

**IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT**

Nancy Huisha-Huisha et al.,

Plaintiff-Appellees,

v.

Alejandro N. Mayorkas,

Defendant-Appellants

and

States of Arizona, Louisiana,
Alabama, Alaska, Kansas,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.

*Proposed Intervenor-
Defendants.*

Case No. 22-5325

**STATES' NOTICE REGARDING FILINGS BELOW AND
REQUEST TO HAVE MOTION TO INTERVENE MADE IN THIS
COURT DECIDED BY THIS COURT**

**NOTICE REGARDING FILINGS BELOW AND REQUEST TO
HAVE MOTION TO INTERVENE MADE IN THIS COURT
DECIDED BY THIS COURT**

The States of Arizona, Louisiana, Alabama, Alaska, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming (“States”) hereby provide notice that both Federal Defendants and Plaintiffs (the “Existing Parties”) have asked the district court to deny the States’ motion to intervene, even though it is pending by operation of law in this Court, as the States have previously explained. Copies of their supplemental memorandum are attached.

In light of Existing Parties’ attempt to have a district court deny a motion pending *in this Court*, the States respectfully clarify that their motion to intervene in this Court has two parts (1) a request that this Court decide the motion filed in the district court, and carried to this Court by the Federal Defendants’ appeal, in favor of the States or, in the alternative, (2) to treat the State’s motion as one for intervention filed, in the first instance in this Court, and to grant it.

Whatever the district court does will not affect the States’ alternative request—and so any ruling the district court makes is of little

to no relevancy to the States' motion. This Court plainly has jurisdiction over this appeal and thus unquestionably has authority to consider a motion to intervene filed in this Court during the pendency of that appeal. The district court does not have authority to prevent this Court from considering a motion to intervene in this appeal filed in this Court during the pendency of this appeal.

CONCLUSION

The States therefore request that the Court act upon their request to intervene in this Court regardless of whether the district court acts upon the motion originally filed below.

Dated: December 14, 2022

JEFF LANDRY
Attorney General of Louisiana

/s/ Elizabeth B. Murrill
ELIZABETH B. MURRILL
Solicitor General
J. SCOTT ST. JOHN
Deputy Solicitor General
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
1885 N. Third Street
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804
Tel: (225) 326-6766
murrille@ag.louisiana.gov
stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov

*Attorneys for the State of
Louisiana*

Respectfully submitted,

MARK BRNOVICH
Attorney General of Arizona

/s/ Drew C. Ensign
DREW C. ENSIGN
Deputy Solicitor General
JAMES K. ROGERS
Senior Litigation Counsel
Arizona Attorney General's Office
2005 N. Central Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Telephone: (602) 542-5200
Drew.Ensign@azag.gov

Attorneys for the State of Arizona

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General of Alabama

/s/ Edmund G. LaCour Jr.

EDMUND G. LACOUR JR.

Solicitor General

State of Alabama

Office of the Attorney General

501 Washington Avenue

Montgomery, Alabama 36130

Telephone: (334) 242-7300

Fax: (334) 353-8400

[Edmund.LaCour@AlabamaAG.g](mailto:Edmund.LaCour@AlabamaAG.gov)[ov](mailto:Edmund.LaCour@AlabamaAG.gov)*Attorneys for the State of
Alabama***TREG R. TAYLOR**

Attorney General of Alaska

CORI M. MILLS

Deputy Attorney General of
Alaska/s/ Christopher A. Robinson

CHRISTOPHER A. ROBINSON

Alaska Bar No. 2111126

Assistant Attorney General

Alaska Department of Law

1031 W. 4th Avenue, Suite 200

Anchorage, Alaska 99501-1994

chris.robison@alaska.gov*Attorneys for the State of Alaska***DEREK SCHMIDT**

Attorney General of Kansas

/s/ Brant M. Laue

BRANT M. LAUE*

Solicitor General

OFFICE OF KANSAS

ATTORNEY GENERAL

120 SW 10th Avenue, 3rd Floor

Topeka, KS 66612-1597

(785) 368-8435 Phone

Brant.Laue@ag.ks.gov*Attorneys for the State of Kansas***DANIEL CAMERON**

Attorney General of Kentucky

/s/ Marc Manley

MARC MANLEY*

Associate Attorney General

KENTUCKY OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

700 Capital Avenue, Suite 118

Frankfort, Kentucky

Tel: (502) 696-5478

*Attorneys for the Commonwealth
of Kentucky*

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General of Mississippi

/s/ Justin L. Matheny

JUSTIN L. MATHENY

Deputy Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE MISSISSIPPI

ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 220

Jackson, MS 39205-0220

Tel: (601) 359-3680

justin.matheny@ago.ms.gov*Attorneys for the State of
Mississippi***ERIC S. SCHMITT**

Attorney General of Missouri

/s/ D. John Sauer

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

MICHAEL E. TALENT

Deputy Solicitor General

Supreme Court Building

P.O. Box 899

Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

(573) 751-8870

John.Sauer@ago.mo.gov*Attorneys for the State of Missouri***AUSTIN KNUDSON**

Attorney General of Montana

/s/ Kathleen L. Smithgall

KATHLEEN L. SMITHGALL

Deputy Solicitor General

Montana Attorney General's

Office 215 N. Sanders St.

Helena, MT 69601 Telephone:

406-444-2026

Kathleen.Smithgall@mt.gov*Attorneys for the State of
Montana***DOUGLAS J. PETERSON**

Attorney General of Nebraska

/s/ James A. Campbell

JAMES A. CAMPBELL*

Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE NEBRASKA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

2115 State Capitol

Lincoln, Nebraska 68509

Tel: (402) 471-2682

jim.campbell@nebraska.gov*Attorneys for the State of
Nebraska*

DAVE YOST

Attorney General of Ohio

/s/ Ben Flowers**BEN FLOWERS**

Solicitor General

Office of Ohio Attorney General

Dave Yost

Office number: (614) 728-7511

Cell phone: (614) 736-4938

benjamin.flowers@ohioattorneygeneral.gov*Attorneys for the State of Ohio***JOHN M. O'CONNOR**

Attorney General of Oklahoma

/s/ Bryan Cleveland**BRYAN CLEVELAND***

Deputy Solicitor General

OKLAHOMA ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S

OFFICE

313 NE 21st Street

Oklahoma City, OK 73105

Phone: (405) 521-3921

*Attorneys for the State of Oklahoma***ALAN WILSON**

Attorney General of South Carolina

/s/ Jams Emory Smith, Jr.**JAME EMORY SMITH, JR.**

Deputy Solicitor General

Post Office Box 11549

Columbia, SC 29211

(803) 734-3642

esmith@scag.gov*Attorneys for the State of South Carolina***KEN PAXTON**

Attorney General of Texas

/s/ Aaron F. Reitz**AARON F. REITZ***Deputy Attorney General for
Legal Strategy**LEIF A. OLSON***

Special Counsel

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL

OF TEXAS

P.O. Box 12548

Austin, Texas 78711-2548

(512) 936-1700

Aaron.Reitz@oag.texas.govLeif.Olson@oag.texas.gov*Attorneys for the State of Texas*

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General and Reporter of
Tennessee

/s/ Clark Hildrabrand

ANDRÉE S. BLUMSTEIN

Solicitor General

BRANDON J. SMITH

Chief of Staff

CLARK L. HILDABRAND

Assistant Solicitor General

Office of the Tennessee Attorney

General and Reporter

P.O. Box 20207

Nashville, TN 37202-0207

(615) 253-5642

Clark.Hildabrand@ag.tn.gov

*Attorneys for the State of
Tennessee*

SEAN D. REYES

Attorney General of Utah

/s/ Melissa A. Holyoak

MELISSA A. HOLYOAK

Solicitor General

160 East 300 South, 5th Floor

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

(801) 366-0260

melissaholyoak@agutah.gov

Attorneys for the State of Utah

JASON S. MIYARES

Attorney General of Virginia

/s/ Andrew N. Ferguson

ANDREW N. FERGUSON

Solicitor General

LUCAS W.E. CROSLow

Deputy Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE VIRGINIA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

202 North 9th Street

Richmond, Virginia 23219

(804) 786-7704

AFerguson@oag.state.va.us

*Attorneys for the Commonwealth
of Virginia*

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General of West
Virginia

LINDSAY SEE*

Solicitor General

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS

Deputy Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE WEST

VIRGINIA ATTORNEY

GENERAL

State Capitol, Bldg 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

(681) 313-4550

Lindsay.S.See@wvago.gov

*Attorneys for the State of West
Virginia*

BRIDGET HILL

Attorney General of Wyoming

/s/ Ryan Schelhaas

RYAN SCHELHAAS*

Chief Deputy Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE WYOMING

ATTORNEY GENERAL

109 State Capitol

Cheyenne, WY 82002

Tel: (307) 777-5786

ryan.schelhaas@wyo.gov*Attorneys for the State of
Wyoming*

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

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s/ Drew C. Ensign

Drew C. Ensign

Counsel for the State of Arizona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 14th day of December, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit using the CM/ECF filing system. Counsel for parties that are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the CM/ECF system pursuant to the notice of electronic filing.

s/ Drew C. Ensign
Counsel for State of Arizona

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

NANCY GIMENA HUISHA-HUISHA, on
behalf of herself and others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary of
Homeland Security, et al.,

Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 21-100 (EGS)

**DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PROPOSED INTERVENORS' MOTION TO INTERVENE**

Defendants respectfully submit this supplemental brief pursuant to the Court's Minute Order of December 8, 2022, and request that the Court rule on the motion by December 15, 2022, in light of developments in the Court of Appeals.

Nineteen States ("Proposed Intervenors") sought to intervene in this litigation that began more than twenty-two months ago, after first choosing to initiate their own litigation against the federal government in the Western District of Louisiana and obtaining a preliminary injunction there enjoining implementation of CDC's April 1, 2022 order terminating Title 42 suspension orders. Defendants demonstrated in their opposition to the intervention motion that Proposed Intervenors lack standing or a legally protected interest in this action, that their intervention motion is untimely, and that Defendants adequately represent Proposed Intervenors' interests in this action.

After the filing of the parties' opposition briefs, on December 7, 2022, Defendants filed a Notice informing this Court of their intent to appeal this Court's November 15, 2022 order and November 22, 2022 judgment, which vacated CDC's Title 42 regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 71.40, and orders issued thereunder. ECF No. 179. The Notice further noted that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and CDC have decided to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking to replace 42 C.F.R. § 71.40. Moreover, Defendants represented that they intend to move the D.C.

Circuit to hold the appeal in abeyance pending (i) the Fifth Circuit’s decision in *Louisiana v. CDC*, No. 22-30303 (5th Cir.), the government’s appeal of the preliminary injunction enjoining implementation of CDC’s Termination Order, and (ii) the forthcoming rulemaking to replace § 71.40. Defendants also noticed their appeal on the same day. On December 8, 2022, this Court ordered supplemental briefing in view of Defendants’ Notice.

Proposed Intervenors have since sought to intervene in the Court of Appeals and a stay pending appeal. Briefing will be complete in the D.C. Circuit on both of those requests on December 15, 2022. Proposed Intervenors argue in both the Court of Appeals and in their supplemental brief that this Court no longer has jurisdiction to decide their intervention motion in light of the government’s appeal. This is an issue on which the D.C. Circuit has not yet opined and the circuits are split. But this Court need not decide that question because even if the Court concludes that it lacks authority to grant the intervention because of the pending appeal, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a)(2) expressly permits the Court to deny the intervention motion on the merits in such circumstances. The Court should do so promptly so that the Court of Appeals would have the benefit of the Court’s consideration. Indeed, Defendants have demonstrated in their opposition that Proposed Intervenors are not entitled to intervention; nor is permissive intervention appropriate. And as explained below, the developments noted in the government’s Notice further underscore that Proposed Intervenors lack standing or a legally protected interest in this action and that Defendants adequately represent Proposed Intervenors’ interests, if any, here.

ARGUMENT

THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE STATES’ MOTION TO INTERVENE

A. Despite the Pending Appeal, this Court Should Deny the Intervention Pursuant to Rule 62.1(a)

Proposed Intervenors argue that in light of the government’s appeal, jurisdiction over their intervention motion “has been transferred to the D.C. Circuit, and that motion is thus no longer pending in this Court.” *See* Proposed Intervenors’ Suppl. Br. at 1; *see also* Notice, *Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorcas*, No. 22-5325 (representing that their motion to intervene is now pending in the Court of

Appeals “by operation of law”). In support, Proposed Intervenors cite only out-of-circuit authority. *See* Proposed Intervenors’ Suppl. Br. at 1–2. But this is an issue on which the circuits are split. *See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.*, 612 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (notice of appeal does not deprive the district court of “authority to consider the motion to intervene”); *see also Amarin Pharms. Ireland Ltd. v. Food & Drug Admin.*, 139 F. Supp. 3d 437, 440–41 (D.D.C. 2015) (discussing the circuit split). The D.C. Circuit has so far declined to address question. *Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Herman*, 166 F.3d 1248, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (declining to address the jurisdictional question and instead affirming the district court’s denial of intervention on the ground of lack of timeliness).

This Court need not resolve the question because even if the Court concludes that it lacks authority to grant the intervention because of the pending appeal, it could still deny the intervention motion on the merits pursuant to Rule 62.1(a)(2). Rule 62.1(a)(2) provides: “If a timely motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion; (2) deny the motion; (3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.” *See, e.g., Out of the Box Enters. v. El Paseo Jewelry Exch., Inc.*, 737 F. App’x 304, 305 (9th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that although the district court lacked the authority to grant a Rule 60(b) motion without a remand from the court of appeals due to the pending appeal, “it had jurisdiction to deny the motion on the merits, defer consideration, or issue an indicative ruling” pursuant to Rule 62.1(a)); *Amarin*, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 440–41 (issuing an indicative ruling on the issue of intervention pursuant to Rule 62.1(a)(3) after concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion due to pending appeal).

This Court’s denial of the intervention may ultimately facilitate appellate review of the issue. Among other things, the Court is intimately familiar with this case, including the untimeliness of the intervention motion. *See* Defs.’ Opp. at 14–17 (demonstrating that government’s decision not to seek a stay pending appeal does not justify Proposed Intervenors’ eleventh-hour effort to intervene because it should have been obvious to Proposed Intervenors for months that the government might not seek

a stay given CDC's Termination Order). Indeed, the Court of Appeals' review of this Court's intervention decision would be deferential at least as to factual questions and matters of discretion. *See Defs. of Wildlife v. Perciasepe*, 714 F.3d 1317, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2013); *see, e.g., United States v. Brit. Am. Tobacco Australia Servs., Ltd.*, 437 F.3d 1235, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reviewing district court's denial of intervention for untimeliness only for abuse of discretion). Accordingly, for the reasons Defendants demonstrated in their opposition brief, and the reasons explained below, Defendants respectfully request that the Court promptly deny Proposed Intervenors' motion so that the Court of Appeals would have the benefit of this Court's consideration.

B. Proposed Intervenors Lack Standing or Any Legally Protected Interest

Proposed Intervenors argued in their reply brief that they "have protectable interests in participating in notice-and-comment rulemaking." Reply at 8, ECF No. 177—"a right," they assert, "they were entitled to exercise *before* termination of Title 42 and which the *Louisiana* injunction protects." *id.* at 5. But Proposed Intervenors are protecting their asserted procedural interests by litigating the notice-and-comment claim in *Louisiana v. CDC*. The government continues to prosecute its appeal of the *Louisiana* injunction. Defendants' Notice now also makes clear that the government plans to move the D.C. Circuit to hold the appeal in this case in abeyance pending the Fifth Circuit's decision on the government's earlier-filed appeal of the *Louisiana* injunction. Thus, any interests Proposed Intervenors have in ensuring that the government complies with APA's notice-and-comment requirements in issuing the Termination Order will be protected through that litigation, not this one, where neither the Termination Order nor any procedural requirements for its issuance is in issue. At bottom, this litigation does not "as a practical matter impair or impede [Proposed Intervenors'] ability to protect [their asserted] interest" in participating in notice-and-comment rulemaking as to the Terminator Order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Proposed Intervenors can fully protect that asserted interest in the Fifth Circuit.¹

¹ Even if HHS and CDC later decide to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking of the Termination Order before the conclusion of the appeal or final judgment in *Louisiana v. CDC*, the States would not

The *Louisiana* preliminary injunction by itself, however, does not give rise to any legally cognizable interest in protecting Proposed Intervenor’s procedural rights *in this case*. While the injunction preliminarily enjoins the government from implementing the Termination Order, it does not vest in the States any legally protectable interest in the continuation of Title 42. Nor does it take precedence over relief granted in unrelated litigation concerning different subject matters—here, the validity of CDC’s Title 42 regulation and suspension orders—and without regard to the Termination Order.² Rather, the injunction merely preserves the status quo in *Louisiana v. CDC* pending the government’s appeal of that district court’s ruling that CDC likely should have engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking when issuing the Termination Order. The States in *Louisiana v. CDC* no doubt have the right to enforce that injunction in that case, as Proposed Intervenor sought to demonstrate. *See* Pls’ Reply at 6, 8. But as with any litigant seeking to intervene to defend the Title 42 regulation and orders, Proposed Intervenor must demonstrate that they suffer an injury in fact that is traceable to the vacatur of the operative Title 42 order (or the underlying regulation), which they have failed to do. *See* Defs’ Opp. at 8–14, ECF No. 174.

Proposed Intervenor’s reliance on cases involving the Anti-Injunction Act is misplaced. *See* Pls’ Reply at 3. In *National Basketball Ass’n v. Minnesota Professional Basketball, Ltd. Partnership*, 56 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 1995), the Eighth Circuit concluded that “a preliminary injunction is a protectable judgment under the relitigation exception” in the Anti-Injunction Act. The Act prohibits federal courts from enjoining proceedings and parties in the state courts, unless one of the Act’s three enumerated exceptions, including the “relitigation exception,” applies. *See id.* 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except ... to protect or effectuate its *judgments*.”) (emphasis added). The relitigation exception “permit[s] a federal

be able to claim any impairment of their asserted procedural interests because they will have received all the relief to which they would be entitled if they had prevailed on their notice-and-comment claim.

² Even where two cases between the same parties on the same subject matter are commenced in two different federal courts, the first-filed case may not necessarily take precedence despite considerations of comity and orderly administration of justice. *Handy v. Shaw, Bransford, Veilleux & Roth*, 325 F.3d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have emphasized that the district court must balance equitable considerations rather than using a ‘mechanical rule of thumb.’”) (citation omitted).

court to prevent state litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and decided by the federal court.” *Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.*, 486 U.S. 140, 147(1988). In concluding that this statutory exception was implicated by a preliminary injunction issued by a federal court, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that a preliminary injunction is an immediately appealable “judgment” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) and “confers important rights and finally adjudicates the issue of preserving the status quo until the district court reaches the case’s merits.” *Nat’l Basketball Ass’n*, 56 F.3d at 871.

National Basketball Association does not suggest that the *Louisiana* preliminary injunction gives Proposed Intervenors a legally protected interest in this litigation. No statutory rights granted by the Anti-Injunction Act are in issue, and this case does not “relitigate” the States’ notice-and-comment challenge to the Terminator Order, upon which the *Louisiana* preliminary injunction is issued. Rather, two federal courts are addressing two distinct challenges to two distinct agency actions. The context in which the Eighth Circuit observed that a preliminary injunction confers “important rights,” *see* Pls’ Reply at 3 (quoting *NBA*, 56 F.3d at 871), shows that the observation is wholly irrelevant here. It is therefore not surprising that Proposed Intervenors cite no authority establishing that they have a protectable legal interest in this litigation based on the *Louisiana* injunction.

Nor have Defendants “admitted that the termination of the Title 42 system will cause the States harms,” as Proposed Intervenors claim. Proposed Intervenors’ Suppl. Br. at 3. Defendants have consistently maintained that the States lack standing to challenge the termination of CDC’s Title 42 orders and suffer no legally cognizable harm from termination of those orders. *See* Defs.’ Opp. to States’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. 11–15, *Louisiana v. CDC*, No. 22-cv-00885 (W.D. La. Apr. 29, 2022), ECF No. 40 (arguing that States “lack[ed] standing to challenge the Termination Order” because they could not establish injury-in-fact or traceability). While the *Louisiana* district court disagreed with the government and held that the States had shown a substantial likelihood of standing, the court relied on Fifth Circuit precedent that, as Defendants have explained, it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence. *See* Defs.’ Opp. to Mot. to Intervene at 10–11, ECF No. 174. Accordingly, it remains the case that the Proposed Intervenors lack standing or any legally protected interest in this action.

C. Defendants Adequately Represent Any Interests That Proposed Intervenors Might Have in This Litigation

The Court should reject Proposed Intervenors' contention that the government does not adequately represent their alleged interests. In their motion to intervene, the States contended that their participation in this litigation was necessary because the government purportedly had "abandoned their defense of Title 42," ECF No. 168 at 1, and was not going to "prosecute [an] appeal" of this Court's rulings, *id.* at 16. But the government has filed a notice of appeal, and the government's longstanding position in this litigation remains unchanged: "CDC's Title 42 Orders were lawful, . . . § 71,40 is valid, and . . . this Court erred in vacating those agency actions." ECF No. 179 at 1.

The government's decision to seek a five-week stay of this Court's judgment to allow the Department of Homeland Security time to prepare to implement full Title 8 processing—rather than an indefinite stay pending appeal—does not render the government's representation inadequate. *See Jones v. Prince George's Cnty., Maryland*, 348 F.3d 1014, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (disagreement over litigation approach does not demonstrate inadequate representation). In light of the CDC's April 1 decision to terminate the Title 42 orders as no longer necessary to protect the public health, the government would have been unable to show the kind of irreparable injury from this Court's judgment that would have been necessary to seek a full stay pending appeal. Moreover, in its memorandum opinion and order, this Court stated that it would deny any request for a stay pending appeal, so it would have been futile for the government to seek such a stay from this Court. ECF No. 164. The government's decision not to seek an emergency stay from the D.C. Circuit likewise does not constitute "abandon[ment]" of the government's defense in this case. ECF No. 168 at 1. A stay pending appeal is an "extraordinary remedy" that is not sought as a matter of course. *Cuomo v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm'n*, 772 F.2d 972, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Indeed, the government did not seek a stay from the Fifth Circuit when it appealed the *Louisiana* injunction, and yet the States expressly agreed that the government adequately represented the interests of a proposed intervenor in that case who had sought a stay pending appeal. *See States' Br.* at 111, *Louisiana v. CDC*, No. 22-30303 (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 2022).

The States also contend that the government does not adequately represent their alleged interests because the government plans to move to hold the appeal in abeyance pending (i) the Fifth

Circuit's decision in *Louisiana v. CDC*, No. 22-30303 (5th Cir.) and (ii) the forthcoming rulemaking to replace § 71.40. Proposed Intervenor's Suppl. Br. at 3. As explained above, the government's intent to move to hold the appeal in the D.C. Circuit in abeyance pending the Fifth Circuit's decision in *Louisiana v. CDC* actually allows the States to fully litigate their notice-and-comment claim; they don't need the government to protect that asserted procedural interests here. To the extent the government is seeking an abeyance also because of HHS and CDC's intent to conduct rulemaking, that is not unusual because further regulatory developments could render further litigation unnecessary. See ECF No. 179 at 2 (collecting cases). The government's decision to follow that standard litigation practice here does not mean that the States should be permitted to intervene to pursue a different course in the Court of Appeals. Granting the motion "would allow a third party to intervene not because an agency failed to move for additional review, but because the agency failed to move for review in the third party's preferred way." *Humane Soc'y v. Dep't of Agric.*, --- F.4th ----, 2022 WL 17411257 at *2 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (Tatel, J., concurring).

As the government has explained, Proposed Intervenor's are not proper litigants to defend an arbitrary-and-capricious challenge to a federal agency's decisionmaking. Congress has charged CDC to carry out Title 42's statutory mission of protecting the public health. And Congress has reserved the control of litigation in which the United States or its agencies and officers are parties to the Department of Justice alone. ECF No. 174 at 17–18. In determining whether, and to what extent, appeals will be taken by the government, the Solicitor General, with her "broader view of litigation in which the Government is involved," considers a number of strategic and other factors that are uniquely within the government's expertise and statutory responsibilities. See *Fed. Election Comm'n v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund*, 513 U.S. 88, 96 (1994); see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b). Permitting third parties such as the States to intervene and defend the reasonableness of the government's regulations and orders in cases such as this one would encroach on the government's significant interests in coordinating its litigation involving important federal policies. See ECF No. 174 at 17–18. Indeed, the government's intent to first prosecute the appeal of the *Louisiana* injunction in the Fifth Circuit

reflects that the government is weighing litigation on Title 42 wholistically to advance important statutory interests. Proposed Intervenors should not be permitted to upset that approach.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Proposed Intervenors' motion to intervene.

Dated: December 16, 2022

MATTHEW M. GRAVES, D.C. Bar. #481052
United States Attorney

BRIAN P. HUDAK
Chief, Civil Division

SEAN M. TEPE, DC Bar #1001323
Assistant United States Attorney
601 D Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
Phone: (202) 252-2533
Email: sean.tepe@usdoj.gov

Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

JEAN LIN
Special Litigation Counsel, NY Bar #4074530
Federal Programs Branch

/s/ John Robinson
JOHN ROBINSON, DC Bar #1044072
Trial Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
1100 L Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
Tel (202) 616-8489
Email: john.j.robinson@usdoj.gov

Counsel for Defendants

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

_____)	
NANCY GIMENA HUISSA-HUISSA, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
)	
<i>Plaintiffs,</i>)	
)	
v.)	No. 1:21-cv-00100-EGS
)	
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary of Homeland)	
Security, in his official capacity, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
)	
<i>Defendants.</i>)	
_____)	

PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE CONCERNING INTERVENTION

Pursuant to the Court’s minute order issued December 8, 2022, Plaintiffs respectfully submit this response to the States’ supplemental brief concerning intervention.

Plaintiffs agree with Defendants that regardless of whether Defendants’ notice of appeal would otherwise deprive this Court of jurisdiction to decide the States’ motion, the Court can and should deny the motion on the merits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a)(2). Defs. Suppl. Mem., Dkt. 185, at 3; *see also Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Fed. Election Comm’n*, No. CV 21-406 (TJK), 2022 WL 1978727, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. June 6, 2022); *Voyageur Outward Bound Sch. v. United States*, No. 1:18-CV-01463 (TNM), 2021 WL 1929123, at *2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2021). Plaintiffs likewise agree with the federal government that a decision from this Court by December 15 addressing the States’ motion may facilitate appellate review of the issue, given that the States have asked the Circuit to rule on their intervention motion by December 16, once the appellate briefing concludes at 11:59 p.m. on December 15.

Dated: December 14, 2022

Stephen B. Kang (Bar ID. CA00090)
Cody Wofsy (Bar ID. CA00103)

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Lee Gelernt
Lee Gelernt (Bar ID. NY0408)
Daniel A. Galindo

Morgan Russell*
My Khanh Ngo
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation,
Immigrants' Rights Project
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Tel: (415) 343-0770

Bernardo Rafael Cruz
Adriana Cecilia Pinon
American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Texas, Inc.
5225 Katy Freeway, Suite 350
Houston, Texas 77007
Tel: (713) 942-8146

Tamara F. Goodlette*
Refugee and Immigrant Center for
Legal Education and Legal Services
(RAICES)
5121 Crestway Drive, Suite 105
San Antonio, TX 78239
Tel: (210) 960-3206

Karla M. Vargas
Texas Civil Rights Project
1017 W. Hackberry Ave.
Alamo, Texas 78516
Tel: (956) 787-8171

Omar Jadwat*
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation,
Immigrants' Rights Project
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Tel: (212) 549-2660

Robert Silverman
Irit Tamir
Oxfam America
Boston, MA 02115, Suite 500
Tel: (617) 482-1211

Scott Michelman (D.C. Bar No. 1006945)
Arthur B. Spitzer (D.C. Bar No. 235960)
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of
the District of Columbia
915 15th Street NW, Second Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005
Tel: (202) 457-0800

Blaine Bookey
Neela Chakravartula
Karen Musalo
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies
200 McAllister St.
San Francisco, CA 94102
Tel: (415) 565-4877

Melissa Crow (D.C. Bar. No. 453487)
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies
1121 14th Street, N.W.
Suite 200
Washington, DC 20005
Tel: (202) 355-4471

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
**Admitted pro hac vice*