Act and executive order that required certain federal contractors to comply with wage and price controls). And in Judge Baker’s words, “as EO 14042 goes far beyond addressing administrative and management issues in order to promote efficiency and economy in procurement and contracting, and instead, in

application, works as a *regulation of public health*, which is not clearly authorized under the Procurement Act.” *Georgia*, 2021 WL 5779939, at *9 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).

In short, several lessons of *NFIB* hold true for this case as well. Just as OSHA’s statutory remit does not extend to requiring vaccinations, neither does SWFTF’s or of any agencies charged with regulating or enforcing vaccinations among federal contractors’ employees. And just as vaccinations were miles apart from the scope of the statutory authority conferred on OSHA, nothing concerning SWFTF’s statutory authority encompasses public health or compelled vaccinations either. Nor can vaccine mandates be credibly slotted into the scope of regulations authorized by the Procurement Act; there is no nexus between procurements and compulsory vaccinations. That should make short work of Defendants’ merits argument.

Finally, the contractor mandate would work irreparable harm on contractors and their employees. In addition to the high (and unrecoverable) costs imposed on bodily integrity, political significance, and economic loss, *NFIB* recognized that vaccinations cannot be donned by employees in the morning and doffed by them at the end of the workday. 2022 WL 120952, at *4. A vaccination is there forever. And, as *NFIB* makes clear, “[t]he equities do not justify withholding interim relief” from Plaintiffs because Congress “has not given [the Executive] the power to regulate public health [as] broadly” as it claims. *Id.*

Meanwhile, the Court’s decision to stay injunctions of the Medicare and Medicaid vaccine mandate (the “CMS Mandate”) does not lead to the contrary conclusion. *See Biden*

v. Missouri, Nos. 21A240 & 21A241, 2022 WL 120950 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2022) (per curiam) (Ex. 2). The Court’s decision there was premised on the agency’s specific authority over “health and safety” and on the particular dangers that COVID-19 posed to Medicaid and Medicare recipients in the healthcare setting. *Id.* at *2–4. Neither is true of the mandate at issue in this case, just as neither was true of the mandate enjoined in *NFIB*.

For all these reasons, the Supreme Court’s decision in *NFIB* militates in favor of a preliminary injunction in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: January 21, 2022

EXHIBIT 1

2022 WL 120952
Supreme Court of the United States.

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS, et al., Applicants
v.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, et al.
Ohio, et al., Applicants
v.
Department of Labor, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, et al.

Nos. 21A244 and 21A247
|
January 13, 2022

Synopsis

Background: States, businesses, trade groups, nonprofit organizations, and others filed separate petitions for review of emergency temporary standard (ETS) issued by Secretary of Labor, acting through Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), mandating that employers with more than 100 employees require the employees to undergo COVID-19 vaccination or take weekly COVID-19 tests at their own expense and wear a mask in workplace. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Engelhardt, Circuit Judge, [17 F.4th 604](#), stayed enforcement pending judicial review of petitioners’ motions for permanent injunction. Government notified judicial panel on multidistrict litigation of petitions across multiple circuits, invoking lottery procedure to consolidate all petitions in single circuit, and panel designated the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to review the petitions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, [Stranch](#), Circuit Judge, [2021 WL 5989357](#), granted federal government's motion to dissolve the stay, and denied rehearing en banc, [20 F.4th 264](#). States and a business organization applied for stay pending judicial review.

Holdings: The Supreme Court held that:

petitioners were likely to succeed on claim that ETS exceeded Secretary's statutory authority, and

equities did not justify withholding interim relief through a stay.

Applications granted; rule stayed.

Justice [Gorsuch](#) filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices [Thomas](#) and [Alito](#) joined.

Justices [Breyer](#), [Sotomayor](#), and [Kagan](#) filed a dissenting opinion.

Procedural Posture(s): Motion for Stay; Review of Administrative Decision.

West Codenotes

Validity Called into Doubt

[29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.501, 1910.504, 1910.505, 1910.509, 1915.1501, 1917.31, 1918.110, 1926.58, 1928.21](#)

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 The Secretary of Labor, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, recently enacted a vaccine mandate for much of the Nation's work force. The mandate, which employers must enforce, applies to roughly 84 million workers, covering virtually all employers with at least 100 employees. It requires that covered workers receive a COVID–19 vaccine, and it pre-empts contrary state laws. The only exception is for workers who obtain a medical test each week at their own expense and on their own time, and also wear a mask each workday. OSHA has never before imposed such a mandate. Nor has Congress. Indeed, although Congress has enacted significant legislation addressing the COVID–19 pandemic, it has declined to enact any measure similar to what OSHA has promulgated here.

Many States, businesses, and nonprofit organizations challenged OSHA's rule in Courts of Appeals across the country. The Fifth Circuit initially entered a stay. But when the cases were consolidated before the Sixth Circuit, that court lifted the stay and allowed OSHA's rule to take effect. Applicants now seek emergency relief from this Court, arguing that OSHA's mandate exceeds its statutory authority and is otherwise unlawful. Agreeing that applicants are likely to prevail, we grant their applications and stay the rule.

I

A

Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970. 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. § 651 *et seq.* The Act created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which is part of the Department of Labor and under the supervision of its Secretary. As its name suggests, OSHA is tasked with ensuring *occupational safety*—that is, “safe and healthful working conditions.” § 651(b). It does so by enforcing occupational safety and health standards promulgated by the Secretary. § 655(b). Such standards must be “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful *employment*.” § 652(8) (emphasis added). They must also be developed using a rigorous process that includes notice, comment, and an opportunity for a public hearing. § 655(b).

The Act contains an exception to those ordinary notice-and-comment procedures for “emergency temporary standards.” § 655(c)(1). Such standards may “take immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register.” *Ibid.* They are permissible, however, only in the narrowest of circumstances: the Secretary must show (1) “that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards,” and (2) that the “emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.” *Ibid.* Prior to the emergence of COVID–19, the Secretary had used this power just nine times before (and never to issue a rule as broad as this one). Of those nine emergency rules, six were challenged in court, and only one of those was upheld in full. See *BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety and Health Admin.*, 17 F.4th 604, 609 (CA5 2021).

B

*2 On September 9, 2021, President Biden announced “a new plan to require more Americans to be vaccinated.” Remarks on the COVID–19 Response and National Vaccination Efforts, 2021 Daily Comp. of Pres. Doc. 775, p. 2. As part of that plan, the President said that the Department of Labor would issue an emergency rule requiring all employers with at least 100 employees “to ensure their workforces are fully vaccinated or show a negative test at least once a week.”

Ibid. The purpose of the rule was to increase *vaccination* rates at “businesses all across America.” *Ibid.* In tandem with other planned regulations, the administration’s goal was to impose “vaccine requirements” on “about 100 million Americans, two-thirds of all workers.” *Id.*, at 3.

After a 2-month delay, the Secretary of Labor issued the promised emergency standard. 86 Fed. Reg. 61402 (2021). Consistent with President Biden’s announcement, the rule applies to all who work for employers with 100 or more employees. There are narrow exemptions for employees who work remotely “100 percent of the time” or who “work exclusively outdoors,” but those exemptions are largely illusory. *Id.*, at 61460. The Secretary has estimated, for example, that only nine percent of landscapers and groundskeepers qualify as working exclusively outside. *Id.*, at 61461. The regulation otherwise operates as a blunt instrument. It draws no distinctions based on industry or risk of exposure to COVID–19. Thus, most lifeguards and linemen face the same regulations as do medics and meatpackers. OSHA estimates that 84.2 million employees are subject to its mandate. *Id.*, at 61467.

Covered employers must “develop, implement, and enforce a mandatory COVID–19 *vaccination* policy.” *Id.*, at 61402. The employer must verify the *vaccination* status of each employee and maintain proof of it. *Id.*, at 61552. The mandate does contain an “exception” for employers that require unvaccinated workers to “undergo [weekly] COVID–19 testing and wear a face covering at work in lieu of *vaccination*.” *Id.*, at 61402. But employers are not required to offer this option, and the emergency regulation purports to pre-empt state laws to the contrary. *Id.*, at 61437. Unvaccinated employees who do not comply with OSHA’s rule must be “removed from the workplace.” *Id.*, at 61532. And employers who commit violations face hefty fines: up to \$13,653 for a standard violation, and up to \$136,532 for a willful one. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.15(d) (2021).

C

OSHA published its vaccine mandate on November 5, 2021. Scores of parties—including States, businesses, trade groups, and nonprofit organizations—filed petitions for review, with at least one petition arriving in each regional Court of Appeals. The cases were consolidated in the Sixth Circuit, which was selected at random pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a).

Prior to consolidation, however, the Fifth Circuit stayed OSHA's rule pending further judicial review. *BST Holdings*, 17 F.4th 604. It held that the mandate likely exceeded OSHA's statutory authority, raised separation-of-powers concerns in the absence of a clear delegation from Congress, and was not properly tailored to the risks facing different types of workers and workplaces.

When the consolidated cases arrived at the Sixth Circuit, two things happened. First, many of the petitioners—nearly 60 in all—requested initial hearing en banc. Second, OSHA asked the Court of Appeals to vacate the Fifth Circuit's existing stay. The Sixth Circuit denied the request for initial hearing en banc by an evenly divided 8-to-8 vote. *In re MCP No. 165*, 20 F.4th 264 (CA6 2021). Chief Judge Sutton dissented, joined by seven of his colleagues. He reasoned that the Secretary's "broad assertions of administrative power demand unmistakable legislative support," which he found lacking. *Id.*, at 268. A three-judge panel then dissolved the Fifth Circuit's stay, holding that OSHA's mandate was likely consistent with the agency's statutory and constitutional authority. See *In re MCP No. 165*, 2021 WL 5989357, — F.4th — (CA6 2021). Judge Larsen dissented.

*3 Various parties then filed applications in this Court requesting that we stay OSHA's emergency standard. We consolidated two of those applications—one from the National Federation of Independent Business, and one from a coalition of States—and heard expedited argument on January 7, 2022.

II

The Sixth Circuit concluded that a stay of the rule was not justified. We disagree.

A

Applicants are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Secretary lacked authority to impose the mandate. Administrative agencies are creatures of statute. They accordingly possess only the authority that Congress has provided. The Secretary has ordered 84 million Americans to either obtain a COVID-19 vaccine or undergo weekly medical testing at their own expense. This is no "everyday exercise of federal power." *In re MCP No. 165*, 20 F.4th

at 272 (Sutton, C. J., dissenting). It is instead a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast number of employees. "We expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance." *Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs.*, 594 U.S. —, —, 141 S.Ct. 2485, 2489, 210 L.Ed.2d 856 (2021) (*per curiam*) (internal quotation marks omitted). There can be little doubt that OSHA's mandate qualifies as an exercise of such authority.

The question, then, is whether the Act plainly authorizes the Secretary's mandate. It does not. The Act empowers the Secretary to set *workplace* safety standards, not broad public health measures. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (directing the Secretary to set "*occupational* safety and health standards" (emphasis added)); § 655(c)(1) (authorizing the Secretary to impose emergency temporary standards necessary to protect "employees" from grave danger in the workplace). Confirming the point, the Act's provisions typically speak to hazards that employees face at work. See, e.g., §§ 651, 653, 657. And no provision of the Act addresses public health more generally, which falls outside of OSHA's sphere of expertise.

The dissent protests that we are imposing "a limit found no place in the governing statute." *Post*, at — (joint opinion of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.). Not so. It is the text of the agency's Organic Act that repeatedly makes clear that OSHA is charged with regulating "occupational" hazards and the safety and health of "employees." See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 654(a)(2), 655(b)–(c).

The Solicitor General does not dispute that OSHA is limited to regulating "work-related dangers." Response Brief for OSHA in No. 21A244 etc., p. 45 (OSHA Response). She instead argues that the risk of contracting COVID-19 qualifies as such a danger. We cannot agree. Although COVID-19 is a risk that occurs in many workplaces, it is not an *occupational* hazard in most. COVID-19 can and does spread at home, in schools, during sporting events, and everywhere else that people gather. That kind of universal risk is no different from the day-to-day dangers that all face from crime, air pollution, or any number of communicable diseases. Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life—simply because most Americans have jobs and face those same risks while on the clock—would significantly expand OSHA's regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.

*4 The dissent contends that OSHA's mandate is comparable to a fire or sanitation regulation imposed by the agency. See *post*, at ———. But a vaccine mandate is strikingly unlike the workplace regulations that OSHA has typically imposed. A [vaccination](#), after all, “cannot be undone at the end of the workday.” *In re MCP No. 165, 20 F.4th at 274* (Sutton, C. J., dissenting). Contrary to the dissent's contention, imposing a vaccine mandate on 84 million Americans in response to a worldwide pandemic is simply not “part of what the agency was built for.” *Post*, at ———.

That is not to say OSHA lacks authority to regulate occupation-specific risks related to COVID-19. Where the virus poses a special danger because of the particular features of an employee's job or workplace, targeted regulations are plainly permissible. We do not doubt, for example, that OSHA could regulate researchers who work with the COVID-19 virus. So too could OSHA regulate risks associated with working in particularly crowded or cramped environments. But the danger present in such workplaces differs in both degree and kind from the everyday risk of contracting COVID-19 that all face. OSHA's indiscriminate approach fails to account for this crucial distinction—between occupational risk and risk more generally—and accordingly the mandate takes on the character of a general public health measure, rather than an “*occupational safety or health standard.*” 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (emphasis added).

In looking for legislative support for the vaccine mandate, the dissent turns to the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, [Pub. L. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4](#). See *post*, at ———. That legislation, signed into law on March 11, 2021, of course said nothing about OSHA's vaccine mandate, which was not announced until six months later. In fact, the most noteworthy action concerning the vaccine mandate by either House of Congress has been a majority vote of the Senate disapproving the regulation on December 8, 2021. S. J. Res. 29, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021).

It is telling that OSHA, in its half century of existence, has never before adopted a broad public health regulation of this kind—addressing a threat that is untethered, in any causal sense, from the workplace. This “lack of historical precedent,” coupled with the breadth of authority that the Secretary now claims, is a “telling indication” that the mandate extends beyond the agency's legitimate reach. *Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight*

Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).¹

1 The dissent says that we do “not contest,” *post*, at ———, that the mandate was otherwise proper under the requirements for an emergency temporary standard, see 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1). To be clear, we express no view on issues not addressed in this opinion.

B

The equities do not justify withholding interim relief. We are told by the States and the employers that OSHA's mandate will force them to incur billions of dollars in unrecoverable compliance costs and will cause hundreds of thousands of employees to leave their jobs. See Application in No. 21A244, pp. 25–32; Application in No. 21A247, pp. 32–33; see also [86 Fed. Reg. 61475](#). For its part, the Federal Government says that the mandate will save over 6,500 lives and prevent hundreds of thousands of hospitalizations. OSHA Response 83; see also [86 Fed. Reg. 61408](#).

It is not our role to weigh such tradeoffs. In our system of government, that is the responsibility of those chosen by the people through democratic processes. Although Congress has indisputably given OSHA the power to regulate occupational dangers, it has not given that agency the power to regulate public health more broadly. Requiring the [vaccination](#) of 84 million Americans, selected simply because they work for employers with more than 100 employees, certainly falls in the latter category.

* * *

*5 The applications for stays presented to Justice KAVANAUGH and by him referred to the Court are granted.

OSHA's [COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 Fed. Reg. 61402](#), is stayed pending disposition of the applicants' petitions for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and disposition of the applicants' petitions for writs of certiorari, if such writs are timely sought. Should the petitions for writs of certiorari be denied, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event the petitions for writs of certiorari are granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

It is so ordered.

Justice GORSUCH, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice ALITO join, concurring.

The central question we face today is: Who decides? No one doubts that the COVID–19 pandemic has posed challenges for every American. Or that our state, local, and national governments all have roles to play in combating the disease. The only question is whether an administrative agency in Washington, one charged with overseeing workplace safety, may mandate the vaccination or regular testing of 84 million people. Or whether, as 27 States before us submit, that work belongs to state and local governments across the country and the people's elected representatives in Congress. This Court is not a public health authority. But it is charged with resolving disputes about which authorities possess the power to make the laws that govern us under the Constitution and the laws of the land.

*

I start with this Court's precedents. There is no question that state and local authorities possess considerable power to regulate public health. They enjoy the “general power of governing,” including all sovereign powers envisioned by the Constitution and not specifically vested in the federal government. *National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius*, 567 U.S. 519, 536, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); U.S. Const., Amdt. 10. And in fact, States have pursued a variety of measures in response to the current pandemic. *E.g.*, Cal. Dept. of Public Health, All Facilities Letter 21–28.1 (Dec. 27, 2021); see also N. Y. Pub. Health Law Ann. § 2164 (West 2021).

The federal government's powers, however, are not general but limited and divided. See *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 4 Wheat. 316, 405, 17 U.S. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). Not only must the federal government properly invoke a constitutionally enumerated source of authority to regulate in this area or any other. It must also act consistently with the Constitution's separation of powers. And when it comes to that obligation, this Court has established at least one firm rule: “We expect Congress to speak clearly” if it wishes to assign to an executive agency decisions “of vast economic and political significance.” *Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs.*, 594 U.S. —, —, 141 S.Ct. 2485, 2489, 210 L.Ed.2d 856 (2021) (*per curiam*) (internal quotation marks omitted). We sometimes

call this the major questions doctrine. *Gundy v. United States*, 588 U.S. —, —, 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2141, 204 L.Ed.2d 522 (2019) (GORSUCH, J., dissenting).

*6 OSHA's mandate fails that doctrine's test. The agency claims the power to force 84 million Americans to receive a vaccine or undergo regular testing. By any measure, that is a claim of power to resolve a question of vast national significance. Yet Congress has nowhere clearly assigned so much power to OSHA. Approximately two years have passed since this pandemic began; vaccines have been available for more than a year. Over that span, Congress has adopted several major pieces of legislation aimed at combating COVID–19. *E.g.*, American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. 117–2, 135 Stat. 4. But Congress has chosen not to afford OSHA—or any federal agency—the authority to issue a vaccine mandate. Indeed, a majority of the Senate even voted to *disapprove* OSHA's regulation. See S.J. Res. 29, 117th Cong., 1st Sess. (2021). It seems, too, that the agency pursued its regulatory initiative only as a legislative “work-around.” *BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA*, 17 F.4th 604, 612 (CA5 2021). Far less consequential agency rules have run afoul of the major questions doctrine. *E.g.*, *MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.*, 512 U.S. 218, 231, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 129 L.Ed.2d 182 (1994) (eliminating rate-filing requirement). It is hard to see how this one does not.

What is OSHA's reply? It directs us to 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1). In that statutory subsection, Congress authorized OSHA to issue “emergency” regulations upon determining that “employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful” and “that such emergency standard[s] [are] necessary to protect employees from such danger[s].” According to the agency, this provision supplies it with “almost unlimited discretion” to mandate new nationwide rules in response to the pandemic so long as those rules are “reasonably related” to workplace safety. 86 Fed. Reg. 61402, 61405 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court rightly applies the major questions doctrine and concludes that this lone statutory subsection does not clearly authorize OSHA's mandate. See *ante*, at 5–6. Section 655(c) (1) was not adopted in response to the pandemic, but some 50 years ago at the time of OSHA's creation. Since then, OSHA has relied on it to issue only comparatively modest rules addressing dangers uniquely prevalent inside the workplace, like asbestos and rare chemicals. See *In re: MCP No. 165*,

20 F.4th 264, 276 (CA6 2021) (Sutton, C. J., dissenting from denial of initial hearing en banc). As the agency itself explained to a federal court less than two years ago, the statute does “not authorize OSHA to issue sweeping health standards” that affect workers’ lives outside the workplace. Brief for Department of Labor, *In re: AFL–CIO*, No. 20–1158, pp. 3, 33 (CADC 2020). Yet that is precisely what the agency seeks to do now—regulate not just what happens inside the workplace but induce individuals to undertake a medical procedure that affects their lives outside the workplace. Historically, such matters have been regulated at the state level by authorities who enjoy broader and more general governmental powers. Meanwhile, at the federal level, OSHA arguably is not even the agency most associated with public health regulation. And in the rare instances when Congress has sought to mandate vaccinations, it has done so expressly. *E.g.*, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(ii). We have nothing like that here.

*

Why does the major questions doctrine matter? It ensures that the national government's power to make the laws that govern us remains where Article I of the Constitution says it belongs—with the people's elected representatives. If administrative agencies seek to regulate the daily lives and liberties of millions of Americans, the doctrine says, they must at least be able to trace that power to a clear grant of authority from Congress.

In this respect, the major questions doctrine is closely related to what is sometimes called the nondelegation doctrine. Indeed, for decades courts have cited the nondelegation doctrine as a reason to apply the major questions doctrine. *E.g.*, *Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute*, 448 U.S. 607, 645, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1980) (plurality opinion). Both are designed to protect the separation of powers and ensure that any new laws governing the lives of Americans are subject to the robust democratic processes the Constitution demands.

*7 The nondelegation doctrine ensures democratic accountability by preventing Congress from intentionally delegating its legislative powers to unelected officials. Sometimes lawmakers may be tempted to delegate power to agencies to “reduc[e] the degree to which they will be held accountable for unpopular actions.” R. Cass, *Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State*, 40 Harv. J. L. Pub. Pol’y 147, 154

(2017). But the Constitution imposes some boundaries here. *Gundy*, 588 U.S., at —, 139 S.Ct., at 2131 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting). If Congress could hand off all its legislative powers to unelected agency officials, it “would dash the whole scheme” of our Constitution and enable intrusions into the private lives and freedoms of Americans by bare edict rather than only with the consent of their elected representatives. *Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads*, 575 U.S. 43, 61, 135 S.Ct. 1225, 191 L.Ed.2d 153 (2015) (ALITO, J., concurring); see also M. McConnell, *The President Who Would Not Be King* 326–335 (2020); I. Wurman, *Nondelegation at the Founding*, 130 Yale L. J. 1490, 1502 (2021).

The major questions doctrine serves a similar function by guarding against unintentional, oblique, or otherwise unlikely delegations of the legislative power. Sometimes, Congress passes broadly worded statutes seeking to resolve important policy questions in a field while leaving an agency to work out the details of implementation. *E.g.*, *King v. Burwell*, 576 U.S. 473, 485–486, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015). Later, the agency may seek to exploit some gap, ambiguity, or doubtful expression in Congress's statutes to assume responsibilities far beyond its initial assignment. The major questions doctrine guards against this possibility by recognizing that Congress does not usually “hide elephants in mouseholes.” *Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.*, 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001). In this way, the doctrine is “a vital check on expansive and aggressive assertions of executive authority.” *United States Telecom Assn. v. FCC*, 855 F.3d 381, 417 (CADC 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also N. Richardson, *Keeping Big Cases From Making Bad Law: The Resurgent Major Questions Doctrine*, 49 Conn. L. Rev. 355, 359 (2016).

Whichever the doctrine, the point is the same. Both serve to prevent “government by bureaucracy supplanting government by the people.” A. Scalia, *A Note on the Benzene Case*, *American Enterprise Institute, J. on Govt. & Soc.*, July–Aug. 1980, p. 27. And both hold their lessons for today's case. On the one hand, OSHA claims the power to issue a nationwide mandate on a major question but cannot trace its authority to do so to any clear congressional mandate. On the other hand, if the statutory subsection the agency cites really *did* endow OSHA with the power it asserts, that law would likely constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Under OSHA's reading, the law would afford it almost unlimited discretion—and certainly impose

no “specific restrictions” that “meaningfully constrai[n]” the agency. *Touby v. United States*, 500 U.S. 160, 166–167, 111 S.Ct. 1752, 114 L.Ed.2d 219 (1991). OSHA would become little more than a “roving commission to inquire into evils and upon discovery correct them.” *A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*, 295 U.S. 495, 551, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring). Either way, the point is the same one Chief Justice Marshall made in 1825: There are some “important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,” and others “of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to [others] to fill up the details.” *Wayman v. Southard*, 10 Wheat. 1, 43, 23 U.S. 1, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825). And on no one's account does this mandate qualify as some “detail.”

*

The question before us is not how to respond to the pandemic, but who holds the power to do so. The answer is clear: Under the law as it stands today, that power rests with the States and Congress, not OSHA. In saying this much, we do not impugn the intentions behind the agency's mandate. Instead, we only discharge our duty to enforce the law's demands when it comes to the question who may govern the lives of 84 million Americans. Respecting those demands may be trying in times of stress. But if this Court were to abide them only in more tranquil conditions, declarations of emergencies would never end and the liberties our Constitution's separation of powers seeks to preserve would amount to little.

Justice BREYER, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice KAGAN, dissenting.

*8 Every day, COVID–19 poses grave dangers to the citizens of this country—and particularly, to its workers. The disease has by now killed almost 1 million Americans and hospitalized almost 4 million. It spreads by person-to-person contact in confined indoor spaces, so causes harm in nearly all workplace environments. And in those environments, more than any others, individuals have little control, and therefore little capacity to mitigate risk. COVID–19, in short, is a menace in work settings. The proof is all around us: Since the disease's onset, most Americans have seen their workplaces transformed.

So the administrative agency charged with ensuring health and safety in workplaces did what Congress commanded it to: It took action to address COVID–19's continuing threat in those spaces. The Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) issued an emergency temporary standard (Standard), requiring *either vaccination or* masking and testing, to protect American workers. The Standard falls within the core of the agency's mission: to “protect employees” from “grave danger” that comes from “new hazards” or exposure to harmful agents. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1). OSHA estimates—and there is no ground for disputing—that the Standard will save over 6,500 lives and prevent over 250,000 hospitalizations in six months' time. 86 Fed. Reg. 61408 (2021).

Yet today the Court issues a stay that prevents the Standard from taking effect. In our view, the Court's order seriously misapplies the applicable legal standards. And in so doing, it stymies the Federal Government's ability to counter the unparalleled threat that COVID–19 poses to our Nation's workers. Acting outside of its competence and without legal basis, the Court displaces the judgments of the Government officials given the responsibility to respond to workplace health emergencies. We respectfully dissent.

I

In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act) “to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources,” including “by developing innovative methods, techniques, and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b), (b)(5). To that end, the Act empowers OSHA to issue “mandatory occupational safety and health standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce.” § 651(b)(3). Still more, the Act requires OSHA to issue “an emergency temporary standard to take immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register if [the agency] determines (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.” § 655(c)(1).

Acting under that statutory command, OSHA promulgated the emergency temporary standard at issue here. The Standard obligates employers with at least 100 employees to require that an employee either (1) be vaccinated against COVID–19 or (2) take a weekly COVID–19 test and wear a mask at work. 86 Fed. Reg. 61551–61553. The Standard thus encourages vaccination, but permits employers to adopt a masking-or-

testing policy instead. (The majority obscures this choice by insistently calling the policy a “vaccine mandate.” *Ante*, at —, —, —, —.) Further, the Standard does not apply in a variety of settings. It exempts employees who are at a reduced risk of infection because they work from home, alone, or outdoors. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61551. It makes exceptions based on religious objections or medical necessity. See *id.*, at 61552. And the Standard does not constrain any employer able to show that its “conditions, practices, means, methods, operations, or processes” make its workplace equivalently “safe and healthful.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(d). Consistent with statutory requirements, the Standard lasts only six months. See § 655(c)(3).

*9 Multiple lawsuits challenging the Standard were filed in the Federal Courts of Appeals. The applicants asked the courts to stay the Standard’s implementation while their legal challenges were pending. The lawsuits were consolidated in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3). That court dissolved a stay previously entered, thus allowing the Standard to take effect. See *In re MCP No. 165*, 2021 WL 5989357, — F. 4th — (2021). The applicants now ask this Court to stay the Standard for the duration of the litigation. Today, the Court grants that request, contravening clear legal principles and itself causing grave danger to the Nation’s workforce.

II

The legal standard governing a request for relief pending appellate review is settled. To obtain that relief, the applicants must show: (1) that their “claims are likely to prevail,” (2) “that denying them relief would lead to irreparable injury,” and (3) “that granting relief would not harm the public interest.” *Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo*, 592 U.S. —, —, 141 S.Ct. 63, 66, 208 L.Ed.2d 206 (2020) (*per curiam*). Moreover, because the applicants seek judicial intervention that the Sixth Circuit withheld below, this Court should not issue relief unless the applicants can establish that their entitlement to relief is “indisputably clear.” *South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom*, 590 U.S. —, —, 140 S.Ct. 1613, 1613, 207 L.Ed.2d 154 (2020) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief) (internal quotation marks omitted). None of these requirements is met here.

III

A

The applicants are not “likely to prevail” under any proper view of the law. OSHA’s rule perfectly fits the language of the applicable statutory provision. Once again, that provision commands—not just enables, but commands—OSHA to issue an emergency temporary standard whenever it determines “(A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1). Each and every part of that provision demands that, in the circumstances here, OSHA act to prevent workplace harm.

The virus that causes COVID–19 is a “new hazard” as well as a “physically harmful” “agent.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 572 (11th ed. 2005) (defining “hazard” as a “source of danger”); *id.*, at 24 (defining “agent” as a “chemically, physically, or biologically active principle”); *id.*, at 1397 (defining “virus” as “the causative agent of an infectious disease”).

The virus also poses a “grave danger” to millions of employees. As of the time OSHA promulgated its rule, more than 725,000 Americans had died of COVID–19 and millions more had been hospitalized. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61408, 61424; see also CDC, COVID Data Tracker Weekly Review: Interpretive Summary for Nov. 5, 2021 (Jan. 12, 2022), <https://cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covidview/past-reports/11052021.html>. Since then, the disease has continued to work its tragic toll. In the last week alone, it has caused, or helped to cause, more than 11,000 new deaths. See CDC, COVID Data Tracker (Jan. 12, 2022), https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_deathsinlast7days. And because the disease spreads in shared indoor spaces, it presents heightened dangers in most workplaces. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61411, 61424.

Finally, the Standard is “necessary” to address the danger of COVID–19. OSHA based its rule, requiring either testing and masking or vaccination, on a host of studies and government reports showing why those measures were of unparalleled use in limiting the threat of COVID–19 in most workplaces. The agency showed, in meticulous detail, that close contact between infected and uninfected individuals spreads the

disease; that “[t]he science of transmission does not vary by industry or by type of workplace”; that testing, mask wearing, and vaccination are highly effective—indeed, essential—tools for reducing the risk of transmission, hospitalization, and death; and that unvaccinated employees of all ages face a substantially increased risk from COVID–19 as compared to their vaccinated peers. *Id.*, at 61403, 61411–61412, 61417–61419, 61433–61435, 61438–61439. In short, OSHA showed that no lesser policy would prevent as much death and injury from COVID–19 as the Standard would.

*10 OSHA’s determinations are “conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(f). Judicial review under that test is deferential, as it should be. OSHA employs, in both its enforcement and health divisions, numerous scientists, doctors, and other experts in public health, especially as it relates to work environments. Their decisions, we have explained, should stand so long as they are supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” *American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan*, 452 U.S. 490, 522, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981) (quoting *Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB*, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)). Given the extensive evidence in the record supporting OSHA’s determinations about the risk of COVID–19 and the efficacy of masking, testing, and vaccination, a court could not conclude that the Standard fails substantial-evidence review.

B

The Court does not dispute that the statutory terms just discussed, read in the ordinary way, authorize this Standard. In other words, the majority does not contest that COVID–19 is a “new hazard” and “physically harmful agent”; that it poses a “grave danger” to employees; or that a testing and masking or vaccination policy is “necessary” to prevent those harms. Instead, the majority claims that the Act does not “plainly authorize[]” the Standard because it gives OSHA the power to “set workplace safety standards” and COVID–19 exists both inside and outside the workplace. *Ante*, at ——. In other words, the Court argues that OSHA cannot keep workplaces safe from COVID–19 because the agency (as it readily acknowledges) has no power to address the disease outside the work setting.

But nothing in the Act’s text supports the majority’s limitation on OSHA’s regulatory authority. Of course, the majority is

correct that OSHA is not a roving public health regulator, see *ante*, at —– – —–: It has power only to protect employees from workplace hazards. But as just explained, that is exactly what the Standard does. See *supra*, at —– – —–. And the Act requires nothing more: Contra the majority, it is indifferent to whether a hazard in the workplace is also found elsewhere. The statute generally charges OSHA with “assur[ing] so far as possible ... safe and healthful working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). That provision authorizes regulation to protect employees from all hazards present in the workplace—or, at least, all hazards in part created by conditions there. It does not matter whether those hazards also exist beyond the workplace walls. The same is true of the provision at issue here demanding the issuance of temporary emergency standards. Once again, that provision kicks in when employees are exposed in the workplace to “new hazards” or “substances or agents” determined to be “physically harmful.” § 655(c)(1). The statute does not require that employees are exposed to those dangers only while on the workplace clock. And that should settle the matter. When Congress “enact[s] expansive language offering no indication whatever that the statute limits what [an agency] can” do, the Court cannot “impos[e] limits on an agency’s discretion that are not supported by the text.” *Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania*, 591 U.S. —, —, 140 S.Ct. 2367, 2380–81, 207 L.Ed.2d 819 (2020)(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). That is what the majority today does—impose a limit found no place in the governing statute.

Consistent with Congress’s directives, OSHA has long regulated risks that arise both inside and outside of the workplace. For example, OSHA has issued, and applied to nearly all workplaces, rules combating risks of fire, faulty electrical installations, and inadequate emergency exits—even though the dangers prevented by those rules arise not only in workplaces but in many physical facilities (*e.g.*, stadiums, schools, hotels, even homes). See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.155 (2020) (fire); §§ 1910.302–1910.308 (electrical installations); §§ 1910.34–1910.39 (exit routes). Similarly, OSHA has regulated to reduce risks from excessive noise and unsafe drinking water—again, risks hardly confined to the workplace. See § 1910.95 (noise); § 1910.141 (water). A biological hazard—here, the virus causing COVID–19—is no different. Indeed, Congress just last year made this clear. It appropriated \$100 million for OSHA “to carry out COVID–19 related worker protection activities” in work environments of all kinds. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. 117–2, 135 Stat. 30. That legislation refutes the majority’s view

that workplace exposure to COVID–19 is somehow not a workplace hazard. Congress knew—and Congress said—that OSHA's responsibility to mitigate the harms of COVID–19 in the typical workplace do not diminish just because the disease also endangers people in other settings.

*11 That is especially so because—as OSHA amply established—COVID–19 poses special risks in most workplaces, across the country and across industries. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61424 (“The likelihood of transmission can be exacerbated by common characteristics of many workplaces”). The majority ignores these findings, but they provide more-than-ample support for the Standard. OSHA determined that the virus causing COVID–19 is “readily transmissible in workplaces because they are areas where multiple people come into contact with one another, often for extended periods of time.” *Id.*, at 61411. In other words, COVID–19 spreads more widely in workplaces than in other venues because more people spend more time together there. And critically, employees usually have little or no control in those settings. “[D]uring the workday,” OSHA explained, “workers may have little ability to limit contact with coworkers, clients, members of the public, patients, and others, any one of whom could represent a source of exposure to” the virus. *Id.*, at 61408. The agency backed up its conclusions with hundreds of reports of workplace COVID–19 outbreaks—not just in cheek-by-jowl settings like factory assembly lines, but in retail stores, restaurants, medical facilities, construction areas, and standard offices. *Id.*, at 61412–61416. But still, OSHA took care to tailor the Standard. Where it could exempt work settings without exposing employees to grave danger, it did so. See *id.*, at 61419–61420; *supra*, at ——. In sum, the agency did just what the Act told it to: It protected employees from a grave danger posed by a new virus as and where needed, and went no further. The majority, in overturning that action, substitutes judicial diktat for reasoned policymaking.

The result of its ruling is squarely at odds with the statutory scheme. As shown earlier, the Act's explicit terms authorize the Standard. See *supra*, at ——. Once again, OSHA must issue an emergency standard in response to new hazards in the workplace that expose employees to “grave danger.” § 655(c)(1); see *supra*, at ——. The entire point of that provision is to enable OSHA to deal with emergencies—to put into effect the new measures needed to cope with new workplace conditions. The enacting Congress of course did not tell the agency to issue this Standard in response to this COVID–19 pandemic—because that Congress could

not predict the future. But that Congress did indeed want OSHA to have the tools needed to confront emerging dangers (including contagious diseases) in the workplace. We know that, first and foremost, from the breadth of the authority Congress granted to OSHA. And we know that because of how OSHA has used that authority from the statute's beginnings—in ways not dissimilar to the action here. OSHA has often issued rules applying to all or nearly all workplaces in the Nation, affecting at once many tens of millions of employees. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141. It has previously regulated infectious disease, including by facilitating vaccinations. See § 1910.1030(f). And it has in other contexts required medical examinations and face coverings for employees. See §§ 1910.120(q)(9)(i), 1910.134. In line with those prior actions, the Standard here requires employers to ensure testing and masking if they do not demand vaccination. Nothing about that measure is so out-of-the-ordinary as to demand a judicially created exception from Congress's command that OSHA protect employees from grave workplace harms.

If OSHA's Standard is far-reaching—applying to many millions of American workers—it no more than reflects the scope of the crisis. The Standard responds to a workplace health emergency unprecedented in the agency's history: an infectious disease that has already killed hundreds of thousands and sickened millions; that is most easily transmitted in the shared indoor spaces that are the hallmark of American working life; and that spreads mostly without regard to differences in occupation or industry. Over the past two years, COVID–19 has affected—indeed, transformed—virtually every workforce and workplace in the Nation. Employers and employees alike have recognized and responded to the special risks of transmission in work environments. It is perverse, given these circumstances, to read the Act's grant of emergency powers in the way the majority does—as constraining OSHA from addressing one of the gravest workplace hazards in the agency's history. The Standard protects untold numbers of employees from a danger especially prevalent in workplace conditions. It lies at the core of OSHA's authority. It is part of what the agency was built for.

IV

*12 Even if the merits were a close question—which they are not—the Court would badly err by issuing this stay. That is because a court may not issue a stay unless the balance of

harms and the public interest support the action. See *Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project*, 582 U.S. —, —, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2087, 198 L.Ed.2d 643 (2017) (*per curiam*) (“Before issuing a stay, it is ultimately necessary to balance the equities—to explore the relative harms” and “the interests of the public at large” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)); *supra*, at —. Here, they do not. The lives and health of the Nation's workers are at stake. And the majority deprives the Government of a measure it needs to keep them safe.

Consider first the economic harms asserted in support of a stay. The employers principally argue that the Standard will disrupt their businesses by prompting hundreds of thousands of employees to leave their jobs. But OSHA expressly considered that claim, and found it exaggerated. According to OSHA, employers that have implemented vaccine mandates have found that far fewer employees actually quit their jobs than threaten to do so. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61474–61475. And of course, the Standard does not impose a vaccine mandate; it allows employers to require only masking and testing instead. See *supra*, at —. In addition, OSHA noted that the Standard would provide employers with some countervailing economic benefits. Many employees, the agency showed, would be more likely to stay at or apply to an employer complying with the Standard's safety precautions. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61474. And employers would see far fewer work days lost from members of their workforces calling in sick. See *id.*, at 61473–61474. All those conclusions are reasonable, and entitled to deference.

More fundamentally, the public interest here—the interest in protecting workers from disease and death—overwhelms the employers' alleged costs. As we have said, OSHA estimated that in six months the emergency standard would save over 6,500 lives and prevent over 250,000 hospitalizations. See *id.*, at 61408. Tragically, those estimates may prove too conservative. Since OSHA issued the Standard, the number of daily new COVID–19 cases has risen tenfold. See CDC, COVID Data Tracker (Jan. 12, 2022), https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends_dailycases (reporting a 7-day average of 71,453 new daily cases on Nov. 5, 2021, and 751,125 on Jan. 10, 2022). And the number of hospitalizations has quadrupled, to a level not seen since the pandemic's previous peak. CDC, COVID Data Tracker (Jan. 12, 2022), <https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions> (reporting a 7-day average of 5,050 new daily hospital admissions on Nov. 5, 2021, and 20,269 on Jan. 10, 2022). And as long as the pandemic

continues, so too does the risk that mutations will produce yet more variants—just as OSHA predicted before the rise of Omicron. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61409 (warning that high transmission and insufficient vaccination rates could “foster the development of new variants that could be similarly, or even more, disruptive” than those then existing). Far from diminishing, the need for broadly applicable workplace protections remains strong, for all the many reasons OSHA gave. See *id.*, at 61407–61419, 61424, 61429–61439, 61445–61447.

These considerations weigh decisively against issuing a stay. This Court should decline to exercise its equitable discretion in a way that will—as this stay will—imperil the lives of thousands of American workers and the health of many more.

* * *

Underlying everything else in this dispute is a single, simple question: Who decides how much protection, and of what kind, American workers need from COVID–19? An agency with expertise in workplace health and safety, acting as Congress and the President authorized? Or a court, lacking any knowledge of how to safeguard workplaces, and insulated from responsibility for any damage it causes?

*13 Here, an agency charged by Congress with safeguarding employees from workplace dangers has decided that action is needed. The agency has thoroughly evaluated the risks that the disease poses to workers across all sectors of the economy. It has considered the extent to which various policies will mitigate those risks, and the costs those policies will entail. It has landed on an approach that encourages vaccination, but allows employers to use masking and testing instead. It has meticulously explained why it has reached its conclusions. And in doing all this, it has acted within the four corners of its statutory authorization—or actually here, its statutory mandate. OSHA, that is, has responded in the way necessary to alleviate the “grave danger” that workplace exposure to the “new hazard[]” of COVID–19 poses to employees across the Nation. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1). The agency's Standard is informed by a half century of experience and expertise in handling workplace health and safety issues. The Standard also has the virtue of political accountability, for OSHA is responsible to the President, and the President is responsible to—and can be held to account by—the American public.

And then, there is this Court. Its Members are elected by, and accountable to, no one. And we “lack[] the background,

competence, and expertise to assess” workplace health and safety issues. *South Bay United Pentecostal Church*, 590 U.S., at —, 140 S.Ct., at 1613 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). When we are wise, we know enough to defer on matters like this one. When we are wise, we know not to displace the judgments of experts, acting within the sphere Congress marked out and under Presidential control, to deal with emergency conditions. Today, we are not wise. In the face of a still-raging pandemic, this Court tells the agency charged with protecting worker safety that it may not do so in all the workplaces needed. As disease and death continue

to mount, this Court tells the agency that it cannot respond in the most effective way possible. Without legal basis, the Court usurps a decision that rightfully belongs to others. It undercuts the capacity of the responsible federal officials, acting well within the scope of their authority, to protect American workers from grave danger.

All Citations

--- S.Ct. ----, 2022 WL 120952, 22 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 568

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EXHIBIT 2

2022 WL 120950
Supreme Court of the United States.

Joseph R. BIDEN, Jr., President of
the United States, et al., Applicants

v.

MISSOURI, et al.

Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health
and Human Services, et al., Applicants

v.

Louisiana, et al.

Nos. 21A240 and 21A241

|
January 13, 2022

Synopsis

Background: In first action, several States brought action against President and other federal defendants, challenging Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ (CMS) interim final rule imposing COVID-19 vaccination mandate applicable to staff of healthcare facilities participating in Medicare and Medicaid. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, Matthew T. Schelp, J., 2021 WL 5564501, granted States’ motion for preliminary injunction, and denied, 2021 WL 5631736, defendants’ motion for stay pending appeal. In second action, several States brought action against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other federal defendants challenging same CMS interim final rule. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Terry A. Doughty, J., 2021 WL 5609846, granted nationwide preliminary injunction, and denied defendants’ motion for stay pending appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 20 F.4th 260, granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for stay pending appeal. In both cases, the federal government filed applications to stay preliminary injunctions.

Holdings: The Supreme Court held that:

Secretary of Health and Human Services did not exceed his statutory authority in issuing rule;

rule was not arbitrary and capricious;

Secretary had requisite good cause to forgo notice-and-comment procedures;

Secretary was not required to consult with appropriate State agencies on participation conditions before issuing rule; and

rule did not violate statutory directive that federal officials may not exercise any supervision or control over manner in which medical services are provided or over selection or tenure of any officer or employee of any participating facility.

Applications granted.

Justice Thomas filed dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined.

Justice Alito filed dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined.

Procedural Posture(s): Motion for Stay.

West Codenotes

Negative Treatment Reconsidered

42 C.F.R. §§ 416.51(c), 418.60(d), 441.151(c), 460.74(d), 482.42(g), 483.80(d)(3)(v), (i), 483.430(f), 483.460, 484.70(d), 485.58, 485.70(n), 485.640(f), 485.725(f), 485.904(c), 486.525(c), 491.8(d), 494.30(b)

ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 The Secretary of Health and Human Services administers the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which provide health insurance for millions of elderly, disabled, and low-income Americans. In November 2021, the Secretary announced that, in order to receive Medicare and Medicaid funding, participating facilities must ensure that their staff—unless exempt for medical or religious reasons—are vaccinated against COVID–19. 86 Fed. Reg. 61555 (2021). Two District Courts enjoined enforcement of the rule, and the Government now asks us to stay those injunctions. Agreeing that it is entitled to such relief, we grant the applications.

A

The Medicare program provides health insurance to individuals 65 and older, as well as those with specified disabilities. The Medicaid program does the same for those with low incomes. Both Medicare and Medicaid are administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who has general statutory authority to promulgate regulations “as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the functions with which [he] is charged.” 42 U. S. C. § 1302(a).

One such function—perhaps the most basic, given the Department’s core mission—is to ensure that the healthcare providers who care for Medicare and Medicaid patients protect their patients’ health and safety. Such providers include hospitals, nursing homes, ambulatory surgical centers, hospices, rehabilitation facilities, and more. To that end, Congress authorized the Secretary to promulgate, as a condition of a facility’s participation in the programs, such “requirements as [he] finds necessary in the interest of the health and safety of individuals who are furnished services in the institution.” 42 U. S. C. § 1395x(e)(9) (hospitals); see, e.g., §§ 1395x(cc)(2)(J) (outpatient rehabilitation facilities), 1395i–3(d)(4)(B) (skilled nursing facilities), 1395k(a)(2)(F) (i) (ambulatory surgical centers); see also §§ 1396r(d)(4)(B), 1396d(l)(1), 1396d(o) (corresponding provisions in Medicaid Act).

Relying on these authorities, the Secretary has established long lists of detailed conditions with which facilities must comply to be eligible to receive Medicare and Medicaid funds. See, e.g., 42 CFR pt. 482 (2020) (hospitals); 42 CFR pt. 483 (long-term care facilities); 42 CFR §§ 416.25–416.54 (ambulatory surgical centers). Such conditions have long included a requirement that certain providers maintain and enforce an “infection prevention and control program designed ... to help prevent the development and transmission of communicable diseases and infections.” § 483.80 (long-term care facilities); see, e.g., §§ 482.42(a) (hospitals), 416.51(b) (ambulatory surgical centers), 485.725 (facilities that provide outpatient physical therapy and speech-language pathology services).

B

On November 5, 2021, the Secretary issued an interim final rule amending the existing conditions of participation in

Medicare and Medicaid to add a new requirement—that facilities ensure that their covered staff are vaccinated against COVID–19. 86 Fed. Reg. 61561, 61616–61627. The rule requires providers to offer medical and religious exemptions, and does not cover staff who telework full-time. *Id.*, at 61571–61572. A facility’s failure to comply may lead to monetary penalties, denial of payment for new admissions, and ultimately termination of participation in the programs. *Id.*, at 61574.

*2 The Secretary issued the rule after finding that vaccination of healthcare workers against COVID–19 was “necessary for the health and safety of individuals to whom care and services are furnished.” *Id.*, at 61561. In many facilities, 35% or more of staff remain unvaccinated, *id.*, at 61559, and those staff, the Secretary explained, pose a serious threat to the health and safety of patients. That determination was based on data showing that the COVID–19 virus can spread rapidly among healthcare workers and from them to patients, and that such spread is more likely when healthcare workers are unvaccinated. *Id.*, at 61558–61561, 61567–61568, 61585–61586. He also explained that, because Medicare and Medicaid patients are often elderly, disabled, or otherwise in poor health, transmission of COVID–19 to such patients is particularly dangerous. *Id.*, at 61566, 61609. In addition to the threat posed by in-facility transmission itself, the Secretary also found that “fear of exposure” to the virus “from unvaccinated health care staff can lead patients to themselves forgo seeking medically necessary care,” creating a further “ris[k] to patient health and safety.” *Id.*, at 61588. He further noted that staffing shortages caused by COVID–19-related exposures or illness has disrupted patient care. *Id.*, at 61559.

The Secretary issued the rule as an interim final rule, rather than through the typical notice-and-comment procedures, after finding “good cause” that it should be made effective immediately. *Id.*, at 61583–61586; see 5 U. S. C. § 553(b) (B). That good cause was, in short, the Secretary’s belief that any “further delay” would endanger patient health and safety given the spread of the Delta variant and the upcoming winter season. 86 Fed. Reg. 61583–61586.

C

Shortly after the interim rule’s announcement, two groups of States—one led by Louisiana and one by Missouri—filed separate actions challenging the rule. The U. S. District

Courts for the Western District of Louisiana and the Eastern District of Missouri each found the rule defective and entered preliminary injunctions against its enforcement. *Louisiana v. Becerra*, — F.Supp.3d —, 2021 WL 5609846 (Nov. 30, 2021); *Missouri v. Biden*, — F.Supp.3d —, 2021 WL 5564501 (Nov. 29, 2021). In each case, the Government moved for a stay of the injunction from the relevant Court of Appeals. In *Louisiana*, the Fifth Circuit denied the Government's motion. 20 F.4th 260 (2021). In *Missouri*, the Eighth Circuit did so as well. See Order in No. 21–3725 (Dec. 13, 2021). The Government filed applications asking us to stay both District Courts' preliminary injunctions, and we heard expedited argument on its requests.

II

A

First, we agree with the Government that the Secretary's rule falls within the authorities that Congress has conferred upon him.

Congress has authorized the Secretary to impose conditions on the receipt of Medicaid and Medicare funds that “the Secretary finds necessary in the interest of the health and safety of individuals who are furnished services.” 42 U. S. C. § 1395x(e)(9).^{*} COVID–19 is a highly contagious, dangerous, and—especially for Medicare and Medicaid patients—deadly disease. The Secretary of Health and Human Services determined that a COVID–19 vaccine mandate will substantially reduce the likelihood that healthcare workers will contract the virus and transmit it to their patients. 86 Fed. Reg. 61557–61558. He accordingly concluded that a vaccine mandate is “necessary to promote and protect patient health and safety” in the face of the ongoing pandemic. *Id.*, at 61613.

^{*} While this provision pertains only to hospitals, the Secretary has similar statutory powers with respect to most other categories of healthcare facilities covered by the interim rule. See *supra*, at —. Justice THOMAS points out that for five such kinds of facilities, the relevant statute does not contain express “health and safety” language. *Post*, at — (dissenting opinion). But employees at these facilities—which include end-stage renal disease clinics and home infusion therapy suppliers—represent less than 3% of the workers covered by

the rule. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. And even with respect to them, the pertinent statutory language may be read as incorporating the “health and safety” authorities applicable to the other 97%. See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. § 1396d(d)(1). We see no reason to let the infusion-clinic tail wag the hospital dog, especially because the rule has an express severability provision. 86 Fed. Reg. 61560.

^{*3} The rule thus fits neatly within the language of the statute. After all, ensuring that providers take steps to avoid transmitting a dangerous virus to their patients is consistent with the fundamental principle of the medical profession: first, do no harm. It would be the “very opposite of efficient and effective administration for a facility that is supposed to make people well to make them sick with COVID–19.” *Florida v. Department of Health and Human Servs.*, 19 F.4th 1271, 1288 (CA11 2021).

The States and Justice THOMAS offer a narrower view of the various authorities at issue, contending that the seemingly broad language cited above authorizes the Secretary to impose no more than a list of bureaucratic rules regarding the technical administration of Medicare and Medicaid. But the longstanding practice of Health and Human Services in implementing the relevant statutory authorities tells a different story. As noted above, healthcare facilities that wish to participate in Medicare and Medicaid have always been obligated to satisfy a host of conditions that address the safe and effective provision of healthcare, not simply sound accounting. Such requirements govern in detail, for instance, the amount of time after admission or surgery within which a hospital patient must be examined and by whom, 42 CFR § 482.22(c)(5), the procurement, transportation, and transplantation of human kidneys, livers, hearts, lungs, and pancreases, § 482.45, the tasks that may be delegated by a physician to a physician assistant or nurse practitioner, § 483.30(e), and, most pertinent here, the programs that hospitals must implement to govern the “surveillance, prevention, and control of ... infectious diseases,” § 482.42.

Moreover, the Secretary routinely imposes conditions of participation that relate to the qualifications and duties of healthcare workers themselves. See, e.g., §§ 482.42(c) (2) (iv) (requiring training of “hospital personnel and staff ” on “infection prevention and control guidelines”), 483.60(a) (1)(ii) (qualified dieticians must have completed at least 900 hours of supervised practice), 482.26(b)–(c) (specifying personnel authorized to use radiologic equipment). And the Secretary has always justified these sorts of requirements

by citing his authorities to protect patient health and safety. See, e.g., §§ 482.1(a)(1)(ii), 483.1(a)(1)(ii), 416.1(a)(1). As these examples illustrate, the Secretary's role in administering Medicare and Medicaid goes far beyond that of a mere bookkeeper.

Indeed, respondents do not contest the validity of this longstanding litany of health-related participation conditions. When asked at oral argument whether the Secretary could, using the very same statutory authorities at issue here, require hospital employees to wear gloves, sterilize instruments, wash their hands in a certain way and at certain intervals, and the like, Missouri answered yes: “[T]he Secretary certainly has authority to implement all kinds of infection control measures at these facilities.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 57–58. Of course the vaccine mandate goes further than what the Secretary has done in the past to implement infection control. But he has never had to address an infection problem of this scale and scope before. In any event, there can be no doubt that addressing infection problems in Medicare and Medicaid facilities is what he does.

And his response is not a surprising one. Vaccination requirements are a common feature of the provision of healthcare in America: Healthcare workers around the country are ordinarily required to be vaccinated for diseases such as hepatitis B, influenza, and measles, mumps, and rubella. CDC, State Healthcare Worker and Patient Vaccination Laws (Feb. 28, 2018), <https://www.cdc.gov/php/publications/topic/vaccinationlaws.html>. As the Secretary explained, these pre-existing state requirements are a major reason the agency has not previously adopted vaccine mandates as a condition of participation. 86 Fed. Reg. 61567–61568.

*4 All this is perhaps why healthcare workers and public-health organizations overwhelmingly support the Secretary's rule. See *id.*, at 61565–61566; see also Brief for American Medical Assn. et al. as *Amici Curiae*; Brief for American Public Health Assn. et al. as *Amici Curiae*; Brief for Secretaries of Health and Human Services et al. as *Amici Curiae*. Indeed, their support suggests that a vaccination requirement under these circumstances is a straightforward and predictable example of the “health and safety” regulations that Congress has authorized the Secretary to impose.

We accordingly conclude that the Secretary did not exceed his statutory authority in requiring that, in order to remain eligible for Medicare and Medicaid dollars, the facilities

covered by the interim rule must ensure that their employees be vaccinated against COVID–19.

B

We also disagree with respondents’ remaining contentions in support of the injunctions entered below. First, the interim rule is not arbitrary and capricious. Given the rulemaking record, it cannot be maintained that the Secretary failed to “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for” his decisions to (1) impose the vaccine mandate instead of a testing mandate; (2) require vaccination of employees with “natural immunity” from prior COVID–19 illness; and (3) depart from the agency's prior approach of merely encouraging vaccination. *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983); see 86 Fed. Reg. 61583, 61559–61561, 61614. Nor is it the case that the Secretary “entirely failed to consider” that the rule might cause staffing shortages, including in rural areas. *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856; see 86 Fed. Reg. 61566, 61569, 61607–61609. As to the additional flaws the District Courts found in the Secretary's analysis, particularly concerning the nature of the data relied upon, the role of courts in reviewing arbitrary and capricious challenges is to “simply ensur[e] that the agency has acted within a zone of reasonableness.” *FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project*, 592 U.S. —, —, 141 S.Ct. 1150, 1158, 209 L.Ed.2d 287 (2021).

Other statutory objections to the rule fare no better. First, Justice ALITO takes issue with the Secretary's finding of good cause to delay notice and comment. But the Secretary's finding that accelerated promulgation of the rule in advance of the winter flu season would significantly reduce COVID–19 infections, hospitalizations, and deaths, 86 Fed. Reg. 61584–61586, constitutes the “something specific,” *post*, at — (dissenting opinion), required to forgo notice and comment. And we cannot say that in this instance the two months the agency took to prepare a 73-page rule constitutes “delay” inconsistent with the Secretary's finding of good cause. Second, we agree with the Secretary that he was not required to “consult with appropriate State agencies,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395z, in advance of issuing the interim rule. Consistent with the existence of the good cause exception, which was properly invoked here, consultation during the deferred notice-and-comment period is permissible. We similarly concur with the Secretary that he need not prepare a regulatory impact analysis discussing a rule's effect on small rural hospitals

when he acts through an interim final rule; that requirement applies only where the Secretary proceeds on the basis of a “notice of proposed rulemaking,” § 1302(b)(1), followed by a “final version of [the] rule,” § 1302(b)(2). Lastly, the rule does not run afoul of the directive in § 1395 that federal officials may not “exercise any supervision or control over the ... manner in which medical services are provided, or over the selection [or] tenure ... of any officer or employee of ” any facility. That reading of section 1395 would mean that nearly every condition of participation the Secretary has long insisted upon is unlawful.

* * *

*5 The challenges posed by a global pandemic do not allow a federal agency to exercise power that Congress has not conferred upon it. At the same time, such unprecedented circumstances provide no grounds for limiting the exercise of authorities the agency has long been recognized to have. Because the latter principle governs in these cases, the applications for a stay presented to Justice ALITO and Justice KAVANAUGH and by them referred to the Court are granted.

The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri's November 29, 2021, order granting a preliminary injunction is stayed pending disposition of the Government's appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the disposition of the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

The District Court for the Western District of Louisiana's November 30, 2021, order granting a preliminary injunction is stayed pending disposition of the Government's appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the disposition of the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the order shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

It is so ordered.

Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice ALITO, Justice GORSUCH, and Justice BARRETT join, dissenting.

Two months ago, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), acting through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), issued an omnibus rule mandating that medical facilities nationwide order their employees, volunteers, contractors, and other workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine. Covered employers must fire noncompliant workers or risk fines and termination of their Medicare and Medicaid provider agreements. As a result, the Government has effectively mandated vaccination for 10 million healthcare workers.

Two District Courts preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the omnibus rule, and the Government now requests an emergency stay of those injunctions pending appeal. Because the Government has not made a strong showing that it has statutory authority to issue the rule, I too would deny a stay.

To obtain a stay, the Government must show that there is (1) a reasonable probability that we would grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that we would reverse the judgments below; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from denying a stay. *Hollingsworth v. Perry*, 558 U.S. 183, 190, 130 S.Ct. 705, 175 L.Ed.2d 657 (2010) (*per curiam*). Because there is no real dispute that this case merits our review, our decision turns primarily on whether the Government can make a “strong showing” that it is likely to succeed on the merits. *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 426, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009). In my view, the Government has not made such a showing here.

The Government begins by invoking two statutory provisions that generally grant CMS authority to promulgate rules to implement Medicare and Medicaid. The first authorizes CMS to “publish such rules and regulations ... as may be necessary to the efficient administration of the [agency's] functions.” 42 U. S. C. § 1302(a). The second authorizes CMS to “prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the administration of the insurance programs” under the Medicare Act. § 1395hh(a)(1).

*6 The Government has not established that either provision empowers it to impose a vaccine mandate. Rules carrying out the “administration” of Medicare and Medicaid are those that serve “the practical management and direction” of those programs. Black's Law Dictionary 58 (3d ed. 1933). Such rules are “necessary” to “administration” if they bear “an

actual and discernible nexus” to the programs’ practical management. *Merck & Co., Inc. v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Servs.*, 962 F.3d 531, 537–538 (CADDC 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the omnibus rule compels millions of healthcare workers to undergo an unwanted medical procedure that “cannot be removed at the end of the shift,” *In re MCP No. 165*, 20 F.4th 264, 268 (CA6 2021) (Sutton, C. J., dissenting from denial of initial hearing en banc). To the extent the rule has any connection to the management of Medicare and Medicaid, it is at most a “tangential” one. *Merck & Co., Inc.*, 962 F.3d at 538.

At oral argument, the Government largely conceded that § 1302(a) and § 1395hh(a)(1) alone do not authorize the omnibus rule. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 10. Instead, it fell back on a constellation of statutory provisions that each concern one of the 15 types of medical facilities that the rule covers. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61567 (2021). Several of those provisions contain language indicating that CMS may regulate those facilities in the interest of “health and safety.” In the Government’s view, that language authorizes CMS to adopt any “requirements that [CMS] deems necessary to ensure patient health and safety,” including a vaccine mandate applicable to all facility types. Application in No. 21A240, p. 19. The majority, too, treats these scattered provisions as a singular (and unqualified) delegation to the Secretary to adopt health and safety regulations.

The Government has not made a strong showing that this agglomeration of statutes authorizes any such rule. To start, 5 of the 15 facility-specific statutes do not authorize CMS to impose “health and safety” regulations at all. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396d(d)(1), (h)(1)(B)(i), 1395rr(b)(1)(A), 1395x(iii)(3)(D)(i)(IV), 1395i–4(e). These provisions cannot support an argument based on statutory text they lack. Perhaps that is why the Government only weakly defends them as a basis for its authority. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25–28.

Next, the Government identifies eight definitional provisions describing, for example, what makes a hospital a “hospital.” These define covered facilities as those that comply with a variety of conditions, including “such other requirements as the Secretary finds necessary in the interest of ... health and safety.” § 1395x(e)(9); see also §§ 1395x(dd)(2)(G), (o)(6), (ff)(3)(B)(iv), (cc)(2)(J), (p)(4)(A)(v), (aa)(2)(K), 1395k(a)(2)(F)(i). The Government similarly invokes a saving clause for “health and safety” regulations applicable to “all-inclusive care” programs for the elderly, see §§ 1395eee(f)(4), 1396u–4(f)(4), and a requirement that long-

term nursing facilities “establish and maintain an infection control program designed to provide a safe, sanitary, and comfortable environment ... to help prevent the development and transmission of disease,” § 1395i–3(d)(3).

The Government has not made a strong showing that this hodgepodge of provisions authorizes a nationwide vaccine mandate. We presume that Congress does not hide “fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague or ancillary provisions.” *Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc.*, 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001). Yet here, the Government proposes to find virtually unlimited vaccination power, over millions of healthcare workers, in definitional provisions, a saving clause, and a provision regarding long-term care facilities’ sanitation procedures. The Government has not explained why Congress would have used these ancillary provisions to house what can only be characterized as a “fundamental detail” of the statutory scheme. Had Congress wanted to grant CMS power to impose a vaccine mandate across all facility types, it would have done what it has done elsewhere—specifically authorize one. See 22 U. S. C. § 2504(e) (authorizing mandate for “such immunization ... as necessary and appropriate” for Peace Corps volunteers).

*7 Nonetheless, even if I were to accept that Congress could have hidden vaccine-mandate power in statutory definitions, the language in these “health and safety” provisions does not suggest that Congress did so. Take, for example, 42 U. S. C. § 1395x(e), which defines “hospital” for certain purposes. Three subsections define hospitals as providers of specific patient services, see §§ 1395x(e)(1), (4), (5), and five describe administrative requirements that a facility must meet to qualify as a covered hospital, see §§ 1395x(e)(2)–(3), (6)–(8). The final subsection then provides that a “hospital” must also “mee[t] such other requirements as the Secretary finds necessary in the interest of the health and safety of individuals who are furnished services.” § 1395x(e)(9) (emphasis added).

Contrary to the Government’s position, this kind of catchall provision does not authorize every regulation related to “health and safety.” As with all statutory language, context must inform the scope of the provision. See *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd.*, 525 U.S. 366, 408, 119 S.Ct. 721, 142 L.Ed.2d 835 (1999) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing *Neal v. Clark*, 95 U.S. 704, 708, 24 L.Ed. 586 (1878)). “[W]here, as here, a more general term follows more specific terms in a list, the general term is usually understood to embrace only objects similar

in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” *Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis*, 584 U. S. —, —, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1625, 200 L.Ed.2d 889 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). That presumption is particularly forceful where the statutory catchall refers to “such other” requirements, signaling that the subjects that come before delimit any residual authority. See *ibid.* Here, in § 1395x(e), none of the myriad subsections preceding the “health and safety” subsection suggests that the Government can order hospitals to require virtually all hospital personnel to be vaccinated. Rather, these subsections show that HHS’ residual authority embraces only administrative requirements like those that precede it—including “provid[ing] 24-hour nursing service,” “maintain[ing] clinical records on all patients,” or having “bylaws in effect.” §§ 1395x(e)(2), (3), (5). A requirement that all healthcare workers be vaccinated is plainly different in kind. The same reasoning applies to almost all of the Government’s proposed facility-specific statutes. See §§ 1395x(aa)(2), (dd)(2), (o)(6); see also §§ 1395x(ff)(3)(B), (p)(4)(A), (cc)(2), 1395eee, 1396u–4(f)(4).

Only one facility-specific provision is arguably different. It regulates long-term care facilities and mandates an “infection control program” among its “health and safety” provisions. § 1395i–3(d)(3). But that infection-control provision focuses on sanitizing the facilities’ “environment,” not its personnel. *Ibid.* In any event, even if this statutory language justified a vaccine mandate in long-term care facilities, it could not sustain the omnibus rule. Neither the “infection control” language nor a reasonable analog appears in any of the other facility-specific provisions. Basic interpretive principles would thus suggest that CMS lacks vaccine-mandating authority with respect to the other types of facilities. See *Russello v. United States*, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). And, of course, the omnibus rule cannot rest on the long-term care provision alone. By CMS’ own estimate, long-term care facilities employ only 10% of the 10 million healthcare workers that the rule covers. 86 Fed. Reg. 61603. Put simply, the oblique reference to “infection control” in the definitional provision for long-term care facilities cannot authorize an omnibus vaccine mandate covering every type of facility that falls within CMS’ purview.

*8 For its part, the Court does not rely on the Government’s proffered statutory provisions. Instead, it asserts that CMS possesses broad vaccine-mandating authority by pointing to a handful of CMS regulations. To begin, the Court does not explain why the bare existence of these regulations is

evidence of what Congress empowered the agency to do. Relying on them appears to put the cart before the horse.

Regardless, these regulations provide scant support for the sweeping power the Government now claims. For example, CMS regulations that mandate the number of hours a dietician must practice under supervision, *ante*, at — (citing 42 CFR § 483.60 (2020)), or that prescribe “the tasks that may be delegated ... to a physician assistant or nurse practitioner,” *ante*, at — (citing § 483.30(e)), cannot support a vaccine mandate for healthcare personnel.

The Court also invokes a regulation requiring hospitals to implement programs that “govern the ‘surveillance, prevention, and control of ... infectious diseases,’ ” *ante*, at — (quoting § 482.42), as well as a few regulations that require “infection and prevention control programs” at some (but apparently not all) facility types. See *ante*, at — (citing, *inter alia*, § 482.42). But many of these infection-control regulations, like the infection-control program set out at 42 U. S. C. § 1395i–3(d)(3), are far afield from immunization. See, e.g., 42 CFR §§ 485.725(b)–(e) (specifying requirements for “aseptic techniques,” “housekeeping services,” “[I]nens,” and “[p]est control”). And insofar as they do touch on immunization, they require only that facilities offer their residents the opportunity to obtain a vaccine, along with “the opportunity to refuse” it. § 483.80(d)(1). These regulations are not precedents for CMS’ newfound authority mandating that all employees be vaccinated.

Finally, our precedents confirm that the Government has failed to make a strong showing on the merits. “We expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency to exercise powers of vast economic and political significance.” *Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs.*, 594 U. S. —, —, 141 S.Ct. 2485, 2489, 210 L.Ed.2d 856 (2021) (*per curiam*) (internal quotation marks omitted). And we expect Congress to use “exceedingly clear language if it wishes to significantly alter the balance between state and federal power.” *Ibid.* (internal quotation marks omitted). The omnibus rule is undoubtedly significant—it requires millions of healthcare workers to choose between losing their livelihoods and acquiescing to a vaccine they have rejected for months. Vaccine mandates also fall squarely within a State’s police power, see *Zucht v. King*, 260 U.S. 174, 176, 43 S.Ct. 24, 67 L.Ed. 194 (1922), and, until now, only rarely have been a tool of the Federal Government. If Congress had wanted to grant CMS authority to impose a

nationwide vaccine mandate, and consequently alter the state-federal balance, it would have said so clearly. It did not.

* * *

These cases are not about the efficacy or importance of COVID–19 vaccines. They are only about whether CMS has the statutory authority to force healthcare workers, by coercing their employers, to undergo a medical procedure they do not want and cannot undo. Because the Government has not made a strong showing that Congress gave CMS that broad authority, I would deny the stays pending appeal. I respectfully dissent.

Justice [ALITO](#), with whom Justice [THOMAS](#), Justice [GORSUCH](#), and Justice [BARRETT](#) join, dissenting.

*9 I join Justice THOMAS's dissent because I do not think that the Federal Government is likely to be able to show that Congress has authorized the unprecedented step of compelling over 10,000,000 healthcare workers to be vaccinated on pain of being fired. The support for the argument that the Federal Government possesses such authority is so obscure that the main argument now pressed by the Government—that the authority is conferred by a hodgepodge of scattered provisions—was not prominently set out by the Government until its reply brief in this Court. Before concluding that the Federal Government possesses this authority, we should demand stronger statutory proof than has been mustered to date.

But even if the Federal Government has the authority to require the [vaccination](#) of healthcare workers, it did not have the authority to impose that requirement in the way it did. Under our Constitution, the authority to make laws that impose obligations on the American people is conferred on Congress, whose Members are elected by the people. Elected representatives solicit the views of their constituents, listen to their complaints and requests, and make a great effort to accommodate their concerns. Today, however, most federal law is not made by Congress. It comes in the form of rules issued by unelected administrators. In order to give individuals and entities who may be seriously impacted by agency rules at least some opportunity to make their views heard and to have them given serious consideration, Congress has clearly required that agencies comply with basic procedural safeguards. Except in rare cases, an agency must provide public notice of proposed rules, [5 U. S. C. § 553\(b\)](#);

the public must be given the opportunity to comment on those proposals, [§ 553\(c\)](#); and if the agency issues the rule, it must address concerns raised during the notice-and-comment process. *United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.*, 568 F.2d 240, 252 (CA2 1977); see also *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). The rule may then be challenged in court, and the court may declare the rule unlawful if these procedures have not been followed.

In these cases, the relevant agency did none of those things, and the Court rewards this extraordinary departure from ordinary principles of administrative procedure. Although today's ruling means only that the Federal Government is likely to be able to show that this departure is lawful, not that it actually is so, this ruling has an importance that extends beyond the confines of these cases. It may have a lasting effect on Executive Branch behavior.

Because of the importance of notice-and-comment rulemaking, an agency must show “good cause” if it wishes to skip that process. [5 U. S. C. § 553\(b\)\(3\)\(B\)](#). Although this Court has never precisely defined what an agency must do to demonstrate good cause, federal courts have consistently held that exceptions to notice-and-comment must be “ ‘narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced.’ ” *Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA*, 682 F.3d 87, 93 (CA DC 2012) (quoting *Utility Solid Waste Activities Group v. EPA*, 236 F.3d 749, 754 (CA DC 2001)); see also C. Koch & R. Murphy, *Good Cause for Avoiding Procedures*, 1 *Admin. L. & Prac.* § 4:13 (3d ed. 2021).

The agency that issued the mandate at issue here, *i.e.*, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), admits it did not comply with the commonsense measure of seeking public input before placing binding rules on millions of people, but it claims that “[t]he data showing the vital importance of [vaccination](#)” indicate that it “cannot delay taking this action.” 86 *Fed. Reg.* 61555, 61583 (2021). But CMS's generalized justification cannot alone establish good cause to dispense with Congress's clear procedural safeguards. An agency seeking to show good cause must “point to something specific that illustrates a particular harm that will be caused by the delay required for notice and comment.” *United States v. Brewer*, 766 F.3d 884, 890 (CA8 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

*10 Although CMS argues that an emergency justifies swift action, both District Courts below held that CMS fatally undercut that justification with its own repeated delays. The vaccines that CMS now claims are vital had been widely available 10 months before CMS's mandate, and millions of healthcare workers had already been vaccinated before the agency took action. President Biden announced the CMS mandate on September 9, 2021, nearly two months before the agency released the rule on November 5, and the mandate itself delayed the compliance deadline further by another month until December 6. 86 Fed. Reg. 61555; *id.*, at 61573 (making implementation of the vaccine mandate begin “30 days after publication” and completed “60 days after publication”). This is hardly swift.

CMS argues that its delay, “even if true,” does not provide a “reason to block a rule” that it claims will protect patient health. Application in No. 21A241, p. 36. It claims that its departure from ordinary procedure after extraordinary delay should be excused because nobody can show they were prejudiced by the lack of a comment period before the rule took effect. But it is CMS's affirmative burden to show it has good cause, not respondents' burden to prove the negative. *Northern Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel*, 808 F.2d 741, 751 (CA10 1987). Congress placed procedural safeguards on executive rulemaking so agencies would consider “important aspect[s] of the problem[s]” they seek to address before restricting the liberty of the people they regulate. *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856. Because CMS chose to circumvent notice-and-comment, States that run Medicaid facilities, as

well as other regulated parties, had no opportunity to present evidence refuting or contradicting CMS's justifications before the rule bound them. And because CMS acknowledged its own “uncertainty” and the “rapidly changing nature of the current pandemic,” 86 Fed. Reg. 61589, it should have been *more* receptive to feedback, not less. “[A]n utter failure to comply with notice and comment cannot be considered harmless if there is any uncertainty at all as to the effect of that failure.” *Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida v. Veneman*, 289 F.3d 89, 96 (CADDC 2002).

Today's decision will ripple through administrative agencies' future decisionmaking. The Executive Branch already touches nearly every aspect of Americans' lives. In concluding that CMS had good cause to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Court shifts the presumption against compliance with procedural strictures from the unelected agency to the people they regulate. Neither CMS nor the Court articulates a limiting principle for why, after an unexplained and unjustified delay, an agency can regulate first and listen later, and then put more than 10 million healthcare workers to the choice of their jobs or an irreversible medical treatment.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

All Citations

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